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2. INDIVIDUAL ABSTRACTS

Stephanie Arel (The National September 11 Memorial & Museum / New York University, USA)
Examining Dread and Denial through a Ricoeurian Lens: Dual Threats to Communal Memorialization

Alongside Joseph Edelheit’s use of the prompt of the law emerging out of Poland in 2018 criminalizing public assertions of Polish responsibility for acts committed by the Third German Reich, this paper will explore motives of such a demand in the field of commemoration of communal trauma. It is worthy to note that the effects of this law reverberated among tour guides and museum employees in Poland where I conducted a series of interviews in July of 2018. In this climate, where a government usurps history to claim or disavow narratives of communal trauma, what is at stake?

Underneath the disavowal of participation in Nazi crimes, Poland’s repudiation of what we are considering “dark memories,” lies Ricoeur’s concept of dread. In this case, dread emerges fueling the mechanism to deny painful historical traumas in order to mitigate their impact and alter meaning. Of what, though, is this dread? Ricoeur asserts that its ontological status replicates a fear that “faces a threat which, beyond the threat of suffering and death, aims at a diminution of existence, a loss of the personal core of one’s being” (Symbolism of Evil, 40). The core of loss (or perceived loss) when something appears antithetical to self-preservation and which a person, culture, even a nation attempts to expunge but which it still possesses, is central to this paper. Similar to what Julia Kristeva calls that which is “abject” to ourselves, this fear of diminution rests in the image of a capable foreigner, a criminal, a particular personality type, even a dying person.

Dread of the abject circulates in the conforming to evil. For instance, Hitler’s response was one to combat his own dread bringing to the fore intention in the sublimation of dread as Ricoeur sees it: “Along with the dread of being stricken, annihilated, there is perception of the movement by which order – whatever order it might be – is restored. That which had been established and which has now been destroyed is re-established. By negation, order reaffirms itself” (43). This first intention apparent in Hitler’s Germany also emerges in the Polish law, where a government which has repeatedly experienced disenfranchisement attempts to reassert order. The paper will show that such order illustrates a notion of penance that rewards “punishment” which is, as Ricoeur writes, directed towards “happiness” (44). This is implicit in archaic dread which Ricoeur makes parallel to ethical anxiety and leads to a third intention – expectation of punishment which has meaning in relation to order leading to “hope that fear itself will disappear from the life of conscience, as a result of its sublimation.” (44). The paper will illustrate that while the sublimation of dread can be useful, when the sublimation tends towards the erasure of memory, what or who is at stake is the human community, whom Ricoeur names as “the guardians of history.”

John Arthos (Indiana University, USA)
A Theory of the Date in Ricoeur and Deleuze

From a few scattered hints, the Canadian philosopher Jay Lampert extracts what he calls “a theory of the date” out of the fourth chapter of Deleuze and Guattari’s One Thousand Plateaus, “Postulates of Linguistics.” Lampert’s distillation of a temporal theme from a few scattered comments is a bold move, since the famous chapter is not about time at all, but about language. Deleuze and Guattari’s quarry there is Lacan’s linguistic theory of the unconscious, although Lampert’s temporal extrapolation is consonant with Deleuze’s extended comments on time in his earlier masterpiece Difference and Repetition. The thematic innovation of One Thousand Plateaus
is to make the date a principle example of what Deleuze and Guattari call the “despotic signifier,” a word that brings hegemonic order to a discourse. The dates they refer to in their exposition are not any dates, but those that have become iconic (July 11, 1789, February 23, 1848, August 4, 1917), and organize our understanding of history, and our historical identity.

I am interested in this Deleuzian theory of the date because it resonates powerfully with the theme of recapitulation that is so important in Ricoeur’s theological writings. There he connects the concept of typology in scriptural studies to the theory of recapitulation, a move that bridges scriptural hermeneutics with Heideggerian phenomenology. Ricoeur develops the theme of typology-as-recapitulation in the exegetical writings, and then incorporates recapitulation in his own narrative theory of time in the third volume of Time and Narrative. What makes recapitulation useful for Ricoeur’s theory of historical time there is that it upsets linear time by reconstituting dates as privileged figures of experience in which the historical record and fictive imagination converge.

We can cross-reference Ricoeur’s theory of the date as recapitulation with the theory of the date as order word in Deleuze and Guattari because structurally they work in virtually the same way. Both take advantage of the potent philosophical concepts of Wiederholung and Nachträglichkeit for their philosophical projects. There is a marked difference of course. Deleuze and Guattari view the recapitulating function of the date through a lens of hermeneutic suspicion; it serves merely as a means of totalizing control of a discursive regime. Ricoeur has a more catholic view of its function, since the date serves to weight the past against forgetfulness, augment the meaning of history for experience, and leverage the insight of temporal distance for the present.

Even as their polemical project drives relentlessly toward the hegemonic deployment of despotic signifiers, Deleuze and Guattari make allowance for the productive use of order words as mechanisms of political resistance, although this is not directly attached to the theory of the date. Their political categories of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization are, mutatis mutandis, strongly analogous to Ricoeur’s mimetic categories of prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration.

My conclusion about the respective theories of the date is that each perspective can benefit from the other. Ricoeur provides a fuller scaffolding for a discursive theory of the date, as well as a rationale for the date’s productive role in the construction of narrative identity. On the other hand, Ricoeur offers only the briefest of acknowledgements of the distorting and totalizing function of recapitulation in his theoretical exposition, so Deleuze and Guattari’s critical treatment can supplement Ricoeur’s theory in this way. An added benefit of this study is that it might help some Deleuze scholars recognize one of the many unacknowledged debts to hermeneutics.

Kyle Bijan Rosen (University of California, Los Angeles, USA)
The Ethics of Poetic Testimony in Arendt, Celan, and Ricoeur

The impulse to tell stories, Ricoeur notes in the first volume of Time and Narrative, is derived from the Aristotelian notion that human lives merit being narrated. This conviction is intensified in the wake of destruction, when historical subjects turn to testimony and other forms of narration in order to configure their experience and give voice to the depth of collective or personal suffering. Noted for their brevity and compactness, the late poems of Paul Celan – who, in addition to being hailed as a seminal post-war poet, was himself a survivor of the Shoah – attest to the ethical primacy of poetic testimony. Teeming with semiotic potentialities, Celan’s poems not only unsettle inherited conceptions of artistic representation; they augment and deepen, by means of
employing calculated semantic deviances, a reader’s disposition in the world (Befindlichkeit). This paper will bring strands of ideas developed in Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative and Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition to bear on a close reading of Celan’s poem “Keine Sandkunst Mehr” (No More Sand Art). Despite a handful of key differences, the discourse on narrative art in Time and Narrative builds upon ideas set forth in Arendt’s lyrical account of memory’s relation to poetry in The Human Condition. Both thinkers probe in similar ways the linguistic density and polysemy of the poem. Unlike Arendt, however, Ricoeur explicitly develops a mimetic framework in which the relationship between the text and its reader is solidified and imbued with ethical significance. It is possible, then, to read Ricoeur’s emphasis on poetry’s ability to “restructure the world of the reader in confronting him or her with the world of the work” in light of Celan’s “Keine Sandkunst Mehr.” Celan’s poem can indeed be considered mimetic to the extent that it restructures a reader’s own elective affinities, but perhaps more importantly, it projects new, perhaps better and more hopeful, worlds that can be metamorphosed into impactful works of our own.

Hsueh-i Chen (National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan)

Memory, Identity, and History between Individuality, Collectivity, and Culturality: Towards a Comparative Study of Paul Ricoeur and Jan Assmann

The question “To what extend does history depend on memory?” is one of the main questions Ricoeur asks in his 2003 book La Mémoire, l’Histoire, l’Oubli. With the same question in mind, Jan Assmann, a renowned German Egyptologist, developed his theory of cultural memory in his book Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination [Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen]. Both Ricoeur’s and Assmann’s theoretical approaches are insightful and seminal in their corresponding and related disciplines—for Ricoeur, hermeneutics, phenomenology, philosophy, and theology; for Assmann, Egyptology, history, and cultural science (Kulturwissenschaft).

Although both Ricoeur and Assmann focus on the nature of memory, they have very different views on what memory is individually, collectively, and culturally made of, and what its reference and relation is to identity and history. On the one hand, Ricoeur refines the theory of memory elaborated by his predecessors in philosophy, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Locke, and Husserl, and therefore relies on the reflexivity of memory for a consciousness of self and on imagination, which are the discussion foci with regard to memory in the philosophical tradition. On the other hand, Assmann develops his concept of cultural memory in the footsteps of French anthropologist and ethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (whose concepts Ricoeur also took into consideration), and differentiates cultural memory from communicative memory. His main questions include: What role does memory play in the formation of cultural identities? What forms of cultural memory exist, and how are they organized? In Assmann’s view, memory is always culturally formed. Cultural memory is not the memory of the past per se, but the conception (Entwurf) of how a community wants to represent itself.

The objective of this paper is to analyze and compare Ricoeur’s and Assmann’s different approaches on the subject of memory, identity, and history, and to highlight their theoretical consequences and influences.
Linda Cox (Austin Community College, USA)

‘How to Begin to Begin Again’: Ricoeurian Innovation and Sedimentation in William Carlos Williams’ Paterson

A peculiar and contradictory impulse seems to be woven into American culture and history: on the one hand, we face the imperative to innovate and to establish new enterprises and communities, but on the other hand, we have an obligation to remember and even repeat those inimitable acts of innovation by telling their stories and writing their histories. For many American modernist writers, writing the history of innovation—tales such as the ‘heroic’ founding events of a community—is itself paradoxical in that historiography seems to petrify and effigize the past while inevitably forgetting or silencing marginalized voices. For poet William Carlos Williams, the question of “how to begin to begin again” therefore requires a new method of writing history, and he explores this possibility in his long poem, Paterson. While most critics of the poem pose the central problem in terms of a debate between modernist and postmodernist impulses, this paper instead considers whether Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic approach to memory and to narrative history is a better way to understand both the problem of American historiography and its potential solution. I briefly examine Ricoeur’s conception of memory as a capacity in Memory, History, and Forgetting and then discuss the three forms of mimesis involved in (communal) commemoration outlined in Time and Narrative, Vol. I. Next, I examine the poem’s treatment of a legendary event of Paterson, New Jersey—the heroic and spectacular leap from the Genesee Falls by America’s first daredevil, Sam Patch—as well as the context in which his story is embedded, the silent leap or fall by a marginalized pastor’s wife, Mrs. Cummings. I argue that it is the practice leap, rather than the commemorated spectacular leap, that is the source of innovation in the poem, but that this knowledge is gained only retroactively by questioning back and exploring the available sedimented stories and their context critically. My conclusion is that Williams’ new method for writing history can be read as Ricoeurian in that he sought to reinvent the metaphor of history not as a petrification but as a sedimentation in which interpretation can shake loose the silenced voices and resettle the historical configuration in new ways. Further, I propose that this new method of writing history suggests that our current configurations, as petrified as they now appear, likewise hold the capacity for more expansive interpretations in the future.

Scott Davidson (Oklahoma City University, USA)

Salvation as Knowledge: Ricoeur’s reading of Plato’s Phaedo

This paper will call attention to two important passages in The Symbolism of Evil that are devoted to Platonic philosophy. This engagement is especially significant because Plato, like Ricoeur, recognizes the profound interrelation between myth and philosophy, between myths and logos. The first engagement takes place in a chapter entitled “The Myth of the Exiled Soul and Salvation through Knowledge” (pp. 279-305), where Ricoeur’s main goal is to demonstrate the influence of Orphic myth on the initial development of ancient Greek philosophy and the philosophical influence on the myth through its rational reconstruction in Neoplatonism. Ricoeur’s second treatment of Plato occurs in a chapter entitled “The Struggle between the Adamic Myth and the Myth of Exile” (especially pp. 336-345), whose aim is to show how the Orphic myth of the exiled soul meshes with the Adamic myth of the fall. There Ricoeur’s account of the exiled soul is based on a schematic reading of Plato’s Phaedo. His reading of the dialogue emphasizes the philosophical transposition of the pre-philosophical Orphic myth. After isolating and clarifying Ricoeur’s interpretation, my assessment will be that it remains unfortunately incomplete. Through a more comprehensive inspection of this dialogue, I will conclude that the incompleteness of
Ricoeur’s reading constitutes a missed opportunity to utilize Platonic philosophy in service of the broader aims of *The Symbolism of Evil*.

Marjolein de Boer (University of Oslo, Norway)
*Melancholy and Mourning in Infertility Treatment*

In his seminal work *Memory, History and Forgetting*, Ricoeur poses an interesting theory on how to overcome melancholy through mourning. By drawing on the work of Freud, Ricoeur argues that the melancholic overcomes her/his lingering in and despairing over the lost past by constructing a new meaning of the lost object through the hermeneutical work of memory. Within this kind of memory work, the melancholic narrates and re-narrates her/his losses until one arrives at an exemplar memory of that past, one that is forward- instead of backward-oriented. In this paper, I take Ricoeur’s theory of mourning as a framework in empirically describing and interpreting women’s experiences of melancholy and mourning in infertility treatment. In doing so, I aim to open up a discussion of melancholy and mourning as a lived and contextually shaped experience within and through which these women make sense of themselves.

In line with Ricoeur’s argument, I will show that these women mourn their losses through remembering, narrating and re-narrating their past. This kind of narrative mourning, I argue, may be understood as a conditional unconditionality: women need to tell their stories in order to mourn, but the hoped-for result of such storytelling – drawing out a memory of the past that constitutes a new and exemplar meaning of the lost object – remains an unconditional surplus of their storytelling. As this logic of the gift inherent in the act of mourning proves to be very difficult for these women, some women in my study ritualize their narrative mourning practice. Through such ritualization, they try to enforce a changed meaning to come about. As such, I argue that women’s mourning practices in infertility treatment can be conceived as a matter of creating and actively awaiting new meaning-making.

At the end of this paper, then, I will reflect on how urgency to grant women in infertility treatment (more) time follows my interpretation of these women’s narrative mourning practices. While the arrival of a new meaning remains a surplus of women’s creating/awaiting efforts in their mourning practice, I argue for the importance of patience, that is, for allowing women time to tell their stories, time to ritualize, and time to mourn.

Michael Deckard (Lenoir-Rhyne University, USA)
*In Limino Primo: A Character in Search of an Author*

Two works were published around the same time: Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another* (1990) and Coetzee’s *Age of Iron* (1990). One is philosophy and one is fiction. Both dealt with loss. Both attempt to heal wounds, personal and political. Eschewing purely biographical narratives, they were attempts to deal meaningfully with children, mothers and fathers. In the first case, Ricoeur dedicates the tragic interlude to Olivier. In the second case, the work is dedicated to Coetzee’s mother, father, and son, all of whom passed away while writing this work. What does this say about narrative identity or the liminality between life and death, fact and fiction, history and character? Utilizing philosophers such as Adriana Cavarero, Louise du Toit, and Stephen Mulhall on narrative and selfhood, and the making and unmaking of the feminine self, I wish to argue that the female narrative of Coetzee’s works are *in limine primo*—in a place that is no-place—a kind of haunting ground (hauntology) of liminal subjects with no real existence. This form of storytelling hits on the real if only through shadows or intimations, that is, a fictive space that provides an
opening onto another world, another way of being in which the plural space of selfhood can be understood. When Ricoeur writes in *Oneself as Another*, “Literature will later give us a striking example of the understanding we have of mental states which are not attributed to anyone or which are suspended from attribution, to the extent that this understanding is the condition for their attribution to fictional characters,” he is describing *l’homme capable* and pointing beyond realism/anti-realism. Both works, *Age of Iron* and *Oneself as Another*, can be read together as attempts at reconciliation with the past and loss.

Brad DeFord (Marian University, USA)

*The Imagination in People with Dementia/Alzheimer’s: A Problem of Remembrance and Recognition*

To address the problem of “remembrance and recognition” in people with dementia/Alzheimer’s we can start with what Ricoeur says in *The Course of Recognition* about “A Phenomenology of the Capable Human Being” (89f). There “capability” consists of “Being Able to Narrate and to Narrate Oneself.” The challenge of “narrative identity” is precisely what people with dementia face.

There are two components to the analysis I propose. One is to consider Ricoeur’s remark in the Preface of that book: “I actively recognize things, persons, myself; I ask, even demand, to be recognized by others.” (x). In this way, people with dementia and those who would care for them face what might be called the relational dilemma of the reciprocity of recognition, focused by the questions: *Who recognizes me when I no longer recognize myself?* And: *What do I do when I am not recognized by someone I love?*

In people with dementia the challenges of recognition are not entirely problems of memory or remembering. They are in many respects more a result of an impingement upon their imagination—as well as a challenge to the imagination of others.

One way to describe this dilemma is to employ a distinction Suzanne Langer makes between the “discursive” and the “non-discursive” imagination. Ricoeur, of course, is a proponent of the former. Langer introduces us to music as an art-based example of the latter.

The reason why this distinction is important to a discussion of the imagination in people with dementia is that while their discursive (word-based) imagination has been impaired by their disease, they remain “capable” human beings in at least this one way: their musical imaginations are still active and available to them. They experience observable re-vitalization through music, whether it be listening, or singing, or even dancing/ movement. To summarize what is essentially the cornerstone of my proposed presentation, Langer says, “The real power of music lies in the fact that it can be ‘true’ to the life of feeling in a way that language cannot; for its significant forms have that *ambivalence* of content which words cannot have.” And: “Music is revealing, where words are obscuring, because it can have not only a content, but a transient play of contents.” (*Philosophy in a New Key*, 243)

Throughout his life, Ricoeur was concerned with aging. In *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, he named Three Sorrows: Finitude, Formlessness, and Contingence (447-456), all of which apply to those with dementia/Alzheimer’s. Moreover, he concludes with an affirmation of Orphism over Stoicism: “Orpheus is the God of the Song.” (474)

Those with dementia/Alzheimer’s may not be able to “narrate” their identities, but they may find them still intact in the “songs” in their hearts. And those who care for people with dementia do recognize them and are recognized by their loved ones through the music they share. Their reciprocity restored by the musical imagination they have in common.
Marc De Leuww (University of New South Wales, Australia)

Ricoeur & “The Uluru Statement from the Heart”: The Politics of Recognition between Remembering, Forgetting and Forgiveness

In May 2017 representatives of 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities from all over Australia gathered at Uluru in Central Australia to discuss a referendum proposal to change the Australian Constitution aimed at recognizing the existence of Aboriginal and TSI as “First Australians” prior to the white European settlement. When the Australian Constitution came into being in 1901 Aboriginal and TSI people were not included due to being considered a “dying race” – this has never been rectified.

At the Uluru convention (which was the culmination of a two-year long process of deliberation among the different Aboriginal and TSI groups) all government proposals were rejected and, instead, the sovereign relation between the groups and their land was reaffirmed in a document called “The Uluru Statement from the Heart”.

The Uluru statement formulates two main objectives: the establishment of a First Nations Voice and a Makarrata Commission. The first objective demands that the Aboriginal and TSI groups be given a permanent “voice” enshrined within the chamber of parliament; the second objective demands a process of truth-telling and agreement-making (following the Yolngu concept of Makarrata which captures the idea of two parties coming together after a struggle to heal the divisions of the past). The current Australian liberal government immediately rejected the Uluru statement as unrealistic and claimed that a permanent Aboriginal and TSI “voice” to parliament was undesirable and undemocratic.

What the Uluru statement and the government’s response makes clear is that for the Indigenous groups recognition anchors foremost in a just form of remembering the past, truth-telling as prior to reconciliation and inclusion perceived as “to be heart” – to be given a “voice”. For the government though the referendum on the inclusion of First Australians in the Constitution itself is perceived as a symbolic act of overcoming that past.

Hence, the Uluru statement reconfigures the “politics of recognition” (as offered by the Australian nation-state) by changing its historical premise: sovereign power over land was never
surrendered, truth never told, reconciliation never established – without a just remembrance recognition in the present has no value.

My paper examines the ‘politics of recognition’ by the Australian government vis-à-vis the request for a just remembrance and institutional “voice” by the First Australians. Their ‘conflict of interpretation’ concerning the relation between remembrance and recognition is analysed through the lens of Ricoeur’s theory of recognition (as developed in The Course of Recognition), and the dialectic between remembering, history, forgetting and forgiveness (as developed in Memory, History, Forgetting). The main aim of the paper is to examine—through the “Uluru Statement from the Heart” and the responses it triggered—how the politics of remembrance and recognition inform our “being with and for others in just institutions” enabling a new ‘state of peace’ (or – if a failure - continuing a state of violence, distrust and suspicion).

María Beatriz Delpech (Universidad Nacional de San Martín and Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Argentina)

*Ideology and Utopia in the Constitution of the Intersubjective Bond and Collective Identity*

This presentation aims to answer Jeffrey Barash’s critical reflection on Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of the intersubjective bond and the constitution of collective memory and identity, based on the reading of *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* and some related essays written during that same period (1975).

As Ricoeur defines them, ideology and utopia are two expression of cultural imagination. His 1976 article “Idéologie et utopie: deux expression de l’imaginaire social” is an inventory of considerations that Ricoeur sought to integrate to his theory as a result of his reading of the young Marx and his rejection of the structuralist interpretation of his theory of ideology. In Marx, he tracked down a fundamental notion of ideology and a concept of *praxis* that included among its structural elements a symbolic mediation. This research set the grounds for the triple mimesis theory that would become central to his philosophy the last thirty years of his life. Not only does he seek to justify his conception on the symbolic element of action but, moreover, through his inquiry on the fundamental functions of ideology and utopia, Ricoeur develops both a process and a dimension in which intersubjectivity, collective identity and collective memory can be conceived. These subjects would become the object of his research especially in *Soi-même comme un autre*, *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* and *Parcours de la reconnaissance*.

In many occasions, however, we find in Ricoeur’s work a leap between the individual and the collective sphere which, in most cases, appears to be not sufficiently justified. In *Soi-même comme un autre*, the French philosopher allows himself to proceed from one level of analysis to the other without further considerations on the construction of the intersubjective bond and the ontological status of collective identities. In *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli*, when examining memory, he takes Husserl’s concept of analogy to justify the relationship between the self and the other and to open the possibility of memory attribution to the first person plural, that is to say, to a collective “we.” In any case, the leap between the individual and the collective remains unclear and it raises more questions than it can possibly answer.

The critical reflection of J. Barash, in many of his papers but mainly in his last book *Collective Memory and the Historical Past*, points out that very imprecision and its challenges. Barash believes that Ricoeur lacks a proper theory of the symbol, which could account for the complex levels of mediation between the personal experience and memory and the collective domain. But Barash’s critical reflections are grounded mainly in –besides *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli*- De
l’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud, from 1965, and Temps et récit, from 1983-85. We believe, however, that we might find the answers to Barash’s objection in the 1975 Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, where Ricoeur outlines a theory of the social imagination that is developed on the grounds of the tension between two functions that imply symbolic mediation, and that does not reduce the unique aspects of communal existence to uniform models of psychic explanation.

Marjolaine Deschênes (Collège Montmorency and Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada / École des hautes études en sciences sociales, France)

*Avec Paul Ricoeur et les féministes du care : élargir la capacité de (se) raconter.*

*Réflexion sur le cas Robert Lepage (spectacles SLÀV et KANATA)*

En juin 2018, lors de la première de SLÀV à Montréal, spectacle de Robert Lepage et de Betty Bonifassi mettant en scène des chants d’esclaves « noir.es » afin de dénoncer l’esclavage sous toutes ses formes, une centaine de manifestant.es se sont opposé.es devant le Théâtre du Nouveau Monde à la diffusion de ce spectacle, parce qu’il ne comptait que deux choristes de couleur noire. Quelles que soient les raisons pour lesquelles le Festival de Jazz de Montréal ait annulé les sept dernières représentations du spectacle, on ne peut nier que plusieurs des manifestant.es avaient pour intention de voir le spectacle annulé, c’est-à-dire, censuré, cela au nom du respect de « leur » histoire.

Il en va autrement de la controverse qui a suivi, portant sur le spectacle KANATA de Lepage et d’Ariane Mnouchkine du Théâtre du Soleil, devant être diffusé à Paris en décembre 2018, et qui s’est vu annulé par ces artistes en raison du retrait de certains promoteurs financiers, cela après la controverse SLÀV et celle s’immisçant dans le dossier KANATA. Pas de censure, dans ce cas-ci, réclamée par les Autochtones du Québec. Mais il faudrait être sourd.es pour ne pas entendre que la demande faite à Lepage consistait encore ici à ce que l’« autre » ne raconte plus l’histoire que l’on dit « nôtre », du moins, pas sans le concours de « notre » voix.

Je tenterai ici d’analyser ces deux conflits à l’aune du concept ricœurien de « fragile identité » (2000) – concept que je distingue, dans l’herméneutique ricœurienne du soi, de celui de vulnérabilité. De fait, ces conflits mettent en jeu le pouvoir du soi de (se) raconter afin d’être reconnu, pouvoir historiquement fragilisé par la domination. Ils ravivent aussi, chez plusieurs Québécois.es, des souffrances liées à la mémoire, à la (non-) reconnaissance du soi, à l’oubli, voire à des processus de pardon (réconciliation) en cours. D’un point de vue ricœurien, considérant les requêtes et reproches faits à Lepage dans ces dossiers, je défendrai essentiellement l’idée selon laquelle l’art, notamment la littérature et le théâtre, s’ils peuvent être les lieux de la sollicitude (1990), n’ont aucun devoir de sollicitude, ni d’ailleurs de mémoire, de reconnaissance politique ou d’imputation éthique sur le plan historique. Cela parce que le discours poétique (métaphorique) se distingue du discours historique (scientifique).

En fait, les controverses autour des spectacles SLÀV et KANATA touchent, au Québec, le problème de l’équité des chances en arts et en culture, pour toute identité collective ayant subi domination.
Or, dans les milieux et pratiques artistiques, quelque chose comme la « discrimination positive » est-il pensable et universellement applicable sans nuire à la liberté de création? Dans quelle mesure les droits culturels et la reconnaissance des identités culturelles (ou de genre) peuvent-ils faire compétition à la liberté artistique, qui se veut universelle? Au chapitre des droits, ne s’agit-il pas d’élargir celui de se raconter, plutôt que de le restreindre?

Geoffrey Dierckxsens (Czech Academy for Sciences, Czech Republic)

*Imagination, Fallibility and Moral Narratives: Fallible Man in relation to Enactivism*

In my paper I propose to examine the significance of *Fallible Man* for contemporary cognitive theory in philosophy of mind, by focusing on the concept of imagination. In *Fallible Man*, Ricœur discusses what he defines as “transcendental imagination,” by drawing on Kant’s idea of imagination. According to this idea, imagination is the cognitive capacity to synthesize knowledge, which we gain from experiences, in order to simulate these experiences. Kant’s idea of representational synthesis has influenced several representational cognitive theories (e.g., Strawson 2007, Fodor 2008). Yet, I will aim to show that Ricœur’s interpretation of transcendental imagination does nonetheless not so much align with representationalism, as it does with enactivism, one of the most significant recent developments in cognitive theory. According to enactivism, knowledge relations are best understood as non-representational, as they result from a direct interaction between the body and the physical world (instead of from a conceptual network made possible by the brain). Although Ricœur refers to images in terms of representations (p. 53) and of representations in terms of cultural meanings and objects (p. xxviii), he stresses that his theory of the knowledge of objects is “by no means completed in a theory of representation” (p.112). Instead of arguing that imagination is part of any kind of functionalistic or representational cognitive theory, Ricœur contends that imagination mediates between embodied affection and cultural meaning (cf., Kearney 2017), between desire and rationality, which relates to lived existence as a whole, and thus not only to mental states as studied by epistemology. For Ricœur, “our body [is] primordially [...] an opening onto the world” (p. 40). In this respect, so I will aim to demonstrate, Ricœur is close – despite the obvious differences in theoretical contexts — to enactivists who understand imagination as an essential part of our cognitive embodied relation with the world (e.g., Hutto and Myin 2017).

I will argue next that understanding Ricœur’s idea of imagination within a theoretical framework that aligns with enactivism has two significant consequences: the first with regard to the interpretation of Ricœur’s own work, and the second with respect to contemporary cognitive theory in philosophy of mind.

1.) Ricœur’s idea of imagination as being part of embodied cognition in *Fallible Man* not only reflects his idea of consciousness as an embodied relation in *Freedom and Nature* (which is connected to *Fallible Man* as part of Ricœur’s project to define a phenomenology of the will), but also to his later hermeneutical writings. More exactly, throughout his writings Ricœur understands consciousness as embodied, i.e., as the interpretation and understanding of cultural and historical meaning, which is not idealistic or representational, but emerges in a direct affective relation with the world and with narratives (cf., his idea of the flesh in *Oneself as Another*). In this respect, there is thus a continuation between his early ‘phenomenological’ writings and his later ‘hermeneutical’ writings, even if the role of narratives is more limited in the early writings and even given that Ricœur does not have one single theory of imagination, but discusses the idea foremost through scattered references in his writings (cf. Taylor 2006, Amalric 2014).
2.) Yet, Ricœur’s emphasis on embodiment also adds to understanding the moral aspects of embodied and enactive cognition, which enactivists are only beginning to explore. If imagination, understood as the cognitive capacity to understand and recount cultural meaning, is central to basic and more complex embodied cognitive relations (e.g., body perception, need, desire and fallibility), this imaginative aspect of embodied cognition also implies a moral aspect, because imagination is influenced by cultural narratives, in the specific sense of the ‘ethico-political’ narratives that are linked to communities and institutions (e.g., the mores of a sub-culture) (cf., *From Text to Action*). By pointing out the moral aspects of cognitive relations, an analysis of Ricœur’s understanding of embodied cognition contributes to contemporary cognitive theory in philosophy of mind.

Joseph Edelheit (St Cloud State University, USA)

*The Humiliation of History*

Paul Ricoeur cogently teaches in “Memory, History, Forgetting.” “The call to remember—the famous Zakhor—hammered home time after time in the Bible is well known to us…but the injunction directed to the transmission of narratives and laws is addressed here, through close relations, to the entire people summoned under the collective name of Israel. The barrier between the close and the distant is abolished; all those summoned are close relations. “Remember, Israel,” says the Shema. The result of this injunction is that “even when not commanded, remembrance is pivotal”…..unlike the dominant conceptions of history among the Greeks, “it was ancient Israel that first assigned a decisive significance to history.” (MHF,pp. 398-399: Yerushalmi/Zakor)

In 2016 the Polish government began a process of legislation that culminated in February 2018 when the President of Poland signed into law a new measure that criminalizes any public statement that “accuses, publicly and against the facts, the Polish nation, or the Polish state, of being responsible or complicit in the Nazi crimes committed by the Third German Reich …” This law defies historical truth and embodies a nationalist discourse of Holocaust Denial. It is certainly not ironic that our meeting’s theme, “Remembrance and Recognition” would incite our Ricoeurian community to consider what our teacher might teach us.

In his eighth study, ‘The Self and the Moral Norm’ of “Oneself as Another” Ricoeur argues: But there is something even worse: in torture, what the tormentor seeks to reach and sometimes—alas—succeeds in destroying is the victim’s self-esteem….What is called humiliation—a horrible caricature of humility—is nothing else than the destruction of self-respect, beyond the destruction of the power-to-act. Here we seem to have reached the depths of evil….the betrayal of friendship, the inverse figure of faithfulness, without being equivalent to the horror of torture, tells us a lot about the malice of the human heart.” (OAA, p. 220)

Ricoeur, the prisoner-of-war, challenges us: “Thus, there is a need for a new imperative telling us to act in such a way that there will still be humans after us.” (TJ, p. 31) We are the guardians of our history and when political and ideological forces combine to dislocate the moral veracity of that history we cannot remain silent. As students of Ricoeur who gather to study and reflect on his teaching, we who now claim his mantle, must engage in both the theoretical and practical issues to responding to colleagues and students to choose challenge the integrity of texts like Jan Gross’ “The Neighbors”. We are reminded of Levinas’ rejoinder, “…the justification of the neighbor’s pain is certainly the source of all immorality.” (CCL, 258).

Using the Polish legislative discourse as a prompt, this paper raises the ongoing issue of historical ownership and responsibility.
Paul Ricoeur seems to overlook the Sabbath in his essay, “Thinking Creation” even though he references Genesis 2-3 as his primary text. “The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array. On the seventh day God finished the work that God had been doing, and God ceased on the seventh day from all the work that God had done. And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy, because on it God ceased from all the work of creation that God had done. Such is the history of heaven and earth when they were created.” (Genesis 2:1-4a) Ricoeur expressly begins his reflection with Genesis 2:4b-3:24, but his omission of the Sabbath is significant.

Ricoeur’s analysis draws upon Jon Levenson’s book, “Creation and the Persistence of Evil”. Ricoeur notes that Levenson argues that “Genesis 1, finds its meaning in an essentially liturgical context as the reference to the Sabbath, which seems indeed to be the organizing pole of this inaugural text, bears witness….If the faithfulness of God to the Covenant is the sole guarantee that God will finally carry the day against the forces of evil, the contribution of human beings to this final victory is the mitzvah—good, right action. The whole of Jewish ethics thus finds itself mobilized as kind of mediation between the fragility of Creation and the persistence of evil.” (TB, p. 59-60)

Abraham Joshua Heschel teaches, “It is, indeed, a unique occasion at which the distinguished word qadosh is used for the first time: in the Book of Genesis at the end of the story of creation. How extremely significant is the fact that it is applied to time: “And God blessed the seventh day and made it holy….The sanctity of time came first, the sanctity of man came second, and the sanctity of space last. Time was hallowed by God; space, the Tabernacle, was consecrated by Moses.” (TS, 9-10)

This paper will put Ricoeur and Heschel in dialogue regarding the Sabbath, holiness, and finally suggest an interpretation for the absence of the Sabbath in Ricoeur’s reflection. Ricoeur concludes his reflection with Rosenzweig noting, “The always-already-there of Creation does not make sense independently of the perpetual futurity of Redemption.” (TB, 67) Rabbinic theology argues that the Sabbath is that “perpetual futurity of Redemption,” a hint of the World to Come, a Messianic promise. Is Ricoeur’s final reference to Rosenzweig also a means of suggesting that though humans are expelled from Eden after discerning moral knowledge, they were textually given a weekly promise of the Ultimate holiness of God’s time?

Solitary confinement is a form of imprisonment in which the prisoner is isolated from any human contact in a separate cell. This confinement can last anywhere from twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day, from days to decades at a time. This practice is used in nearly every prison across North America for reasons such as the prisoner being a “threat” to or being threatened by other prisoners, or as a means to punish the prisoner. In Canada, the existing statutes regarding prolonged solitary confinement were recently ruled unconstitutional by British Columbia’s Supreme Court due to its increased risk of self-harm, suicide and serious psychological harm. However, early this year, the federal government announced it will be appealing the decision (CBC 2018). Because of the current political relevance of this issue, I am here interested in using Ricœurian concepts to examine the practice from a philosophical perspective. Paul Ricœur’s work does not avoid engaging with political and social concerns, including ethics at an individual and societal level. It seems fitting, for that reason, to apply his concepts to the issue of solitary
confinement in an attempt to understand the ethical concerns present in this institutional practice.

In this paper I will argue, using Ricoeur’s notions of self-esteem, capacity, and rehabilitation, that solitary confinement is indefensible on three counts: (1) it denies the guilty party the necessary means for self-esteem by depriving him of others; (2) it results in the loss of a person’s capacity to be a capable and thereby responsible subject; and (3) it is an accelerated process of desocialization which seriously harms any project of reestablishment of the prisoner into society at the end of his sentence. I will raise and reply to a possible objection that Ricoeur would be sympathetic to (one of) the original purposes of solitary confinement, namely, to force the prisoner to confront their own moral guilt.

Vita Emery (Fordham University, USA)

Paul Ricoeur, Normative Narrative Identity, and the Limits of Narrative

Kim Atkins in a 2005 paper, “Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity,” argues that narrative accounts of identity are more “inclusive and exhaustive” than other causal models of identity because “only the narrative model preserves the first-person perspective, which is essential to an ethical perspective” (Atkins, 341). Atkins relies heavily on Paul Ricoeur’s work to give weight to her position that narrative theories of identity are more complete than psychological continuity theories, explaining Ricoeur’s emphasis on his narrative identity model’s ability to capture the ethical component of our being. Thus, in addition to being a good way of understanding human experience, there is a normative component to many narrative theories of identity, including Ricoeur’s. Thinkers like Ricoeur, Atkins and Alasdair MacIntyre, (who I will also discuss in this work) believe that our lives will be better if we are able to put them into narrative form. In this paper, using Atkins claim of inclusivity as a jumping off point, I wish to explore the limits of narrative definition. I will use Catherine Malabou’s work in Ontology of the Accident and The New Wounded to problematize the standard theories of narrative that (often only implicitly) undergird normative theories of narrative identity. Catherine Malabou argues that there are certain traumatic experiences that can cause a temporal rupture in a subject’s life forcing the event itself outside of the memory of the damaged being. According to Malabou, if an event ceases to be found in the curves and ripples of the brain, it should no longer be emphasized as an aspect of that subject’s identity. Here, she calls into question the typical treatments of subject’s who have suffered serious traumas, asking us to re-think a reliance on psychoanalytic interpretation and the tactics of reintegration that this space offers. One implication of her argument regarding the psychanalytic method is that there is something damaging about the use of the narrative form to help a subject make sense of his or her being. When normative narrative structures are used as a hermeneutic for certain subject’s lives it may cause more damage than good. Here, I contend that Malabou’s new wounded should not cause us to throw out narrative theories of identity. Instead we must re-think narrative as a conceptual apparatus. I intend to argue for the benefits of narrative for a subject’s identity but want to explore how we might stretch the definition of narrative to make it a useful concept for a group of subjects, like Malabou’s new wounded, who may not find the standard model applicable. This will force some divergence from Ricoeur and other more teleological models of narrative identity. Yet, I contend that in order for narrative to continue to be a useful concept there must be some limit case for what counts as narrative, such that some of Ricoeur’s basic claims will remain salient.
Gaëlle Fiasse (McGill University, Canada)

*The Incognito of Forgiving Oneself: A Double Aim*

The “incognito of forgiveness” does not only belong to the fields of political and law, since Ricœur has developed an “incognito of forgiveness” for the self. This is a kind of forgiving oneself, one which amounts to endorsing losses. However, this way of relating to oneself must be understood in the light of Ricœur’s statements on forgiveness, which always concerns at least two people: the offender who is able to ask for forgiveness and the victim who receives the request. That is why, *stricto sensu*, forgiving oneself is impossible, because forgiveness requires, at minimum, an intersubjective relationship. However, once the self confronts its own fault, it can do so while succumbing to memory illnesses. In consequence, Ricœur puts forward the idea of an incognito of forgiveness, which likens the work of remembrance and mourning to a form of “generosity”. My goal, here, is to problematize this relationship to oneself by showing that Ricœur does not make explicit whether it concerns the victim or the offender. I believe he has in mind the model of a person who suffers from the suicide of a dear one, and who therefore can at the same time suffer from the loss as well as from guilt, insofar as he is affected by the absence of the deceased, while having the impression that he did not do enough to prevent the irreparable. In light of Ricœur’s writings and his interpretation of Sigmund Freud’s mechanism of mourning, I will question this double aim of the incognito of forgiveness, since it seems to me, to involve the offender and the victim, in a way that has not been clearly set out.

Paolo Furia (University of Turin, Italy)

*Place and Memory between Ricoeur and Human Geography*

This paper aims at showing how the application of the threefold « mimesis » of narrativity to the dialectic of constructing/inhabiting, carried out by Ricœur in the text *Architecture and narrativity*, results in a quite determined conception of Place. Considered both as a garrison for concrete recognition processes and as a living source of collective memory, Place has been targeted by many different interdisciplinar approaches in the last decades. Our objective is to show that Ricœur’s contribution on this topic can be fruitfully put in dialogue with theories and conceptions elaborated within sociology, geography, cultural anthropology and other social sciences.

Firstly, we will recap Ricœur’s position on architecture, by showing how architecture is related to the theme of memory. A building witnesses a past that was there and projects it into the present and the future: by doing so, it helps the local community to establish and perpetuate a shared memory and identity. At the same time, the silent presence of the architectural artifact also implies a work of memory, as the past that gave birth to the building is not there anymore. This leads to the importance of refiguration, considered as the re-generation of a building from a living and present perspective (represented, in architecture, by the needs and the expectations of the inhabitants). The priority of refiguration over configuration brings with it a difference between two kinds of memories: the repetition-memory and the reconstruction-memory. Ricœur sides with the latter one, as long as it can « welcome the new with curiosity ».

Then, we will draw a concept of Place on the basis of Ricœurian conception of architecture. Place can be understood as a delicate balance of forces distributed in space and time, a dense assemblage of mobilities, where nothing can be taken for granted. Ricœur's perspective can be associated to the one fostered by « phenomenological geography », represented by authors as Edward Relph, Edward Casey, Anne Buttimer and, on the critical side of it, Doreen Massey, up to the post-colonial strand of the research in geography. According to this trend, Place is an
inevitable balance between old and new: it is impossible to have a total understanding of it and it is always to the point of evolve, change, or even colonized, ruined, frayed. It necessarily echoes the (mostly conflictual) evolution of human history.

We will conclude by comparing his dialectic of constructing/inhabiting with the one proposed by Heidegger in 1951. In *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger adopts a normative conception of the inhabiting that should govern the act of construction. Hence, he derives a pessimistic attitude towards the present dwellings, condemned as manifestations of the inability to « well inhabiting » typical of modern age. Heidegger’s approach leads towards a sort of cultural particularism connected to the recasting of some « spirit of the Place », which is not compatible with the phenomenological account of the Place.

Guido Gorgoni (University of Padova, Italy)

*Responsibility, Recognition, Vulnerability: The Dialectical Constitution of the Self as a Subject of Rights and as a Responsible Agent*

This paper aims at considering the dialectical relationship in Ricoeur’s thought between the Self and the Subject of Rights. The identity of Subject of Rights is that of the homme capable (*l’homme agissant et souffrant*); nevertheless this does not imply a reduction of one figure to the other one. At the opposite, not only for Ricoeur the identity of the subject of rights is to be constructed along that of the self, that is through the different levels of attestation of the capacities (see *The Subject of Rights in The Just 1*), but on the other side the Self, as Ricoeur claims, do attain its highest level of constitution as a Subject of Rights (see *The Course of Recognition*).

I wish to deepen the implications of this latter line of thought. Two movements have to be considered in this dialectical construction of the Subject as a “veritable” Subject of Rights. In the movement going from the Subject of Rights to the Self, Ricoeur meets the reflections of Lon Fuller on “inner morality” of the Law (*The Morality of Law*, 196, chap 1). The idea behind this approach, in sum, is that it is not possible to give a fully formalistic account of the law and of legal subjectivity. Despite this anti-formalistic stance, Ricoeur is not claiming for the prevalence of the “natural” Self over the legal one, but he is more interested in considering the subject under the perspective of the action, in a prospective and proactive manner, rather than under that of being, i.e. under the perspective of the imputation of rights, duties and responsibilities. On the other side, in *The Course of Recognition* Ricoeur states that it is only as a fully constituted subject of Rights that the Self acquires its highest signification, thus becoming a “true” or “full” or “real” Subject of Rights.

Where the first movement form the Subject of Rights is placed under the sign of the (revised) idea of responsibility, the reciprocal one is placed under the idea of recognition, meeting the reflections of Axel Honneth on the intersubjective constitution of the legal-political subject left open by Modernity. If the autonomous Self becomes a fully responsible agent only when it is constituted as an active and proactive agent taking responsibility for somebody else, nevertheless the “veritable” Subject of Rights can suffer *misrecognition* (Honneth, 1996), as the reciprocal parcours from *you* to *everyone* and back (in the specific situation) cannot be taken for granted, as expectations of recognition are at risk to be disappointed, whether by hazard or on purpose. This *vulnerability to misrecognition* becomes therefore a definitional trait of the identity of the Self as a Subject of Rights and can be overcome only on the plan of action and responsibility.


In November 18, 2016, Ferdinand E. Marcos—a dictator who committed numerous human rights abuses, acquired massive hidden wealth, and exercised an iron hand in the Philippines for 20 years—was buried with honors in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (Heroes Cemetery), after an intense push by the Duterte administration. The burial was met with wide indignation, especially among the millennials, but soon waned as the dead remained buried and the stories of torture, summary killings, ill-gotten wealth, and abuse of power faded away from the public consciousness.

Six months later, in May 11, 2018, the Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling, effectively put the Judiciary under the control of the Executive. With majority of lawmakers in the Legislative branch subservient to the wishes of the President, the Philippines technically entered into a de-facto dictatorship. Meanwhile, the killings under the Duterte administration’s War on Drugs continue unabated with suspected drug addicts and their families from poor communities subjected to arrest, imprisonment, and death without due process; prominent individuals who were previously charged with plunder and corruption and for drug dealing were released and their cases dropped for purportedly “lack of evidence”; the independent commission tasked to recover the Marcos ill-gotten wealth was transferred to the Executive branch and legal cases against the Marcoses were no longer pursued; and those who dared to criticize the government, for human rights abuses, including the media, are harassed, persecuted, imprisoned, or removed from office. In addition, the current Vice President, Leni Robredo, is in danger of being replaced by Bongbong Marcos, the son of the deposed dictator, who lost the elections but has successfully moved for a recount that has the Election Tribunal ruling that some votes of Vice President Robredo cannot be counted. It is reminiscent of the martial law years of the Marcos era. Duterte himself has repeatedly said that the former strongman Marcos was “the best president ever” and, at one time, even denied the existence of human rights abuses under Marcos’ martial law.

Drawing from Ricoeur’s reflections on the use and abuses of memory and forgetting, and his emphasis on costly forgiveness, this paper traces the trajectory of selective and distorted memory, forgetfulness, and cheap forgiveness that resulted in the Marcos burial in the Heroes cemetery, leading to historical revisionism and the promotion of a culture of impunity, human rights abuses, intolerance for dissent, and abuses of power under the Duterte administration. It proposes that, consequently, “remembering rightly” is an important factor in resisting the structural consolidation of one-man rule that the Duterte administration is aggressively and relentlessly pursuing.
One of the distinctive features of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is his attempt to mediate between the theology of the Word (as found in Barth, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, and the New Hermeneutic of Ebeling and Fuchs) with a phenomenology of the sacred (such as one finds in Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade). In other words, it is a matter of mediating between proclamation of the kerygma and the manifestation of the sacred. According to Ricoeur, both are essential aspects in understanding religion and revelation. My paper will examine the convergence and eventual divergence of these lines in thinking in Ricoeur’s work, showing how it develops through different stages of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics of religion.

Part 1 will examine the role of Barth and Eliade in *The Symbolism of Evil*. Barth’s strongly antimetaphysical, critical approach to philosophy governs *The Symbolism of Evil*, both in its methodology and in its Reformed understanding of sin and the superabundant logic of grace. Yet this Word-centric focus was tempered by Eliade’s influence on the book’s methodological orientation toward symbols and myths, which are the means by which the human being relates to “fundamental reality,” which manifests itself as the sacred.

Eliade became a key figure in Ricoeur’s approach to the phenomenology of religion, but Ricoeur also notes in a tribute to Eliade that his work in *The Symbolism of Evil* was still a very historicist approach to the phenomenology of religion. Ricoeur later credited Eliade with liberating him from his “too exclusive” dependence on Barth. Part 2 will examine how this played out in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of religion, first in *Freud and Philosophy* and then in the essay “Manifestation and Proclamation,” where Ricoeur presents a less historicist view of religious symbols, but instead of these symbols as “the manifestation in the sensible—in imagination, gestures, and feelings—of a further reality, the expression of a depth which both shows and hides itself.” In the latter essay Ricoeur attempts to mediate between this concept of revelation as manifestation and the kerygmatic concept of revelation as proclamation of the Word.

Part 3 will then examine Ricoeur’s treatment of these two lines of thought in his hermeneutics of religion in the 1990s. His 1992 essay “The Entanglement of Voice and Writing in Biblical Discourse” presents one of his clearest statements about the relation between the divine Word and the human word, but without the mediation of the sacred. In subsequent years, in several texts from the mid- to late-90s, Ricoeur also appears to give priority to revelation as manifestation of what he calls the “Fundamental.” In these texts it is unclear what role the kerygmatic Word still plays in Ricoeur’s account of revelation, as the Word starts to seem like a species of manifestation. Thus my conclusion will ask whether this view of the Fundamental signals a shift toward a more impersonal, immanent conception of revelation.

Arguing for a profound thematic unity between the two thinkers, Vanessa Rumble maintains that both Kierkegaard and Ricoeur “try to steer clear of the grandiose pretensions of speculative philosophy, focusing instead on the ramifications of finitude for questions such as the nature and possibility of self-knowledge, the extent of human freedom, and the exigencies of the understanding.” This would lead us to consider whether there perhaps exists a larger agreement, and perhaps a philosophical continuity, between the two thinkers.
That Ricoeur had some definite interest in Kierkegaard beyond the more general aspects and themes that are present in many texts that carry a Christian existential undertone is apparent in Ricoeur’s admission – made distinctly from the two quite well-known 1963 essays discussing Kierkegaard – that in terms of his early (albeit also lasting) interest in philosophical anthropology, Kierkegaard should be acknowledged as a source of philosophical support for him: “it is perhaps Kierkegaard who gets closest to the initial intuition of our inquiry.” In the light of “the problem of the inner disproportion within human beings or of their antinomical structure, wherein they find themselves distended between an infinite and a finite pole” in particular, Ricoeur’s stance is strikingly Kierkegaardian—this is clear from Ricoeur’s brief commentary of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death.

Upon focusing more closely in Ricoeur’s use of Kierkegaard in his early texts, the question offers itself as why Ricoeur scholarship has largely remained uninterested in exploring the apparent connection between the two thinkers. Given the almost absolute lack of references to Kierkegaard (only twice, both in passing) in the large collection of essays in the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Ricoeur, it is safe to state that in the eyes of larger Ricoeur scholarship Kierkegaard has not been considered formative for Ricoeur’s thought, or having even had some general importance to Ricoeur’s philosophical project. Such observation would also be warranted by the fact that neither is Kierkegaard present in Charles E. Reagan’s Paul Ricoeur: His Life and His Work nor in Reflection and Imagination: A Ricoeur Reader (edited by Mario J. Valdés).

Keeping an eye on Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology in particular, this paper will complement this relative lack of scholarship by mapping out Ricoeur’s explicit affinity with Kierkegaard in his early, formative texts. The specific aim of this paper—that relates to a previous presentation on Kierkegaard’s overall presence in Ricoeur’s work – is to “remember” the origins of Ricoeur’s thought by recognizing his early use of some crucial aspects of Kierkegaard’s work. In spite of not having been seen as a major influence for Ricoeur’s thought, it is possible to construe a Kierkegaardian anthropology in Ricoeur’s early work that, I claim, is firmly present in Ricoeur’s anthropological thought as a whole. While I will in the end pay special attention to the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary—or that of finitude and the infinite—I will also present an overview of Ricoeur’s philosophy of wagers as a reflection of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of the leap.

Gregory Hoskins (Villanova University, USA)
Consolidating Democracy: Social Imaginaries, Common Sense, and Communities of Memory

With the recent publication of the 1985 Ricoeur and Castoriadis radio dialogue, there is renewed interest in Ricoeur’s work on the themes of ideology/utopia and of the social imaginary. (That interest informed the contributions by Suzi Adams and George Taylor at the 2017 SRS Conference at Boston University.) In my contribution to the 2018 SRS conference I propose to exam the contribution Ricoeur’s work on these themes can make to discussions in political history and political theory concerning common sense, sensus communis, as the ground of democratic political life, and on the roles of memory in communal/political identity formation and maintenance. To anchor my examination, I will reflect on the resonance of Ricoeur’s work with Sophia Rosenfeld’s political history of common sense and with W. James Booth’s examination of the constitution and maintenance of communal identity over time and the potential of the past to help realize a just, pluralistic, multicultural, democratic future.

In Common Sense: A Political History Rosenfeld contends that since Thomas Paine published his influential pamphlet Common Sense in 1776 that trust in common sense as the shared faculty of judgment and the judgments that result from the common exercise of that faculty has become –
in the context of democratic politics itself – common sensical. Without summarizing all of Ricoeur’s work on ideology and utopia, it suffices to recall that Ricoeur argue the healthy modality of ideology concerns itself with the past, the history of a group, and it has the ability to “pattern, to consolidate, [and] to provide order to [any] course of action” that the group might undertake, and further that, “Ideology is the discourse itself of the imaginary constitution of society.”¹ What I contend using Ricoeur’s work is that the [always plural, controversial, and contestable] social imaginary is the imagination of the sensus communis, of democratic common sense.

In Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice, Booth is concerned with how to understand the persistence of group identity over time – the ways in which the past determines the present senses of group identity – and the possibilities of holding groups responsible for not only their present actions but for their past actions. One of the most innovative features of Booth’s work is that he argues that shame – the inherited, and therefore passively received, debt or responsibility for a past failure, suffering suffered or suffering inflicted – is a necessary category with which to understand political identity. Booth argues – rightly, I think – that liberalism’s commitment to mechanisms of choice, of consent, its dependence on universal, basic principles such as rights, formal equality, etc. and its consideration of the future benefits of communal life as the locus of political identity renders it particularly ill-suited to accommodate or account for role of memory in political identity formation and maintenance. “Memory,” Booth argues is “(as a concept of identity) deeply particularizing.” I think Booth is right that there is an irreducible tension between Liberalism’s universal basic principles and the “particularizing” role that memory plays in the formation of political identity. Nonetheless, I think Ricoeur offers us the resources to mediate this tension. With Ricoeur I will argue that although memory defines, and thus distinguishes groups one from the other, it is also a means by which groups can be brought together in mutual understanding and sympathy.

Cristal Huang (Soochow University, Taiwan)

Paul Ricoeur’s ideas in Between Re-cognition and Re-figuration: Toward a Method of Philosophical Counselling

The practical relevance of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy to everyday questions in life is one reason why many of us find him to be one of the most important philosophers today. In this paper, I will focus on his conception of threefold mimesis from Time and Narrative and its relation to idem and ipse in The Course of Recognition.

Following Augustine’s approach to the question of time and Aristotle’s account of emplotment, I would like to examine how the third level of mimesis, or refiguration, is arguably involved in self-re-cognition and self-reformation. On this view, the whole of threefold mimesis is a kind of re-building and re-questing process of life. That is to say, re-figuration is a re-building and re-questing for the idem and ipse of identity. We can see this when linking Ricoeur’s account of re-connaissance, or re-cognition, to refiguration. The imitative process of mimesis thus turns out to be a possibility of re-birth, or a new understanding of ourselves and the world.

The paper will conclude by looking at how Ricoeur’s theory of mimesis and recognition is relevant to the practice of philosophical counseling in Taiwan, with specific reference to refiguring the memory of certain questions in our daily lives.

In this paper, I examine Paul Ricoeur’s account of forgiveness in *Le mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* (2000; Eng. 2004) in relation to some perplexing questions concerning the role of *creative imagination* in his later thought beginning with the period of *Time and Narrative* (Vols. I-III, 1983-85; Eng. 1984-88). George Taylor recently raised these questions in an essay on the 1985 Radio France broadcast of a discussion between Paul Ricoeur and Cornelius Castoriadis, titled “Dialogue on History and the Social Imaginary” (recently published in French and English). The central issue in the Radio France dialogue is whether there can be a radically creative imagination at work in the social imaginary, one in which new social rules and institutions are created *ex nihilo*, as something “absolutely new” or a “radical otherness.” Can imagination be radical in the sense that it is a self-institution, *ex nihilo*, and not merely a productive reconfiguration of past paradigms, meanings, and rules of action? Can the social imaginary “shatter” previous paradigms and institutional patterns and institute something radically new in society? Near the outset of the dialogue, Ricoeur apparently rejects the possibility of a radically creative imagination operative in the social imaginary in favor of a *productive imagination*, in the Kantian sense, along the lines he develops and deploys all throughout his theories of metaphor, narrative, and meaningful action of the 1970s and 80s. In this view, imagination always draws upon the pre-configured symbolic mediation of action and pre-instituted forms of society even as it produces something novel, a new configuration. Productive imagination is creative, producing something new, but not in the sense of a radical creation *ex nihilo*.

Drawing upon key textual passages and arguments in *Le mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* in the section on “Forgetting” in Part III (“The Historical Condition”) as well as the Epilogue (“Difficult Forgiveness”), I will argue that Ricoeur does find a place for creative imagination, and we can see this at work in his analyses of “the forgiveness equation” (the correlation of the two speech acts: the avowal of evil and the hymn of forgiveness, the depth of fault and the height of forgiveness) and “impossible” but practically possible, though “difficult,” event of forgiveness. In short, I will argue that forgiveness puts the agent in touch – through a radical, pre-empirical affection of the self’s existence (effort to exist) – with “natality,” to use Arendt’s term, or the “original causality” of the “original affirmation,” in Nabert’s reflexive philosophy, that allows the unbinding of the agent from his or her evil action and the regeneration of the original affirmation. This “unconditional” event then funds the narrative imagination (binding and unbinding) as a necessary condition for the well-functioning of the social imaginary and the realization of the wish for the good life with and for others in just institutions. I will argue that we should connect what Ricoeur maintains about the “inscription-affections” in the “reserve of forgetting” with this pre-empirical regeneration of original affirmation. I suggest that a clue to the puzzle about creative imagination can be found in Ricoeur’s reference (in the 1985 dialogue) to Freud’s notion of an “after-effect” (*après-coup, Nachträglichkeit*), or what Ricoeur also calls “retroaction.” I will argue that an analysis of this uncanny temporality structure is necessary to identify the possible role of the creative imagination in the later thought of Ricoeur and Memory, History, and Forgetting. Based on these connections, I will provisionally posit a profound continuity in Ricoeur’s thinking about the creative imagination from 1975 through his later thought.

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In his critical essay, George Taylor discerns a possible and perhaps puzzling shift in Ricoeur’s views on the possibility of a creative imagination at work in the social imaginary (or the symbolic mediation of human action) between the unpublished 1975 Lectures on Imagination\(^2\) and the 1985 Radio France discussion with Castoriadis. Citing numerous examples from the Lectures, Taylor contends that Ricoeur seems to affirm the possibility of a creative imagination as well as the productive imagination operative in the social imaginary. In the Radio France dialogue, on the other hand, Taylor observes that “Ricoeur grants positive weight to the productive but not to the creative imagination. He finds the notion of creation to relate more to the powers of a ‘foundational sacred’, while a productive imagination relates to our inextricable existence within an institutional order (Dialogue, 4),” and also that “Ricoeur here relates the creative imagination to a religious origin, as he does not do so elsewhere.”\(^3\) If I understand correctly, Taylor’s question is whether there can be found a positive role for creative imagination proper to the social imaginary (or the symbolic mediation of action). In other words, the operation of creative imagination is not restricted solely to the realm of the sacred imaginary. Taylor suggests elsewhere (“Prospective Political Identity,” p. 130) that, at the time of Time and Narrative, vol. 1 (i.e., in the same period as the Radio France dialogue), Ricoeur seems to privilege a description of narrative as ‘concordant discordance’ or as a ‘synthesis of the heterogeneous’ (citing Ricoeur 1984, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 66). This is significant because the theory of threefold mimesis (prefiguration, configuration, refiguration) comes to encompass the earlier theory of the symbolic mediation of action (including the dialectic of ideology and utopia, institutions, and meaningful action in general) of the 1970s.

Taylor’s worry is that the emphasis on “concordance” seems to exclude a role for a creative imagination. The emphasis on “configuration” in threefold mimesis seems too conservative, in the sense that it forecloses a “figuration” that creates a “significant break” with the past and a “significant redirection” of the future, an operation of the imaginary operative, in Taylor’s view, in Ricoeur’s idea of utopian imagination in the dialectic of ideology and utopia. Taylor employs the term “transfiguration” to capture the sense of an operation of creative imagination midway between that of a creative imagination ex nihilo (in Castoriadis’s sense) and productive imagination that places the emphasis too much on “configuration” and continuity with the past.

“As I shall argue in part three, then, the critical differentiation between productive and creative imagination does not rest upon whether we place ourselves within Ricoeur’s framework of the symbolic mediation of action and the social imaginary. The dividing line is whether we permit a more robust sense of the transfiguration - the break, the rupture, the newness - that may occur within this framework of figuration. An absolute break with the past is not possible, but a significant break; a significant point of redirection may be. As I shall also pursue in the next part, this contention in favour of the creative imagination may readily draw upon arguments in Ricoeur’s corpus that are not attended in the present dialogue or in works such as Time and Narrative.”\(^4\)

Transfiguration would place the emphasis on break, rupture, and newness, rather than concordance, so it does not fit within Ricoeur’s restrictive sense of productive imagination used in the Radio dialogue.

I take Taylor’s incisive textual analyses of Ricoeur’s usage of the terminology of creative imagination (vs. productive imagination) in the periods of the Lectures on Imagination (and Lectures on Ideology and Utopia) and the period of Time and Narrative (and the Radio France dialogue) as an invitation for researchers to investigate possible indications in Ricoeur’s later work

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\(^3\) “On the Cusp,” 30.
(i.e., *post Time and Narrative*) for the operation of a creative imagination similar to Taylor’s notion of transfiguration. The other question is whether the shift in terminology can be explained by arguing that the problematic has been swept up into a larger framework. In my proposal, I think we can find an example -- albeit a very complicated one - in his treatment of “difficult forgiveness” in the “Epilogue” to *Memory, History and Forgetting*. If we place the function of “transfiguration” on a spectrum between, on one end, a radically creative imagination (understood as creation ex nihilo, sacred foundation, in a limit-concept sense) and, on the other, a productive imagination that emphasizes concordance over discordance, I think we can align all three functions with different levels of Ricoeur’s argument in the *Epilogue*. In effect, I will argue Ricoeur gives a solution similar to Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason, upon which he builds his concept of initiative that he offers as a solution to the aporias of ascription in *Oneself as Another*. This makes sense, since he talks about initiative as a “new beginning” in time but not an “absolute beginning” of time. In his argument about forgiveness, my proposal is to see the two senses of beginning (relative new beginning, absolute beginning; transfiguration, creation ex nihilo) as in a dialectical relation and productive tension that we can trace back to Nabert’s idea of original affirmation. This needs to be spelled out in detail. I hope to sketch this out, at least in part, in the conference presentation.

Laura Kassar (Université de Montréal, Canada)

*Y a-t-il un « récit historique »? Re-description du réel et re-composition du passé chez Paul Ricoeur et Annie Ernaux*

Nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette communication, de nous servir des outils herméneutiques développés par Paul Ricoeur dans les deux premiers tomes de *Temps et Récit* (1983 et 1984) pour interroger les tensions constitutives qui se trouvent aux fondements de la relation aporétique entre historiographie et fiction. Si une distinction épistémologique entre récit historique et récit fictif paraît d’abord aller de soi, la proximité posée par Ricoeur entre la figure de l’historien et celle du narrateur nous enjoint à tirer le constat suivant: la relation entre histoire (avec sa prétention à l’objectivité toujours déçue) et fiction (avec la présence assumée de son narrateur) est fondée sur l’ambiguïté, au terme d’une opération que Ricoeur nomme la *référence croisée*.

Nous aimerions dès lors nous demander : la manière dont nous nous rapportons, ou dont nous re-composons le passé réel, diffère-t-elle radicalement de la manière dont nous *composons* le passé fictif ? L’historien, comme le narrateur, doit en effet supposer « ce qui se serait passé ». En sachant que pour Ricoeur le langage opère une véritable re-*description* du réel au niveau « ontologique », nous sommes en droit de nous demander si « penser l’histoire » n’impliquerait pas toujours inévitablement de *se penser* dans l’histoire – et donc, à chaque fois, de teinter l’Histoire de son histoire. Le contrat de « neutralité » historiographique – dont l’une des marques est l’emploi impersonnel de la troisième personne grammaticale – ne serait-il pas en effet subtilement rompu de par le caractère *raconté* de l’histoire elle-même?

The aim of this paper is to grasp the similarities and differences between the concepts of freedom for Spinoza and Ricœur. Whether freedom is related to a will of action or just a will of perception, is one of the main questions that guides this essay.

For Spinoza, the problem of freedom consists in having an idea about an adequate cause, which he defines in the third part of his Ethic (1677): “By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived”. When an idea of an adequate cause arises, the affected one can understand the affection with all its parts. And because of that global comprehension, freedom can take place. Perceiving why and how something is happening and in which way it is affecting oneself, is what determines the degree of freedom. This paper is going to refer to Spinoza’s point of view as freedom of perception.

According to Ricœur, the problem of freedom is solved in a philosophical matter. For him, freedom is the power of acting, of performing, of thinking in a context with a limited field of action. This limitation of mankind is not a problem of freedom for Ricœur. For him, the difficulty of the problem is a different one: the responsibilities all actions carry.

Is it possible to conciliate these two ways of understanding freedom? With this paper, I want to interpret Ricœur’s ethic and his concept of freedom through the statements Spinoza offers to that matter. I will try to show how both ideas can not only work together but collaborate to build a more complete concept. But the purpose of this paper is not only to conciliate both philosophers but also to show how the ideas of Spinoza enrich Ricœur’s work. It will attempt to show how Spinoza’s freedom of perception helps build the bridge between the ethic and ontology in Ricœur’s philosophy. On one hand by showing that the responsibility of an action can be explained by its motivations (why) and also by its causes (how). On the other hand by displaying that selfhood for Spinoza affects others and can be reflected in the figures of otherness that Ricœur presents in his book Oneself as another (1990).

I would like to examine Ricœur’s idea that justice “overcomes” vengeance. The question I have in mind is whether justice, in its overcoming of vengeance, entails the abolishment or alleviation of the residue of vengeance – namely, the use of violence – in practices of justice.

I approach the question first by reconstructing Ricœur’s relevant ideas, usually scattered or oriented towards other problematics, into an integral and thematic account. First, I show that justice overcomes vengeance in three aspects: creating a distance between the transgression and the reprisal; transferring conflicts from the plane of violence to that of language and discourse; facilitating recognition of and by the victim as well as the offender.

Second, I examine why vengeance has to be overcome by justice. The argument can be formulated either extrinsically or intrinsically to the concept of vengeance. Extrinsically, humanity, or morality in particular, prompts us to proceed from vengeance to justice, because the process of justice (e.g. a trial) puts an end, at least in principle, to the course of action and reaction. Also, the procedures
of justice give both parties a chance to be heard, so that the mutual misunderstanding of the adversaries is reduced as much as possible. Moreover, justice reestablishes reciprocity for the victim and for the offender, so that their self-esteem can be rehabilitated and they can be reincorporated into the society.

Intrinsically, vengeance demands to fulfill some aims (e.g. balance and reciprocity) but fails to do so actually, while justice fulfills those aims more properly than mere vengeance. Vengeance makes sense only when it establishes a bilateral, quasi-discursive relationship between the adversaries, but in fact it ends up being unilateral. Justice, on the other hand, is fully reciprocal. Also, vengeance aims to resume a balance, but fails to do so because the retaliation is yet another disturbing offense, while justice resumes that balance in a more careful way.

Finally, I argue that 1) justice, given over to itself, does not entail abolishment or alleviation of violence in punishment, but 2) when allowed to develop further, justice is motivated by the logic of superabundance to reduce residual violence in practices of justice. This argument is based on a Hegelian interpretation of Ricoeur’s expression “given over to itself”. Whenever one assumes an “inside” and an “outside” of the concept of overcoming, one easily ignores the dynamicity of becoming of the concept and reduces it to a static realm with definite borders. The practical consequence of this ignorance is the belief that it is absolutely just to remain in a definite version of justice, to stick to certain institutions of justice. On the contrary, if the concept of overcoming is allowed to develop further, it will let itself be illuminated by the logic of superabundance, so as to constantly become even more just.

Steven Mailloux (Loyola Marymount University, USA)  
Symbol, History, Dialogue: Encounters between Paul Ricoeur and Gaston Fessard  

In his 2014 article “De la poétique de l’amour à la dialectique homme-femme,” Alain Thomasset sets out to compare Paul Ricoeur and Gaston Fessard on the question of structural recognition. In so doing, Thomasset stages what he calls “a fictional dialogue between the two authors.” I would like to supplement Thomasset’s insightful essay by describing the actual historical dialogue between those same authors as they interacted in a series of conferences during the 1960s. Where Thomasset focuses on the way Fessard’s social anthropology effectively addresses certain unresolved tensions within Ricoeur’s The Course of Recognition, I will take up their arguments over the truth of myth, symbol, and history within the contexts of Christian theology, German hermeneutics, and Cold War politics. For example, in a 1962 Conference at the University of Rome on “Demystification and Image,” Ricoeur and Fessard both delivered papers on the hermeneutics of the symbol. Fessard used passages from the second volume of Ricoeur’s Finitude and Culpabilité to begin his paper and elaborated on Ricoeur’s claim that the “greatness of myth” is that “it has more meaning than a true history.” In the discussion following Fessard’s talk, Ricoeur challenged Fessard’s over-reliance on Hegelian dialectic. Fessard responded by saying, “I know Hegel a little and appreciate him a lot; but I think myself anti-Hegelian as well.” The Jesuit then made reference not only to the Hegelian dialectic of Master and Slave but to the anti-Hegelian dialectic of Before and After in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, both of which he valued in developing his political theology and his past comments on international relations. The following year in a Rome conference on “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” Fessard presented a paper examining the relation of obedience and interpretation. In discussion Ricoeur commented extensively on Fessard’s argument, zeroing in on their disagreement over the contemporary relevance of the traditional hermeneutics of Christianity. Fessard and Ricoeur continued their dialogue at later meetings throughout the decade, including Rome conferences in 1965 on “Demythization and Morality” and in 1967 on “The Myth of Punishment.” After discussing the
most prominent issues in these historical encounters, I will conclude by relating them to the fictional dialogue staged by Thomasset on the question of recognition.

Greg McKinzie (Fuller Theological Seminary, USA)
Ricoeur and Theological Interpretation of Scripture

Paul Ricoeur has been a significant interlocutor for the recent movement in Christian biblical hermeneutics known as theological interpretation of Scripture. Concepts such as second naïveté, distanciation, and the surplus of meaning have helped theological interpreters escape the stranglehold that historical-critical methods have had on biblical studies. Furthermore, the narrative construal of the biblical canon, on which Ricoeur had a decisive influence, has become an indispensable dimension of theological interpretation. Yet, two related issues complicate theological interpreters’ relationship with Ricoeur. First, for the majority of his career, Ricoeur purported to “suspend” faith as he engaged in the philosophical reflection that has proven so fruitful for theological hermeneutics. Theological interpreters, by contrast, generally understand the attempt to bracket faith as not only impossible but methodologically inimical to the kinds of committed reading it advocates. Second, by extension, theological interpreters are often suspicious of general hermeneutics that tend to reduce Scripture to mere text, in contrast with the church’s confession regarding the nature of Scripture as the word of God. Thus, whereas Ricoeur thematizes the relationship between general hermeneutics and regional hermeneutics in such a way as to preserve the integrity and autonomy of theological hermeneutics, theological interpretation of Scripture questions the corollary claim that general hermeneutics functions autonomously. This essay will explore these tensions and suggest how Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology and theological interpretation of Scripture might be understood as mutually beneficial.

Todd Mei (University of Kent, UK)
Clarifying the Role of Intentionality in Ricoeur’s Theory of Action: A Reflection on Derrida, Searle, and Ricoeur

While speech act theory (i.e. Austin, Searle) called into question the primacy given to the analysis of statements in analytic philosophy by showing that meaning and reference are not confined to assertions about what is (i.e. constatives), the debate between Derrida and Searle brought into focus a second philosophical naiveté about the role of intentionality. On Derrida’s view, philosophical analysis tends to assume intentionality to be unproblematic, where perception and communication are transparent, or operate within ideal conditions of clarity. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics has a much more ambiguous relation to intentionality. On the one hand, Ricoeur’s notion of the autonomy of the text and its relevance to perlocutionary aspects of action sits amicably with the prevalence Derrida gives to the indeterminacy of written discourse and hence a suspicion of conceiving interpretation mainly in terms of authorial intention. On the other hand, Ricoeur’s use of speech acts to demonstrate how actions can be meaningful does not seem to square with his more programmatic concern for ethical action which clearly involves a capacity to recognize intentions and foresee the consequences of intended actions.

This paper will attempt to square Ricoeur’s appropriation of speech acts with his ethical project, distancing it from poststructuralism’s suspicion of intentionality. My analysis will proceed by means of clarifying how intentionality has a secondary role for the agent when understanding how she can be responsible or imputable. This role is secondary because agent intentionality cannot exist without a more primary activity in which one interprets actions as models or thought-
experiments for understanding how to act. This bi-level relation also appears when attempting to understand the intentions of an agent when we speak, not of understanding the intentions of an agent per se, but of understanding intentions with reference to interpreting their actions in relation to other factors.

Horacio Hector Mercau (Universidad de Sao Paulo, Brazil)

Filosofía de la Esperanza en Paul Ricoeur: historias recientes del mal en los pueblos indígenas de Pampa-Patagonia

El presente trabajo intenta reflexionar sobre la historia reciente y la herencia dejada - de la última dictadura militar en Argentina (1976-1983) - en las formas de ser y pensar con respecto a los pueblos indígenas de Pampa-Patagonia. Para dar cuenta de ello se tomaran diferentes relatos plasmados en distintos manuales escolares. En cuanto a su abordaje metodológico nos ubicaremos desde un análisis semántico del tema del mal siguiendo la perspectiva de Paul Ricoeur, a partir de los cuales se pensarán las expresiones del mal en la cultura y la historia con la intención de visualizar cuestiones de resistencia, memoria y esperanza. Dichos elementos se presentarán como condiciones de posibilidad de una filosofía de la esperanza en términos de Ricoeur.

La propuesta de Ricoeur es hacer un análisis semántico del tema del mal. Evita tomar este término en su uso psicológico, sino en aquellos textos a partir de los cuales se constituyó y fijó su significado. El presente trabajo intenta reflexionar sobre la historia reciente y la herencia dejada por esta -última dictadura militar en Argentina (1976-1983)- en las formas de ser y pensar con respecto a los pueblos indígenas de Pampa-Patagonia. Para dar cuenta de ello se tomarán diferentes relatos plasmados en diferentes manuales escolares. A partir de los cuales se pensará el tema del mal en términos ricoeurianos para adentrarnos en cuestiones de resistencia y memoria. Para en definitiva, en términos de Paul Ricoeur quien toma las palabras de Sócrates para preguntarse “¿No es de la memoria y de la sensación de donde se forma siempre en nosotros la opinión, espontánea y reflexiva?”. Protarco asiente

En la tercera parte de la filosofía de la voluntad, denominada poética, Ricoeur intentaría mostrar las vías de regeneración de una voluntad que se ha hecho impotente a sí misma por causa del mal. Nuestra intención, a lo largo de este trabajo, ha sido justamente mostrar una vía posible para la regeneración de la voluntad. Creemos que ella la encontramos en la esperanza. Con la esperanza incorporamos un elemento que consideramos importante para la realización de la poética de la voluntad a la que Ricoeur intentaba llegar. La esperanza es confianza, denota el anhelo de totalidad y el deseo de superar la condición del hombre y que llamamos poética de la esperanza.

El mal y la esperanza son muy solidarios. Si el mal del mal nace en el camino hacia la totalización, no aparece sino en una patología de la esperanza, como perversión inherente a la problemática de la realización y de la totalización. Es decir, la verdadera maladía del hombre no aparece sino en el Estado y en la Iglesia, en tanto que instituciones de reunión, de totalización. La hermenéutica profunda que Ricoeur propone como tarea estructura la poética de la voluntad. En ella, que se nos manifiesta como tensión dialéctica abre un lugar de encuentro entre la finitud del hombre y su búsqueda de algo infinito. En esta hermenéutica se entrelazan el mal y la esperanza. Conviven “la tristeza de lo finito” y “la esperanza en lo infinito”.
My colleague, dialogue partner and Friend, Joseph Edelheit, has set for us the framework for a proposed dialogue on remembering the Sabbath. It is once again a task filled with various dialogues. There is the dialogue with the text (Exodus 20:8-11 and Deuteronomy 5:12-15), a conversation that is clearly of central concern for Paul Ricoeur’s life work. There is the dialogue between the two of us which means also between the two religious perspectives that we bring to our reading any text. There is the proposed dialogue between Ricoeur and Heschel and between specific texts pertinent to that interaction. There is the dialogue between moments in time (history and the existential present). There is the notion of sacred time which clearly marks a relationship between the sacred and the mundane (or the secular?). This involves an exploration of ritual and the place of ritual in holy observance as well as in life (is observance remembering or is it more, doing, or is it all of the above?) Finally there is the theme of remembering, which is also a form of dialogue since remembering is a form of a merging of horizons. In particular, the Sabbath command specifically connects the person remembering with the creation and the creation narrative (indeed, the priestly narrative, the post-exilic narrative). It would be a bit presumptuous to believe we can do justice to every dimension of dialogue noted here even with the two of us bringing our reflection to the task. I will assume a position in dialogue which gives most attention to the contribution of Ricoeur and how that sets up a way of considering the range of dialogues we are now engaging. I suggest that one of these contributions does relate to time and to the narrative setting of the commandment presented (the commandment delivered as part of the Exodus narrative but perhaps also part of the exilic narrative). To remember is to tell the story. Ricoeur writes in “Toward a Narrative Theology,” “This temporality interweaves the two temporal components: on the one hand, the pure, discrete, and interminable succession of what we may call the story’s incidents and that constitute the episodic side of the story; on the other hand, the aspect of integration, culmination, and closure brought about by what Louis O. Mink calls the ‘configurational act of narrating’” Remembering the Sabbath in telling the story is ritualized in observance, played out in action and urging the question of what it means to “observe.” In part, the observing “is” the doing.
relations aux proches, ou « consociates » chez Schütz sera l’occasion d’un détour herméneutique vers ce lien social de la proximité. « Sur quel trajet d’attribution de la mémoire se situent les proches ? » se demande Ricoeur. C’est dans un dialogue instructif avec Schütz que nous tenterons de poser des jalons.

Quel rôle peut jouer ce relai des proches dans l’établissement de souvenirs ? Quelle situation occupe ce type de mémoire ? Si la mémoire des proches n’est pas un maillon manquant qui réunirait ou réconcilierait le pôle de la mémoire personnelle et le pôle de la mémoire collective, l’exploration du champ de la proximité est l’occasion d’un autre type de questionnement qui ne vise pas une synthèse. En effet, les proches sont aussi l’occasion de penser la reconnaissance par le chemin du souvenir. Par qui se souvient-on ? Cette question est posée chez Schütz et Ricoeur. « Mes proches sont ceux qui m’approuvent d’exister et dont j’approuve l’existence dans la réciprocité et l’égalité de l’estime » définit Ricoeur. Dans cette exploration de l’attribution des souvenirs s’ouvre la connexion de la mémoire à la reconnaissance à une échelle particulière du lien social, celui de la proximité.

Marie-Hélène Nadeau (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada)

Entre mémoire individuelle et mémoire collective : le rôle de l’incorporation symbolique et de l’imagination


contemporains sans écrire ma propre vie liée à celle de ceux que j’ai connus depuis mon enfance » (2007 : 38).

Fernando Nascimento (Bowdoin College, USA)

*Ethical Recognition*

Ricoeur devotes the second section of *Course of Recognition* to the analysis of self-recognition that builds a conceptual bridge between the active recognition as identification and mutual recognition. At the center of the discussion on self-recognition, Ricoeur puts the ethical agency, the process of taking deliberate decisions and the recognition of the self based on the ethical responsibility. On the first part of his argumentation, he recovers the figure of the *phronimos* who is the "living measure" of the concept of practical wisdom that permeates the Aristotelian ethics and since *Oneself as Another* occupies a prominent place in Ricoeur’s practical philosophy.

In this article, I want to explore aspects of the concept of recognition associated with the *phronimos*. I propose an investigation on how a given ethical community recognizes the *phronimos* and what are the implications of this recognition for the formation of personal and collective identities within such ethical community. On a fundamental level, as Ricoeur puts it, the *phronimos* is the "anticipated figure of the reflexive self implied by the recognition of responsibility". In this sense, the hermeneutical process of recognizing oneself through one's actions and the parallel recognition of the ethical implication to the actor of the ethical attributes of actions finds one of its iconic realization in the recognition of the *phronimos*.

This fundamental level leads to the specific question of how the phronimoi are recognized as such by the ethical community. We suggest that from the established relationship between agent and action, the community interprets the actions and decisions taken by phronimoi as the practical realization of the ethical ideal (ethos) on the theoretical level. And this hermeneutic of the action is possible because, during the deliberation process, the phronimoi are capable of creating a deliberative narrative that weaves the traditional community ideals of a good life with the creative imagination to cope with the specific circumstances of the ethical dilemma at hand. The recognition of the *phronimos* by the ethical community has therefore as its reflexive corollary the recognition of personal and communal ethical identities. By recognizing the phronimos, the community participants also recognize their ethical ideals and themselves as responsible agents for ethical actions that may approach or distance themselves from the practical wisdom which is actualized by the *phronimoi*, and that leads to a fulfilled life.

Diego Francisco Oritz Parra (Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Mexico)

*Innovación semántica y auto reconocimiento en Paul Ricoeur*

La innovación semántica como problema filosófico ha sido tratada por Ricoeur principalmente en dos trabajos (*La metáfora viva, Tiempo y Narración I*) que se ocupan de ella desde dos perspectivas respectivamente: por un lado están las metáforas que se construyen al interior de los componentes lingüísticos y lógicos de una frase y por otro la innovación semántica que se construye en la totalidad de una composición narrativa. En ambos casos, el problema filosófico apunta hacia la comprensión mediante la cual el sujeto se reconoce a través de estos niveles del discurso. El presente trabajo busca demostrar que la innovación semántica como acontecimiento vivo del lenguaje y como composición narrativa es una pieza importante para el auto reconocimiento del sujeto a través del carácter metafórico que reviste a estas creaciones del lenguaje. Por tanto, mediante el reconocimiento de la *praxis* implícita en las metáforas, el sujeto
prefigura su comprensión como un modo de ser en el mundo, comprensión que en la obra de Ricoeur anuncia una hermenéutica del *sí mismo*. La importancia de la metáfora como un elemento para el reconocimiento del sí mismo en la praxis subsistente en estas creaciones simbólicas se confirma por el papel que juega el método hermenéutico de la “vía larga” a lo largo de la obra de Ricoeur y que admite el carácter indirecto que implica esta hermenéutica. Tomando como referencia esta intención general de la obra de Ricoeur, se asume que el reconocimiento del sí en su dimensión existencial requiere de la innovación semántica como uno de sus modos para realizarse. En ese sentido, este artículo se concentrará específicamente, en establecer un vínculo entre la innovación semántica como narración y la identidad narrativa del sujeto (identidad ipse) como un modo de intelección de la totalidad de las vivencias que se llevan a cabo en la existencia concreta de éste como una posibilidad de reconocerse históricamente y existencialmente. De tal modo, el reconocimiento del sí, asumido como un proceso de comprensión, requiere de una innovación al interior del conjunto de signos que integran determinado lenguaje para ofrecer un significante a la totalidad dispersa de las acciones de un mismo sujeto.

Rosa Pacheco Soto (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico)

*El texto. Reflexiones desde la perspectiva de Paul Ricoeur*

Para Ricoeur el texto es todo discurso fijado por la escritura. A partir de esta definición, considero que el texto entonces contiene un movimiento extraordinario. Comprenderse ante la obra será para Ricoeur una dimensión de la noción de texto muy importante pues nos remite a los signos donde nos podemos reconocer.

El texto como vínculo y testimonio directo entre autor y lector se caracteriza por ser representación simbólica entre dos formas de vida. Dos episodios en la vida de los sujetos que se encuentran. Representa el cruce de caminos.

Considero que el texto guarda lo que Hermes lleva como mensaje oculto. Analogía y Hermes como análogo principal. Para Ricoeur hay una apropiación del mundo que no está detrás del texto sino delante de él que se descubre.

El texto es la mediación que guarda un contenido configurado por el autor y lector, construido por uno y descubierto por otro paulatinamente, al ritmo de la lectura del segundo. Este descubrimiento será para Ricoeur la entrada a la subjetividad del lector.

Se trata de los tres participantes en el acto de escritura y acto de lectura en un espacio simbólico mediador, a saber: El autor, el lector y el texto. ¿Podrá existir un reconocimiento entre dos de ellos cuando la dicotomía al hablar de la ausencia de uno y la presencia del otro nos envuelve en la complejidad de percibir estados o posiciones diferentes? ¿Cuál es el camino de conocimiento y luego de reconocimiento que indica Ricoeur? ¿Cómo es ese camino?

Creo que aquí se presenta la primera posibilidad de diálogo entre autor y lector. En la perspectiva de Ricoeur es el cara a cara subjetivo. La intención del autor y las conjeturas interpretativas del lector u observador. Se va tejiendo, al mismo tiempo que se va configurando la acción interpretativa, la práctica de la hermenéutica.
Robert Piercey (University of Regina, Canada)

Is Ricoeur Still Relevant to the Philosophy of History?

When *Time and Narrative* was published, it was recognized as an important contribution to the philosophy of history. It mounted a powerful defense of the view that “if history were to break every connection to our basic competence for following a story..., it would lose its distinctive place in the chorus of the social sciences.”¹ The book advanced an equally powerful critique of several approaches to the field that marginalized narrative, such as logical empiricism and the *Annales* school. Thirty years later, however, Ricoeur’s contributions might look dated. The approaches he criticized no longer have many followers or much influence. More importantly, the philosophy of history is often said to have entered a “postnarrativist” phase. The most prominent of the postnarrativists, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, argues that Ricoeur was right to claim that the basic unit of history-writing is the complete text, and to see that every text contains “some content-synthesizing entity”² that combines its individual claims into something more than the sum of its parts. But he insists that narrative is not the only entity capable of performing this synthesis, and that history-writing is not *essentially* narrative in character. Kuukkanen further argues that to ground history-writing in our capacity to follow a story “demeans”³ the enterprise, distorting its status as a truth-seeking enterprise that engages in rational argumentation. In short, the philosophy of history has moved on since the appearance of *Time and Narrative*. So we should ask: is Ricoeur still relevant to the field?

I argue that he is. Even if some of Ricoeur’s claims about the place of narrative in history are overstated, *Time and Narrative* still offers something indispensable: a way of connecting the structures of written history with the lived experience of time. To show this, I contrast Ricoeur’s view of the historian’s task with Kuukkanen’s. Kuukkanen sees narrative as a useful but ultimately optional way of synthesizing the data historians discuss. He is therefore led to view this synthesis as something imposed on the data from the outside, not a discovery of something in them. Kuukkanen’s strategy leads him to adopt unsatisfactory views about the ontological status of the concepts historians use. Since they have been constructed to organize the data, they must not refer to anything real; since they have been made, they must be made up. Ricoeur, by contrast, can say far more nuanced things about the historian’s toolbox, because on his view, the structures of mimesis₁ and mimesis₂ explicate the implicit structures of mimesis₁. I further suggest that, while the postnarrativist critique of Ricoeur does not do him justice, it performs an important service by pointing out several respects in which Ricoeur’s philosophy of history can be refined and buttressed. In particular, the postnarrativists help show that Ricoeur says too little about the cognitive evaluation of narratives. His work does, however, contain rich resources for doing so, and I close by sketching what Ricoeur might say about this matter.

Sebastian Purcell (SUNY Cortland, USA)

The Ethics of Recognition

In *Oneself as Another* Ricoeur proposes to integrate Aristotle’s eudaemonist approach to ethics with Immanuel Kant’s deontological moral philosophy. This would appear to be an impossible task. If one takes up the eudaemonist approach, then it is by appealing to a specific conception of the good life that one is able to discern whether an action is right. Stated differently, a conception

³ Kuukkanen, 86.
of the good appears as a premise in argument for the evaluation of a right action, and the conclusion of the argument will state whether the action is permissible. On the Kantian approach, one first appeals to a procedure, i.e., the categorical imperative procedure, to discern whether the proposed action is morally permissible, and then concludes to whether the action could be part of a conception of the good life. A dilemma emerges: either a conception of the good is a premise in the argument for moral evaluation (Aristotle), or it is a conclusion (Kant). An integrated, middle ground position looks to be logically impossible.

The central thesis of this essay argues that despite the apparent impossibility of integrating these two approaches, Ricoeur manages to propose a solution that could reasonably be considered an integrated solution: what one evaluates are not individual actions, but practices which embed standards of excellence. The significance of this achievement appears to have been unnoticed in the broader philosophical community. One consequence of it is that it enables Ricoeur to address cases of misrecognition in a way that has eluded the individualist assessments of either contemporary virtue ethicists or Kantian deontologists.

Karl Racette (Université de Montréal, Canada)

Histoire, mémoire et narrativité chez Paul Ricoeur

Dans son article « Le pardon peut-il guérir », Ricoeur thématise la difficulté contemporaine à se rapporter à l’histoire. C’est que le 20e siècle aura été le théâtre des plus grandes horreurs de l’histoire humaine. Ainsi, la manière dont nous nous rapportons au passé, par la mémoire, est essentiellement traumatique, s’exprimant par soit un trop de mémoire, soit par un défaut de mémoire1. Face à ce double écueil de notre rapport à l’histoire et au passé, Ricoeur, en reprenant certaines idées de la psychanalyse freudienne, élabore son concept de travail de souvenir2.

Ce que peut nous apprendre le projet ricoeurien du travail de souvenir, c’est que le passé n’est pas, comme nous sommes portés à le croire, « fixé une fois pour toutes »3. En ce sens, le travail de mémoire doit s’articuler avec la théorie narrative de Ricoeur, dans la mesure où elle est en mesure de revisiter le sens des événements passés afin d’y faire émerger de nouvelles possibilités de sens.

Dans le cadre de cette présentation, nous présenterons d’abord le travail de souvenir et ses différents moments (mémoire, oubli et pardon) présentés dans La mémoire, l’histoire et l’oubli en ce qu’ils se rapportent à la théorie narrative de Ricoeur, telle que présentée dans Temps et récit et Soi-même comme un autre. Nous déferurons ainsi l’idée que, loin d’être simplement introspective, la théorie narrative ricoeurienne nous offre la possibilité de revisiter notre passé (à la fois historique et personnel) dans le but d’y accomplir le travail de souvenir, véritable travail de deuil, qui doit s’ouvrir sur des possibilités futures. En abordant les différents textes sur la mémoire, le passé et leur rapport au récit, nous montrerons en quoi la pensée de Ricoeur est en mesure de répondre adéquatement au problème de la discontinuité (discordance) et de la continuité (concordance) de l’histoire tout en rendant justice à la fois à ces deux moments. Par la « concordance discordance »4 propre à la théorie narrative, Ricoeur nous permet de penser une histoire humaine qui n’est ni celle complètement disparate en hétérogène de la discontinuité, ni celle aplanie et simpliste de la continuité. C’est précisément cette double prise en compte de l’histoire qui permet à Ricoeur de proposer une nouvelle lecture de l’histoire, celle qui, peut-on l’espérer, pourra nous guérir.

1 Ricoeur, La pardon peut-il guérir ? p. 77
2 Ricoeur, La pardon peut-il guérir ? p. 80
3 Ricoeur, La pardon peut-il guérir ? p. 79
4 Ricoeur, Temps et récit, p. 72
For almost two millennia, the ancient routes of the Silk Road facilitated encounters among people, cultures, and nations. Today, the forces of globalization have brought people and their cultures exceedingly closer with an accelerating speed. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, neoliberal policies have contributed to an increase in cultural conflicts, national hostilities, and international atrocities. These violent encounters involve most importantly the denial of recognition of the Other, processes of dehumanization, and conditions of hopelessness. In contrast, the historical Silk Road is represented as a model for peaceful cultural, religious, and political exchanges. Following Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “interlinguistic hospitality,” Marianne Moyaert sees “interreligious hospitality” as the condition by means of which religious violence can be overcome. Drawing upon Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of translation, in my paper I intend to introduce the concept of “intercultural hospitality” as an ethos that eschews socio-political conflicts through promoting equitable cultural exchanges. The spirit of the Silk Road is manifested today in many world music festivals, which serve as case studies to examine how they embody the ideals associated with the Silk Road through providing new spaces for intercultural hospitality. Based on ethnographic data collected from internationally known world music festivals in Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Germany, and the United States, I will examine how world music festivals seek to advice productive communication and peaceful intercultural exchanges by embracing ethical values of caring and trust. Through cultivating an ethos of intercultural hospitality, musicians’ collaborations within these festivals presupposes respect for, and the recognition of, others. Accordingly, these collaborations between musicians from different traditions exemplify the kind of mutual cooperation that is a sign of hope through contributing productively to the ongoing path of history. By considering how these festivals are, however, often deployed as a propaganda tool for the dissemination of specific ideological agendas, this paper focuses on the tensions between the intercultural hospitality fostered within these festivals and hegemonic neoliberal forces at work.

Walter Salles (Pontifical Catholic University of Campinas, Brazil)
The Role of Love in the Legal System

The departure points for my reflection are Paul Ricoeur’s well-known essays on love and justice. Frequently, Ricoeur presents the dialectic between love and justice in the form of an opposition, or at least love and justice are placed in positions that prevent or make it difficult to think a possible interrelation between the two perspectives. My thesis is that Ricoeur went too quickly to religious (or theological) aspects to oppose the logic of superabundance (love) to the logic of equivalence (justice), and consequently he does not consider sufficiently the possibility of love orienting judicial practice from within the sense of justice. My goal, from a philosophical perspective, is to show that love can be more integrated into law in its day-to-day operations, even if it is realized only occasionally. I intend to defend that the tension between both logics (superabundance and equivalence) does not entail a necessary opposition, for love and justice can interact with each other. Deepening too much the disproportion between these two logics can transform the experience of love into something distant from the daily life of people in such a way that the experience of love would be the exclusivity of a privileged group. Interpreting legal practice through the perspective of the judiciary could provide philosophy with a new opportunity to reflect on the sense of justice and the role of love in the legal system. Philosophical analysis of law cannot ignore the human conflicts presented to the law and the emotions that they provoke. Noneconomic issues matter for justice, because sometimes the litigants want something more than money. Other aspects such as dignity, voice, and recognition may be involved beyond the
goal of material retribution. The way in which Ricoeur exposes the dimensions of the judicial system allows us to venture beyond his thesis and endorse the interrelation between love and justice. Love can be incorporated into the legal system and can support the striving for justice.

Charles Sharp (California State University, Fullerton, USA)

Politics and Aesthetics in the “post-truth” World: Affect Theory and Phenomenological Hermeneutics

Hannah Arendt accurately diagnosed the connection between cynicism and contempt and the mobilization of mobs in the rise of totalitarianism. That diagnosis is frightfully familiar in our current political climate where by chance or design appeals to gut-level emotions hold greater sway and attention than actual facts: the political appears as a world of alternative facts and post-truths. Arendt noted the dangers of mob mentality in 1951, but only recently have social sciences and humanities undergone what is often termed an affective turn: paying attention to ways in which nonlinguistic forces shape our identity. Affect theory, as it is sometimes referred to despite being far from a unified theory, follows the philosophical influences of Spinoza and Bergson through Deleuze and Guattari, largely overlooking or missing phenomenological hermeneutics, which is often construed as being too text based and linguistic to be of use for the study of feelings and emotion. Affect theory, and in particular the work of Brian Massumi, purposely blurs the distinction between aesthetic and political spheres in order to reflect on the visceral response individuals have in relationship to ideology, while paradoxically appealing to neurological science for objective truth of non-linguistic feeling. This paper seeks to draw affect theory into communication with hermeneutics via Ricoeur and Arendt’s thoughts on aesthetics and politics, taking note of the openings in Ricoeur’s thoughts on Spinoza and Bergson in particular. It further seeks to put phenomenological aesthetics under the scrutiny of affect theory: can we still speak of the productive imagination if what is communicated through the experience of art is subjective in every way other than seemingly autonomic physiological responses? I argue that not only can we, we must. Ricoeur’s thought on identity further guides us towards conceptualizing the productive imagination as a key component of what it means to be a capable human. Ricoeur’s thought suggests to me the importance of remaining vigilant towards the exercise of the imagination and judgment characteristic of aesthetics precisely as a response to our current political climate that often seems to demand that we either join the mob and cease to think or seek refuge, keeping our thoughts to ourselves.

Jim Sisson (Middle Georgia State University, USA)

Beyond the “Dynamic of Faith” and Doubt: The Ricoeurean Empathetic

On the most basic level, I am interested in tracing the trajectory of Ricoeur’s thoughts on empathy, most explicitly found in his 1986 study, “The Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy,” but also as implied throughout Oneself as Another (1992). Paul Tillich’s thought on a “dynamic of faith,” as a willingness to doubt or question faith defined as “ultimate concern” (Tillich 1-4) provides a useful frame from which to consider how Ricoeur traces empathy as a path of understanding from oneself to another self. In one way of asking, how much doubt, imagination, and willingness to question one’s own “ultimate concerns” does one need to imagine and empathize with the concerns and identities of others? Ricoeur articulates his most clear connection between imagination and empathy in his 1986 response to Heinz Kohut’s study on psychoanalysis and cure, “[I]magination fills out this experienced Paarung [bodily pairing with an other]. Through empathy, I can imagine what I would perceive if I was over there, what I would feel if I inhabited that body over there that is the ‘here’ of the other person” (OP 87). To empathize with the other requires imagination (and perhaps a very “bodily” or tangible imagination at that).
What kinds of doubts and willingness to question one’s own ideas and ultimate concerns does the self need to wrestle with to achieve this empathy? Is suffering prerequisite to empathy? Is a trajectory toward empathy only possible through a willingness to doubt one’s own faith, ultimate concern? “Empathy” is a difficult word to locate (explicitly) in Oneself as Another, but one of the closest approximations and a term worthy of parsing is Ricoeur’s use of “solicitude” in “The Self and the Ethical Aim.” There, Ricoeur qualifies, “This intimate union between the ethical aim of solicitude and the affective flesh of feelings seems to me to justify the choice of the term ‘solicitude’” (OA 192). The surprising moment for this investigation into empathy is the inability to get rid of the “bodies,” the intimate recognition between the self and the other that Ricoeur, in at least these two occasions mentioned, describes in very “bodily” terms. Perhaps it is only the most palpable imaginative act of doubting, questioning, suffering, and still believing, in some form, with others that one may recognize the self as another.

Works Cited
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Jozef Sivak (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia)
Ricœur et Jankelevitch sur le mal

La question du mal préoccupait P. Ricœur toute sa vie, plusieurs titres de ses œuvres en témoignent, notamment l’opuscule sur le Mal (Un défi à la philosophe et à la théologie, Genève 2004), notre référence principale dans cet exposé. Il pourrait être intéressant de confronter cet opuscule avec celui de son contemporain et compatriote Vl. Jankélévitch (Le Mal, Paris 1947), moraliste et métaphysicien dont nous nous rappelons, cette année, le 115e anniversaire de la naissance. Si leur points de départ (liberté, faute, vouloir, imperfection, absurdité du mal) sont semblables, ils diffèrent dans la la manière de penser le mal. L’un emploie la méthode herméneutique appliquée à la symptomatologie du péché dans l’Écriture, l’autre proposant une lecture « pneumatique » à la place de celle « grammalectale » ou littérale de l’Écriture. Si le premier voit dans la „dialectique brisée“ de K. Barth, dialectique rendant inconciliable le mal avec la bonté divine, la possibilité de dépasser la théodicée classique, le deuxième considère comme crux de toute théodiceée le rapport entre absurdité et scandale du mal, rapport déjouant la réponse à la question « Qui a fait ? » Le mal existe en général alors que les recherches de causalité et de responsabilité sont toujours de caractère social. Finalement, les deux auteurs se rapprochent dans une certaine mesure descendant du niveau spéculatif au niveau pratique. Chez Ricœur, c’est la convergence entre la pensée, l’action (morale et politique) et la spiritualisation de la lamentation. La question ne porte plus sur l’origine du mal mais sur ce qu’il faut faire pour le combattre. A cela s’ajoute le « travail de deuil » avec les trois stades de la spiritualisation de la lamentation : l’intégration de ignorance du « pourquoi » ; la protestation contre l’idée de la « permission » divine ; raisons de croire en Dieu « malgré... ». Mais même si l’on supprimait la violence, resterait l’irréductible souffrance. Chez Jankélévitch, la sottise aggrave la méchanceté ambiguë : coupable et innocente à la fois. Au lieu d’excuser la méchanceté sans la guérir il faudrait la pardonner par amour, la faute étant absence de celui-ci. Voilà les niveaux possibles de cette comparaison.

Dan Stiver (Hardin-Simmons University, USA)
The Symbol Gives Rise to Theology: A Poetics of Theology
Ricoeur’s groundbreaking work in 1960 in *The Symbolism of Evil* has had enormous influence. It has been pointed out that almost all mainline theological schools in the late sixties and seventies in the Anglo-American world read this book. In it, based on his earlier phenomenology of the will in *Freedom and Nature* and analysis of fallibility in *Fallible Man*, he moved away from a centuries-old preoccupation in the West with a speculative account of sin and evil to move behind them towards the symbols and myths that underlay the speculative accounts. As he said, “It is to the least elaborate, the most inarticulate expressions of the confession of evil that philosophic reason must listen.” (4) This was a major shift away from highly rationalistic discourse towards the figurative language and experience that underlay it, which the conceptual systems often left behind and replaced. In *The Symbolism of Evil*, Ricoeur thus opened up a transformation not only of philosophy but of theology.

Ricoeur argued over the course of his life that philosophy cannot begin without presuppositions, that there is no absolute starting point. Rather, he says that philosophy’s “first task is not to begin, but, from the midst of speech, to remember,” (349) namely, to take into account its symbols and myths. As Ricoeur indicates, with the great influence of Augustinian theology in the West, theology has often obscured its figurative roots. In recent years, however, one can see in approaches to salvation and atonement in Christian theology reflection that comports with Ricoeur’s call for reflection to have a close relationship to its symbolic and metaphorical roots and not leave them behind. Ricoeur’s work here and later undergirds such a shift and also can enhance it. Theology, too, like philosophy, “must makes its presuppositions explicit, state them as beliefs, and try to make the wager pay off in understanding.” (357)

As a focused illustration, I will indicate how this hewing close to figurative language in theology is enriching in relationship to symbols of salvation, especially atonement, in Christian theology. As such, it picks up Ricoeur’s later turn to the capable self more than the faulty or broken self. In this area, the conceptual discourse of theology has begun to stay with the multiplicity of salvific metaphors rather than reducing them to one master model, itself taken literally. Many think that there is only one possible model of atonement. In fact, the Bible and Christian history are replete with other models and symbols. In keeping, however, with Ricoeur’s understanding of them as symbols or metaphors, in the end they work best as complementary just as the symbols of evil represented a complementary cycle of metaphors if not myths. Ricoeur projected a poetics of hope for a third volume that never materialized. A theological poetics of salvation can hint at the direction of such a hopeful poetics.

George Taylor (University of Pittsburgh, USA)

*The Role of Figuration in Ricoeur’s Theory of Productive Imagination*

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur discusses at great length the subjects of prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration, but he rarely attends the meaning and implications of the theme of figuration itself that underlies these discussions. To comprehend the meaning of figuration in Ricoeur and its import for his theory of productive imagination, I argue that we must read the topic of figuration back onto discussions of the figure and the figurative that are subordinate arguments occurring in *The Rule of Metaphor*. On its own terms, *The Rule of Metaphor* seems an engagement with the figure and the figurative in its earlier pages in order to establish the framework for discussion of metaphor as the book’s primary topic. Only in light of *Time and Narrative* can we understand the merits of reversing priority and reading *The Rule of Metaphor* as a text where the discussion of metaphor illuminates the broader theme of figuration. Similarly, only when we relate Ricoeur’s elaboration of the figure and figurative in *The Rule of Metaphor*
(and some of his other articles of this time period) to the role of figuration in *Time and Narrative* do we appreciate the profound significance of the thematic of figuration to Ricoeur’s theory of productive imagination. Arguing for the conjunction of the two texts seems especially appropriate if we recall that for Ricoeur the two texts “form a pair” and were “conceived together.” My analysis is then oriented to a descriptive elaboration of the import of Ricoeur’s argument, and I attend how, in Ricoeur’s view, is the productive imagination possible. For Ricoeur there is a figuration at work at the origin of logical thought, at the root of all classification To my knowledge, the larger import of Ricoeur’s turn to figuration in *Time and Narrative* has received some attention in the secondary literature – principally on Ricoeur’s change in vocabulary from reference to figuration – but this literature does not pursue the direction I advance.

James Taylor (European Center for the Study of War and Peace, Croatia)
*Beyond Zero Sum Ethics: In Praise of Reciprocity with Paul Ricoeur*

Among philosophers of otherness, Paul Ricoeur is one of the few to mount a strong defense of reciprocity between self and other as a salutary ethical operation. Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, among others, concerned that any benefit the self receives from the other involves assimilation and therefore violation of the other, target reciprocity as something to be overcome or deconstructed. Ricoeur on the other hand, without denying the dangers involved, argues the opposite: reciprocity need not reduce otherness but may rather increase the difference between self and other and produce a more ethical appreciation of alterity. Directly in response to Levinas’ zero-sum-game reasoning, Ricoeur suggests that through interpreting otherness—of one’s body, of the other person, and of one’s conscience—alterity becomes amplified rather than assimilated and the self, “enjoined” by the other, becomes capable of responding to other’s call.

After analyzing the contemporary suspicion of reciprocity found in Derrida and especially in Levinas, I will articulate and evaluate Ricoeur’s defense of reciprocity as a vehicle for increasing rather than reducing otherness. I will argue that Ricoeur’s response is sound and compelling and deserves to be taken seriously in a contemporary world that uncritically equates understanding and domination. In such a climate, we are in danger of substituting one form of violence (assimilation by the self) with another (traumatic invasion by the other). In fact, I will argue that unlike his interlocutors, Ricoeur demonstrates that self and other are, at heart, bound together through a non-violent, generative relation. That this relation often (even usually) devolves into violence, does not mean that the relation is violent in principle.

By way of conclusion I will raise and evaluate an important objection to Ricoeur’s argument. Does not Ricoeur’s use of the (Aristotelian) figure of “friendship” to demonstrate the benefits of reciprocity between selves stack the deck in favor of the familiar and similar? Does this not validate Levinas’ critique that the other is always interpreted in terms of the self, and that although self and other are different, even difference is based on a more fundamental sameness? What about the encounter with the stranger rather than the friend? Is reciprocity possible here, where there is no prior basis for understanding or affection? I will argue that Ricoeur answers this more radical critique by turning to translation as an exemplary paradigm for the ethical encounter and by showing that through the long labor of translating others and being translated oneself, amplifying reciprocity obtains even between strangers.
Considérer les monstres: Le rôle de la reconnaissance considérative dans la pensée de Paul Ricœur

Dans son article intitulé « Sanction, réhabilitation, pardon », Paul Ricœur décrit le processus juridique comme non seulement celui d’une « reconnaissance du plaignant comme victime », mais aussi d’une « reconnaissance de l’accusé comme coupable ». Cette reconnaissance due à l’accusé est tout à fait cohérente avec la récupération que fait Ricœur du concept d’incognito du pardon, lorsqu’il suggère que la « considération due à tout homme, particulièrement au coupable », permet à la justice d’« éradiquer sur le plan symbolique la composante sacrée de la vengeance ». En cela, est due au coupable de la considération, « ce contraire du mépris ».

Cependant, il devient plus difficile, voire scandaleux, de parler de reconnaissance et de considération envers un coupable lorsqu’il est question de crimes extrêmes. Les crimes contre l’humanité ou les génocides empêchent en effet « d’étendre cette considération à leurs auteurs ; la marque de notre incapacité à aimer absolument ». Pour cette présentation, nous défendrons que s’il est impératif de revoir cette idée de reconnaissance considérative lorsqu’il s’agit de crimes extrêmes, elle n’en demeure pas moins une composante essentielle de tout processus de justice, si horribles soient les crimes. En sollicitant les études de Ricœur portant sur la responsabilité, l’imputabilité et la narrativité, nous constaterons qu’en reconnaissant et en considérant les accusés comme rationnels et imputables de leurs crimes, il devient alors possible de ramener ces souffrances dans la sphère de l’agir humain. Ce processus permet alors de montrer que ce qui se montre à nous comme une fatalité était au moment des faits sous la responsabilité, le contrôle de quelqu’un, et qu’il pouvait donc en être autrement ; ce passé est devenu du fait de la liberté d’agir.

Pour Ricœur, la considération due aux coupables est nécessaire à la fois pour rétablir le droit, mais aussi pour restaurer l’honneur, le respect de soi et l’estime de soi des victimes. Cette reconnaissance se révélera faire partie de la tâche dirigée vers le futur : dans les erreurs du passé, on peut alors entrevoir la capacité que nous avons à ce que ces horreurs n’arrivent plus jamais. Cette tâche, c’est l’éradication du mal en tant qu’il ne devrait pas être, qu’il n’a pas à être, contre lequel nous sommes capables de faire quelque chose.

Pour appuyer nos dires, nous utiliserons comme figure emblématique le traitement du procès d’Adolf Eichmann fait par Hannah Arendt. Dans son opposition aux hypothèses qu’Eichmann ait été soit un monstre sadique, soit un simple rouage dans la machine de la Solution Finale, Arendt démontre à juste titre que la reconnaissance d’une responsabilité morale individuelle ainsi que d’une dignité humaine fondamentale est une condition sine qua non de l’accomplissement de la justice. Cette analyse de la pensée de Arendt, passée au crible de la philosophie ricœurienne, nous permettra de valider concrètement notre hypothèse.

1. Ricœur, « Sanction, réhabilitation, pardon », p. 201
2. Id.
3. Tiré du propos de Klaus Kodalle dans Verzeihung nach Wendezeiten?
4. Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, p. 594
5. Ricœur, « Sanction, réhabilitation, pardon », p. 207
6. Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, p. 614
7. Ce que Ricœur reconnaît lui-même : « On ne comprend la portée de cette disposition d’esprit [c.-à-d. la considération donnée au coupable] que si on quitte la région spéciale des crimes extrêmes et si on revient aux crimes de droit commun » (Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, p. 614).
8. Id.
9. Ricœur, « Sanction, réhabilitation, pardon », p. 199
10. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 289
Cristina Vendra (Università G. D'Annunzio, Italy / École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, France)

For an Immanent Critique of Social Memory. Reshaping Social Remembrance and Social Time with Paul Ricoeur

"Under history, memory and forgetting.
Under memory and forgetting, life. But writing a life is another story.
Incompletion"
(Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p.506)

Memory may be defined as the complex human being’s mental capacity of retaining and reviving past events. Since we are endowed from our birth with others, memory has a social aspect related to our ontologically relational existence. From a psychological perspective, we develop memory capabilities in our childhood through the interactions with family members, i.e., within what can be considered as a proto-social space. It is in this familiar inhabited space that we learn and memorize gestures as necessary and provisional mediums of our being-in-the-social-world.

The enigma of memory puzzled Paul Ricoeur. Through reference to his thought, this paper seeks to emphasize the social dimension of memory within a reflection on the social time. The main references are the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985) and Memory, History, Forgetting (2000). The analyses focuses on memory as a result of the effort of remembering and recognizing something now past, as a socio-cultural phenomenon that together with tradition creates individual, social, and cultural identity. These reflections allow us to understand the paradoxical configuration of social time.

First, my research examines with the phenomenological method the concept of obligated memory. Memory is connected with the notion of debt towards others and it is inseparable from the idea of heritage. Memory is not the mystification of a commemoration, but a present duty related to the inheritance from the past and engaged with a responsibility for the future. In thinking about how memory is at once something that is done, that now is, and a future-oriented task, Ricoeur relates to collective memory as the source of social cohesion and to its public function. Thus, memory is not only in relation with individuals or collectivities, but also connected with the most fundamental social sense of human being’s world. The process of memory becomes social when it is narrated to others who listen. Narration empowers others to gain more control over the traces left by historical events. Social memory and social time are structurally intertwined.

Social memory is not passively endured. Moreover, there can be false or manipulated memories. Since social memory is at the crossroad of history, identity, and alterity, false memories are dangerous for the maintenance of the social order. How can we recognize this danger and re-establish a “just memory” within our shared social space? In order to answer this question, I believe that Ricoeur’s phenomenology of memory has to be connected with critical theory. In using this approach, we should be critical of our memory as a storage of fore-meanings. This means that memory left alone in itself is insufficient to fulfill the task of social cohesion. In a nutshell, I claim that the phenomenology of memory and the hermeneutics of narration have to be connected to a critical thought that will enable us to make sense of social time. As a result, all philosophy of memory, if it is not to become a purely abstract project, must start with phenomenology, pass through narration, and go beyond them in the direction of a critical social-hermeneutics. This is an extremely demanding task that entails a long effort and that can never be completely accomplished, but which needs our constant effort to save the essential value of cohabiting the social space and the social time together.
Graduate Panel 1
Mémoire et référence dans les récits littéraires, historiques et ordinaires / Memory and reference in literary, historical, and ordinary narratives

Marie-Hélène Nadeau
Laura Kassar
Anaïd Mouratian

Respondent: Marjolaine Deschênes

Graduate Panel 2
Criminalité, Culpabilité, Justice et Reconnaissance / Criminality, Guilty, Justice, and Recognition

Celia Edell
Gabriel Toupin
Renxiang Liu

Respondent: Geoffrey Dierckxsens

Graduate Panel 3
Mal, Espérance et Liberté / Evil, Hope, and Freedom

Horatio Hector Mercau
Jozef Sivak
Ana Larran

Respondent: Fernando Nascimento and Todd Mei

Graduate Panel 4
Du Souvenir à la Reconnaissance. Proximité, Deuil, Témoignage / From Remembrance to Recognition: Proximity, Mourning, and Testimony

Karl Racette
Kyle Bijan Rosen
Vita Emery

Respondent: Gaëlle Fiasse
Interfaith Dialogue on the Sabbath

Joseph Edelheith
James Moore

Moderator: Brad DeFord

“Remembrance and Recognition” are curious echoes of the Fourth Commandment, Remember the Sabbath (Ex 20) and Keep/Observe the Sabbath (Deut 5). The Sabbath is the only ritual observance included in the 10 Commandments and is considered the ‘holiest’ day in the Jewish calendar.

Paul Ricoeur has engaged the issue of time and scripture, even writing an entire chapter, Biblical Time in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination. He mentions the Sabbath only tangentially in the corpus of his work, though the issues of time, the sacred, community, and the interpretation of scripture are all important.

This panel will continue to provide a Jewish-Christian dialogue from two of Paul Ricoeur’s students, James Moore and Joseph Edelheit. Using the stated theme: Remembrance and Recognition as a link to the Fourth Commandment—Remember and Keep the Sabbath.

Ricoeur writes: The law, in effect, brings with it the dimension of an irrevocable anteriority, of a past prior to every past, something that the Hebrew Bible expresses concretely in its theology of the covenant in speaking of God’s faithfulness. And at the same time, this ethical anteriority affects the narrative anteriority in such a way that the narrative becomes something more than pure linearity. (Biblical Time, FTS-2554/5155) ...In founding the identity of the people, it projects itself toward the future in the form of an unuprootable confidence in a security that cannot fail. (2569/5155)

Though Ricoeur only refers to the Sabbath a few times, it is not difficult to use his text to create a dialogue with Abraham Joshua Heschel, a contemporary who interested Ricoeur a great deal. Heschel’s classic text, The Sabbath, considered by many to be one of the most significant religious texts of the 20th century provides an important dialogical echo to Ricoeur. Heschel teaches, “Holiness in space, in nature, was known in other religions. New in the teaching of Judaism was that the idea of holiness was gradually shifted from space to time, from the realm of nature to the realm of history, from things to event.” (Heschel, p. 79) “The Bible is more concerned with time than with space.... To understand the teaching of the Bible, one must accept its premise that time has a meaning for life which is at least equal to that of space; that time has a significance and sovereignty of its own.” “On the Sabbath we try to become attuned to holiness in time. It is a day on which we are called upon to share in what is eternal in time, to turn from the results of creation to the mystery of creation. (S, 19)

This panel will open in a Jewish-Christian dialogue that celebrates Ricoeur’s ‘irrevocable anteriority’ and Heschel’s ‘holiness in time.’
Traumatic Memory and the Paradox of Remembrance and Recognition

Stephanie Arel
Joseph Edelheit

Moderator: Dan Stiver

“In fact, history does not belong to us but rather we to it.” H.G. Gadamer
“It is in the problematic of identity that we seek the cause of the fragility of memory manipulated.”
(Ricoeur, MHF, p. 81)

This panel will consider the ambiguity of dark memories which continue to demand critical response and patient reflection. Who owns the history and/or memory of assault, oppression, and extermination: victim, perpetrator, by-stander? These questions challenge us to reflect on Ricoeur as illuminated by #METOO, the Polish legislation regarding the crimes of the Shoah, the evolving meaning of 9/11 for the US and others, and the continuing anger over “memorials and monuments” that are experienced as both racist and historical. The mass murder of students, faculty and staff in Parkland, Florida has now raised these questions even as the aggressive discourse of gun lobbyists, survivors and politicians flatten any attempts of critical conversations.

“The body politic is declared to be foreign to conflict in its very being. The question is then posted: is a sensible politics possible without something like a censure of memory? Political prose begins where vengeance ceases, if history is not to remain locked up within the deadly oscillation between eternal hatred and forgetful memory. A society cannot be continually angry with itself.”
(MHF, pp. 500-501)

There is a significant paradox to the theme, ‘Remembrance and Recognition’ when the necessity of memory stimulates an embattled division of perspectives. When traumatic history is used by one group against other for change, Ricoeur’s warning about the ‘fragility of memory’ must be a corrective. In the immediate turmoil of social, political, and cultural experience, how do Ricoeur’s insights provide thinkers with a means to re-engage the vitality of the ‘to-and-fro’ of critical conversations? Each panelist will offer her/his specific work as a lens through which others will be asked to re-read Ricoeur.

—END OF ABSTRACTS—