CROSSING BOUNDARIES: RICOEUR IN A GLOBAL AGE
2016 SRS Conference Abstracts
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2. INDIVIDUAL ABSTRACTS

Recep Alpyagil (Istanbul University, Turkey)
Metaphor and Imagination: A Comparative Study of Ricoeur and Islamic Philosophy

In *Imagination in Discourse and in Action*, Ricoeur writes “imagining is above all restructuring semantic fields. It is, to use Wittgenstein’s expression in the *Philosophical Investigation*, seeing as ... ”. He refers to this point many times in his works, especially in *The Rule of Metaphor* and *Time and Narrative*. In the latter, Ricoeur suggests that “seeing-as” sums up the power of metaphor and it could be the revealer of a “being-as” on the deepest ontological level. In this paper, I will try restructuring the semantic fields between Ricoeur and Islamic philosophy through ‘seeing-as’. For this aim, I will make three Ricoeurian detours: Firstly, I will discuss the legitimacy of comparative study between Ricoeur and Islamic Philosophy. Secondly, it will be analyzed the role of ‘seeing-as’ for the imagination and metaphor in Ricoeur. Thirdly, I will show how imagination is a peculiar way of thinking for to discover the subtle features in the metaphysical structure of reality in Islamic philosophy. From multi-disciplinary perspective, ‘seeing-as’ seems as a meeting point for the different philosophical traditions to carry their legacy into new fields. In this way, the exact aspect of metaphor can be seen otherwise be unable to seen.

John Arthos (Indiana University, USA)
Auxesis: How Ricoeur Augments a Gadamerian Trope

The Greek term auxesis means different things in different disciplinary contexts -- in agriculture, the multiplication of seeds, in grammar, the augmented form, in rhetoric, copious invention, in biology, the principle of cell growth without division. The figure of generative increase permeates Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutic understanding as the accumulation of culture built up in language and texts. But since history is both a record of cultural enrichment and of ruination and decay, we need to understand how hermeneutics reconciles the generative force of language with its pathologies. Hermeneutic understanding is not simply a growing sum. Gadamer knew this but left its role in linguisticality undertheorized.

Ricoeur shows the principle of auxesis at work in the realm of narrative theory through what he identifies as iconic augmentation -- in the way that fictional reference makes of reality something truer than itself. This truth is a tragic truth, a tension between the configuring order of emplotment and the disorder and loss endemic to human finitude. Ricoeur’s negotiation of this tension can begin to supplement the figure of auxesis at the heart of hermeneutics. A representation that articulates the troubled condition of humanity between its eternal longings and its finitude disciplines the generative capacity of language by a measure that guides its heuristic capacities. Just as with Heidegger, who’s negative is not an empty void (*nihil*), but rather fullness expressed by negation (*litotes*), Ricoeur helps us recover the paradox of giving and withdrawing at the heart of hermeneutic comprehension.

Marius Ban (Heythrop College, UK)
The Openness of the Symbols of Evil and the Possibility of Developing a Total Anthropology beyond the Modern Confession of Evil

Following the Lisbon earthquake (1755) the language of moral evil has witnessed a process of radicalization that marks the more reflective strand of modern philosophy.
It is the contention of this paper that by tracing the changes in the language of evil advanced by the ‘openness’ of the symbols of evil, a global philosophical anthropology may unfold beyond the moral language of evil and its fragmentation of being.

The first aspect of the paper explores Ricoeur’s theory of the symbolic language of the fall. Whether understood in light of Eliade’s phenomenology of symbol, or in conjunction with the Humboldtian tradition of German romanticism, an existential ‘openness’ appears to underlie Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols. Thus, the ‘shown-yet-concealed’ logic of symbol widens the discussion from the ‘isolated’ mode of moral existence towards a ‘non-intentional’ experience of the evil ‘already there’. It is worth concluding at this point that the power of symbol to convey an inexhaustible experience of evil prevents the reflective tendency from securing an exclusive moral understanding of evil.

The second aspect of the paper investigates the symbol’s multiple meanings in light of Kant’s moral semantic of evil and its consequent anthropology. In doing so, the one-sided understanding of evil, characteristic to modernity is further exposed by the symbol’s resistance to a total assimilation into the moral syllabus. As such, an anthropology of the total understanding of being may emerge beyond the autonomous self projected by Kant’s ethical language of evil.

The last aspect of the paper explores the possibility of finding in Arendt’s work on Eichmann a more amenable approach to Ricoeur’s symbolism of evil. Arendt’s departure from the limitations of a modern reading of evil is assessed in view of her conviction that some of the worst evils in the world occur without ‘forethought’. In addition, the use of metaphorical images to allude to a non-intentional form of evil reinforces the value of creative hermeneutics for an enhanced philosophical anthropology.

In sum, the inexhaustible experience of evil posed by the ‘opening’ of symbol invites a continual reconfiguration of the reflective language of evil. This appears to safeguard a total understanding of being beyond the impoverished anthropology of moral intentionality.

Anna Borisenkova (University of Winnipeg, Canada)

L’expérience esthétique du flâneur dans la perspective herméneutique de Paul Ricœur

Alain Kerlan and Denis Simard are convinced that Paul Ricoeur’s oeuvre bears at least one of the marks of “the great philosophies” of the twentieth century: it does not propose a philosophy of education that will turn out to be as important as “the legacy of a Plato, a Locke, a Hegel or even a Nietzsche” (2011: xii). For that reason they shift attention away from any philosophy of education that might be found in Ricoeur’s writings and focus on what they term, Ricoeur’s “philosophy for education” (2011: xi). It would appear that there are several things that make Ricoeur’s work a philosophy for education. First, education is a phenomenon with a particular scope and complexity, which Ricoeur’s style of philosophy is poised to capture thanks to its characteristic modesty. Second, practitioners in the field of education are sure to appreciate the fact that Ricoeur’s philosophy remains “attentive and open to the work of the human sciences,” even as it allows us to hear certain philosophical resonances in the “event of education” (2011: xi-xii).

Kerlan and Simard joined forces with other teacher educators and researchers in the mid-2000s to map out this new terrain of a Ricoeurian philosophy for education. What we learn from their collective efforts is that quite a number of Ricoeur’s works speak directly to issues that arise in education, from “the tasks of the educator” and “education as institution” through “the hermeneutics or long route of education” to moral education and lifelong learning. The first part of my paper will identify those works of Ricoeur that, according to the authors, have a particular significance for the theory and practice of education.

However, there are some who would not agree with Kerlan and Simard that Ricoeur’s philosophy of education is relatively unimportant, that like all great philosophies of the twentieth century it will never match the legacies of Plato, Locke, Hegel or Nietzsche. Marguerite Léna, a former student of Ricoeur’s, is one of them. She developed a philosophy of education under his direction, which he would appear to have fully endorsed. Further, there are times when she articulates her position by engaging directly with some observation or argument that Ricoeur has made in his work concerning pupils, teachers, power relations in the classroom, etc. The second part of my paper will explore the possibility that there are the rudiments of a philosophy of education to be found in Ricoeur’s oeuvre, principles that inspired Léna’s work on the theory and practice of education. That part of the paper will note and then briefly expand upon Catherine Goldenstein’s research into Ricoeur’s works on education.

The paper will argue that Ricoeur’s oeuvre can be seen both as a philosophy for education and as the repository of a thought-provoking, but under-developed philosophy of education.

Bibliography
When designing technologies a key factor which needs to be taken into account is the nature of singular, practical horizons which serve as the background for the deployment of these technologies. This paper will examine the relationship between design and context by arguing that the process of application is always an ambiguous one, and that this ambiguity can serve as a resource both for designing more moral technologies as well as for recognising the limits of the role of technologies in human action. The Aristotelian virtues of techne and phronesis will be taken as reflective of two types of hermeneutic “skills” related to practical application. These skills are often seen as strongly distinguishable, due to the association of phronesis with morality and self-knowledge, and the association of techne with production and instrumental knowledge. However, drawing on Peter-Paul Verbeek’s view of technological mediation, I will argue that these types of distinctions can be challenged.

Highlighting the back and forth play between the two virtues, I will argue that practical application is an inherently dynamic process. Although Verbeek does not discuss phronesis thematically, I will use it as a lens through which to view his approach to practical, variable morality. His view emphasises the productivity of the tension between knowing how (techne) and knowing when (practical wisdom) by arguing that the multistabilities of technologies open up a space for a consideration of the link between the self, morality, agency, and practical artefacts/devices. On the other hand, the work of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer will also be examined in order to focus more closely on the incommensurability between the two types of application. In hermeneutic philosophies of practice, phronesis is also linked strongly to “tragic wisdom”, and in this way hermeneutics provides an insight into application which allows us to recognise the inherent fragility of action in a way in which Verbeek’s phenomenology seems to remain unaware of. Approaches which aim to draw technologies and practical morality closer together through focusing on the practical self indeed succeed in characterising the problems of application in a new and productive way, yet there are still aspects of practical life which cannot be anticipated by technologies, such as the instability of practice and the persistence of conflict in ethical life.

Hsueh-I Chen (National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan)

Imagination, Mimesis, Narrative Identity and the Intercultural Self

This paper is an attempt to interrelate different philosophical concepts that derive from two different philosophical realms and cultural backgrounds: first, Ricoeur’s concept of imagination, mimesis and narrative identity and second, theories of intercultural-oriented philosophy developed by contemporary philosophers in German-speaking areas. The main objective of this paper is to make a speculative approach of a potential inter-philosophical and intercultural reading of Ricoeur possible.

Before Ricoeur’s concept of mimesis solidified in his oeuvre “Temps et Récit,” he used the conceptional pair of “reproductive and productive imagination”—particularly in his “Lectures on Imagination” and “La Metaphore Vive”—to explain the differences between reference and the creation of reality. Later, in “Soi-meme Comme un Autre,” he emphasized that “idem” and “ipse” have different consequences related to the identity of the self. In other words, if Ricoeur’s mimesis is regarded as a processual intellectual development, his concept of mimesis may be perceived in its extensive meaning as far-reaching, impacting not only narratives but also imaginary creativity and the understanding of the self.

Due to the development of globalization, different human-science-related disciplines try to understand the intercultural condition of modern society from different perspectives. This kind of questioning does not only have cultural and social dimensions; it also has a philosophical aspect. How
do cultures interfere and relate to each other? How do we construct ourselves culturally in confrontation with other cultures? Being inter-cultural subjects in a multicultural society we cannot rely solely on the retrospective orientation of cultural identification. We may have to conceptualize ourselves in an intercultural way.

Despite the fact that Ricoeur and intercultural philosophers have different motivations, purposes, and foci in philosophizing, and in order to read Ricoeur in an intercultural manner, this paper will try to follow and merge their intellectual paths, point out similarities and differences, and create new references.
Richard Kearney proposes, in the opening essay of Carnal Hermeneutics (2015), that we think of the body as a unifying, encompassing, reversible (touching / being-touched) instrument and organ by which we sense, make sense, and are oriented in the world. The body mediates inside and outside, self and world, self and others, immanence and transcendence: it is an ontological membrane that judges and senses together. Embodied, we read the world carnally (for understanding and for the yes-and-no) and are read by it carnally (via a grammar of embodied gestures): thus, for Kearney, ‘tact’ in being-in-the-world. Such savvy sense-making is, moreover, pre-cognitive and pre-linguistic. But, of course, as a membrane the body also imposes a gap and pause, a chiasmus between the self and the world that both differentiates and connects them. Commerce back and forth—reading- and acting-across this gap—involves and implies a diacritical hermeneutics. We do not fuse with the world and others because our body marks us off; but it also places us, via touch, into rich, continual, intimate exchange with it. The result is ontological savvy in expression and reception, action and passion, feeling and discerning: ‘need’ thus bundles into ‘value’ and, indeed, alterity is rooted first in the otherness of one’s own flesh. Inside and outside are, via the body, always distinct and always joined.

This essay will offer a threefold constructive critique of Kearney’s case, based on some of Ricoeur’s mature hermeneutical ideas. First, the self-other framework is inadequate to a carnal hermeneutics, since what one faces is not an other, but a plurality of others: the problem of (for example) ‘the face’ thus becomes one of (unbearable) loneliness, of other kinds of body, of kinds of others, and therefore a mathematics (‘calculation’, if you like) of the wagers of judgment, of sensation, of ‘belonging’. Second, Kearney’s critiques of Sartre and Levinas disclose his anxiety to keep the gap and mediation of the body ‘always on’: as long as it is, ontology includes and involves hermeneutics, judgment, reflection. The problem is that we clearly do sometimes fall—into desire, play, dreams, fear—and so the question of the gap is one of the rhythm of appearance and withdrawal. Together, these suggest that something else is needed to understand the embodied self’s savvy expressivity: why does it bother? What is its impulsion, its energetics, its spring? Why, and what, is it trying to be (that is, to do)? Buried in Living Metaphor, Oneself and Another, and Memory, History, Forgetting is the notion of ‘vehemence’— usually tied to ‘ontological’, which suggests that being is always already a desire-to-be: charged, urgent, primal. Being always-already wants to press into knowledge as into dreams, to be ratified and sanctified by others, and to organize, even fictionalize and color the cosmos just-so. Being, oddly, ontologizes—and so beings, in a variety of styles, strive each to mold and inscribe its World into the world. And ‘vehemence’ may be even more carnal than rational.

Ricoeur’s ethical aim – living well with and for others in just institutions - is well known among scholars. It is an aim at the heart of an attempt to unify the experience of socially located and constituted individuals under the aegis of a concept of justice. However, as the work of both George Taylor (2014) and Johann Michel (2012) have demonstrated, what is meant by Ricoeur when he references “just institutions” is anything but clear. This lack of clarity raises numerous questions, including: What counts as an institution? How do institutions and individuals, or institutions and groups, interact with respect to the aim of justice? What are the characteristics required of an institution in order for it to be deemed just? How can greater justice be achieved in, and perhaps through, institutions? Can we change unjust institutions? This paper proposes that
a helpful aid in answering these questions is the theory of structuration, as developed by British sociologist Anthony Giddens. In his collection of works dedicated specifically to structuration theory (1976, 1979, 1984), Giddens takes the position that there is an intimate and indissoluble relation between actions of individuals and the structures that make up society. Perhaps the most central concept in structuration theory is the duality of structure, in which, Giddens argues, both agents and structures are continually made and remade through social action. This is very clearly a dialectic, not unlike that found in Oneself as Another (1992) between the acting self and the institutions that pervade society. But importantly, Giddens’ detailed analysis of the nature of this relationship fills gaps in Ricoeur’s work in at least two ways. Firstly, by thoroughly addressing the nature of social constraint, often held to be the key aspect of institutionally organized life, and its relationship to the enabling of social action, Giddens clearly demonstrates the interdependence of the individual and society that is unclear in Ricoeur. Secondly, by detailing the reflective nature of action and its potential for supporting either social stasis or social transformation, Giddens’ structuration theory provides insight into the ways in which justice can be achieved where it is lacking. These two components, while not given any normative content in Giddens’ analysis, give substance to the concept of institution such that it becomes possible both to more readily determine and to more accurately aim at those institutions that are just.

Isabelle Dame and Christian Thiboutot (Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada)

Comment le bouleversement et la continuité identitaires de Julie dans Bleu de Krzysztof Kieslowski (1993) peut-elle être mise en dialogue avec la théorie de l’identité narrative de Paul Ricoeur?


Par ailleurs, nous constaterons comment Julie tente de se départir de tous les objets et liens qui lui rappellent son passé afin d’apaiser la souffrance qu’entraîne la survenue de l’inénarrable. Nous verrons qu’à-travers l’habitation d’un espace de marge dans lequel elle s’affirme d’abord comme totalement autre, Julie posera des gestes qui révéleront finalement la permanence de son caractère et de sa posture éthique. Nous ferons un parallèle avec l’Homme sans qualités que présente Ricoeur (Robert Musil dans Ricoeur, 1990) ainsi qu’avec la notion de liberté ricoeurienne.
The Operative Concept of Life in Ricoeur’s Phenomenology

Scott Davidson (Oklahoma City University, USA)

The title of my paper comes from Eugen Fink’s famous paper on Husserl’s phenomenology which proposed that the distinction between the thematic and operative intentions in conscious life can be applied equally to the interpretation of Husserl’s writings. The thematic intention refers to what is actively present in conscious life and is the explicit focus of his attention, while the operative intentions remain merely implicit there. The latter are not of some lesser importance, instead they reveal the fundamental sources through thematic reflection takes place. Just as Fink employs this distinction to call attention to the implicit dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology, I carry out the same task with regard to the work of Paul Ricoeur, contending that the concept of

Joshua Daniel (University of Chicago, Graham School, USA)

Just Proximity: Ricoeur and American Criminal Justice

This paper probes Ricoeur’s account of justice as “just distance” in order to render it productive for critically examining the American criminal justice system. On Ricoeur’s account, justice is established through the overcoming of vengeance, accomplished paradigmatically through the trial process which establishes a series of ‘spacings,’ e.g., between the crime and its punishment, between the accuser and the defendant. The idea is that vengeance operates as a short circuit, compounding physical violence and suffering rather than replacing them with a ‘war of words’ that ultimately leads to social peace and mutual recognition. While Ricoeur notes that, since “just distance” is a virtue (of institutions) it is thereby a mean between excesses of proximity and remoteness, the opposition he articulates between justice and vengeance implies that justice’s predominant vice is the excess of proximity indulged in vengeance, and this privileges the creation of space as the establishment of just distance. My paper intends to extend Ricoeur’s account of justice as just distance, arguing that America’s criminal justice system, especially vis-à-vis drug offenses, is unjust insofar as it indulgences an excess of remoteness. Those involved in the creation and enforcement of drug laws are often too remote from those communities impacted by these laws the most. The result is an abstracted form of vengeance that retaliates against distorted images of drug offenders whose threat is more imagined than actual. My hope is that this extension of Ricoeur opens onto broader inquires, in particular, the relationship between justice as an institutional virtue and the community or communities in which it is instituted, as well as how the political value of representation fits into the notion of just distance.

Ouvrages cités


life, though not thematized in a sustained manner in Ricoeur’s work, remains an operative concept throughout.

Michael Deckard (Lenoir-Rhyne University, USA)
The Monstrous Idea of Christian Nonviolence: Selfhood and Identity in Ricoeur and Badiou

In Alain Badiou’s review of Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting, entitled ‘The Subject supposed to be a Christian’, his critique boils down to the fact that Christianity infiltrates Ricoeur’s thinking. What does this mean in terms of the subject? How does this criticism get to the heart of Christian philosophy? Is the belief in incarnation (and redemption) ‘monstrous’? Most importantly, is there something elemental about Christian nonviolence at the heart of Ricoeur’s thinking on the incarnation, which provides the refutation of Badiou?

Throughout Ricoeur’s career, he purposely tried to separate his Christianity and his philosophy. In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur excised his lectures on biblical hermeneutics and wished to ‘bracket… convictions that bind me to biblical faith’. While much has been written on Ricoeur’s philosophical theology or philosophy of religion, the ‘shame’ of announcing his real intentions, that is, to produce a Christian anthropology let alone a Christian pacifism, centers around Ricoeur’s philosophies of selfhood and identity. Beginning in the 1940s, Ricoeur published several essays on nonviolence, which were explicitly Christian. Beginning with these essays, but also his later work (most importantly Memory, History, Forgetting), we will read Ricoeur as a theorist of nonviolent philosophy.

To speak of Christian nonviolence is to speak in a way that honors Derrida and Levinas’s memory (and other victims of the Shoah), for indeed Judaism and Christianity cannot be reduced to the same. Hints are given: ‘This is why I will speak of this voice as a voice from above. It is from above, in the way that the admission of fault proceeds from the unfathomable depths of selfhood’ (mirroring I Cor. 12:31: ‘The higher ones are the ones you should aim at’). This reading will thus emphasize the overlapping of biblical and philosophical anthropology, using most explicitly the co-authored work (with André Lacoque), Thinking Biblically.

Brad deFord (Marian University, USA)
Analogy, Metaphor & Imagination: A Comparison of the Inter-disciplinary Emphases in David Tracy and Paul Ricoeur

Ricoeur enjoyed his time in Chicago for the conversations with other faculty, especially David Tracy, with whom comparisons could be made between philosophical and theological hermeneutics. (One example is Ricoeur’s “Philosophical hermeneutics and theological hermeneutics” (Ricoeur Summer 1975). Another might be his essay, “Hope and the Structure of Philosophical Systems” (1995), which was originally published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Association (1970), 55-69.) There are, of course, many other examples of Ricoeur’s efforts

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3 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 23-4; he particular refers to ‘Le soi dans le miroir des Écritures’ and ‘Le sujet convoqué: A l’école des récits de vocation prophétique’ as being left out.
to speak as a philosopher about religious and theological concepts, including his essays on biblical
hermeneutics.

In this paper, I propose to take three of Tracy’s books (Blessed Rage for Order, (1975) The
Analogical Imagination (1981) and Plurality and Ambiguity (1987)) and “read back” from them
implications of the conversation Tracy might well have been having with Ricoeur. Evidence for
much of this dialogue occurs in the footnotes of Tracy’s books. Tracy cites Ricoeur often. The
contribution of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics to Tracy’s theological hermeneutics is
explicit and clear.

Ricoeur, on the other hand, does not cite Tracy (at least, that I could find) in any of his work
published during this period, 1970-1985. Consequently, I propose an “imagined” response on
Ricoeur’s part to Tracy. For instance, Ricoeur wrote The Rule of Metaphor (1981) in the mid-70’s,
during the time Tracy’s focus was on the analogical imagination. Given this, there are several
possible “touch points” for their dialogue, including metaphorical imagination vs analogical
imagination as it pertains to: biblical hermeneutics; the “fact of evil” (Tracy 1975, 211); and the
interpretation of “religious classics” (Tracy 1987, 84).

Yet what would make such a conversation between Tracy and Ricoeur most relevant to today
would be both men’s interests in the multi-disciplinary and the inter-disciplinary. Perhaps what
each provides would promote a hermeneutical exchange not only across disciplines but across
cultures. Tracy hints as much when he writes, “The necessity for interdisciplinary methods in
theology, like the need for collaborative practices among theologians themselves, was never more
urgent.” (1981, 448) Yes, that was true then, and is all the more, now. For the remedy for living
in a world of #philosophysowhite necessitates the means for dialogue across boundaries: theology
among, not merely between, religions; philosophy across cultures, in a unifying effort of mutual
understanding. Together the philosophical hermeneutics of Ricoeur and the theological
hermeneutics of Tracy point the way toward such a horizon of possibility.

Ricoeur, Paul. "Philosophical hermeneutics and theological hermeneutics." Studies in
Ricoeur, Paul. "Hope and the Structure of Philosophical Systems." In Figuring the Sacred, by Paul

Hope Abides?: Applying Ricoeur’s Concept of Hope to Telling the Truth to the Dying

It is axiomatic among clinicians that telling the truth to those with a terminal prognosis would have
a deleterious effect upon their hope. This fear of hope destruction nearly universally enters into
end-of-life care conversations, not only between clinicians and their patients but also among
family members and other designated-as-surrogate decision-makers. On rare occasion, respect
for a patient-and-family’s culture does justify this practice. More commonly, the result is that the
patient, family, care providers and medical staff all operate within separate realities—each with
the intent of maintaining the patient’s hope. Hope thus becomes more important to those
participating in the dying process than truth.
In *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur opened a conversation about telling the truth to the dying. (1992, 269f) In many of his earlier writings he addressed hope. For example, in “Freedom in the Light of Hope,” he spoke of “spera ut intelligam— I hope in order to understand” (1980, 166), a phrase he also used in “Hope and the Structure of Philosophical Systems.” (1995, 207) (The first essay was originally published in 1968, the second, originally in 1970.) True, in both essays Ricoeur was at that time in his life drawing on a Christian understanding of hope based on the Resurrection. (Ricoeur added to and amended this earlier understanding, for instance, in *Time and Narrative III*, where he writes: “Without memory ..., there is no principle of hope.” (1988, 258)) But what he said in “Freedom in the Light of Hope,” that “hope, expressed in psychological terms, is nothing else than this creative imagination of the possible” (1980, 161), was one of his attempts to distinguish *intellectus spei* in “parallel” to *intellectus fidei* (1995, 203), to articulate parallels between philosophy and theology. When he concludes, “henceforth all hope will carry the same sign of discontinuity, between what is heading toward death and what denies death” (1980, 163), he is reaching beyond both fields into what is occurring in the lives of those who are dying and those who are caring for them.

This paper would explore what hope means in Ricoeur and how his concept of hope might apply in the provision of end-of-life care, perhaps permitting or even encouraging a greater capacity for truth-telling to the dying.


Marc De Leeuw (University of New South Wales, Australia)

*The Phenomenological Presupposition: The Experience of Law and Justice in Paul Ricoeur’s Philosophy*

At first sight Paul Ricoeur’s work does not seem to offer a coherent or systematic legal philosophy, and is mainly formulated in different talks, reviews and coincidental responses to legal or political thinkers. It is the assumption of this paper, however, that Ricoeur’s work beholds an original legal theory which directly or indirectly explores various philosophical “presuppositions” of law. These “presuppositions” stand “before” or go “beyond” the often rigid borders and debates in legal positivism, constructivism, realism or pragmatism.

My paper focusses on the fundamental discrepancy between moral, political and legal justice and in addition asks how Ricoeur’s notion of “just institutions” can be made productive for a global understanding of justice beyond the failed attempt to establish human rights as a universal moral appeal to our “shared humanity”? This paper will focus on the particular *phenomenological* aspect of the above questions.¹

To explore the phenomenological presupposition of law (a completely neglected field in contemporary jurisprudence) the paper turns first to Ricoeur’s early writings on intersubjectivity

¹ This paper forms the second part of a book length study on the anthropological, phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical and legal aspects of Ricoeur’s legal philosophy. The first part *The Anthropological Presupposition* was recently published in *Paul Ricoeur in the Age of Hermeneutical Reason: Poetics, Praxis, Critique*, ed. Roger W.H. Savage, Lexington 2015.
Husserl) and willing (Freedom and Nature); in a second step the phenomenological aspects of promising, attestation, alterity, forgiveness, giving and recognition (Oneself as Another; History, Forgetting, Forgiveness; The Course of Recognition) will be described; in the third, and final, step the paper analyses how Ricoeur’s phenomenological descriptions inform his reflections on classical legal concepts such as responsibility, obligations, rights, justice, judging, sanctioning, pardoning, conscience, vengeance, universalism and respect (mainly worked out in his two volumes on The Just).

The paper shows that it is in the actual phenomenological understanding that a rebinding of the legal to the moral plane, and the personal to the collective “just” evokes the potential to resituate the demand for justice and “just institutions” on the level of our shared experiences “with and for others” (within and across borders). In concluding the paper hopes to make a case for a Ricoeourian inspired Rechtsphänomenologie (phenomenology of law) to be added to the modern jurisprudential debate.

Martin DeNys (George Mason University, USA)

Philosophical Hermeneutics and Fundamental Theology

Philosophy, Paul Ricoeur maintains, does not begin by autonomously determining its own starting point. Rather, philosophy begins within the fullness of language, and develops its own possibilities within that context. With regard to philosophical considerations of religion and God, this requires a consideration of what Ricoeur calls “originary” religious discourse. This is the discourse that operates most basically within the domain of historical religious involvements. It is a necessary condition of any consciousness of sacred reality. Such discourse precedes the discourse appropriate to theoretical reflections. Originary religious discourse is symbolic, poetic as to its genus, and specified by the function of “naming God” through metaphors, because sacred reality cannot be named directly, and through limit expressions, which indicate the inadequacies of even the metaphors. A hermeneutic of originary religious discourse discloses, Ricoeur maintains, the faith, or the religious experience of the world, that is other than discursive but that allows itself to be understood only through the discourse that forms and expresses it. Analogously, a hermeneutic of originary religious discourse discloses sacred reality as something that addresses the self or the community, affects the recipient of that address, and calls for a response. The response is an action that surpasses discourse. At the same time, an understanding of the address, the way in which it affects its recipient, and the response to it, is possible only through an interpretation of the discourse that articulates and gives determination to those moments of religious involvement.

Originary religious discourse articulates a consciousness of sacred reality that conceptually precedes the understandings of metaphysics and reflective theology. Ricoeur does not urge that such understandings, and specifically an understanding of God expressed through language that employs the idiom of “being,” be renounced. His arguments do require that an understanding of the experience of the world that originary religious discourse articulates serve as the horizon that situates metaphysical conceptions of God. Such conceptions would, in this situation, give, to use the words of one theologian, a kind of “metaphysical hermeneutic” of originary religious discourse, and of the sense of sacred reality that such discourse suggests. Such a metaphysical hermeneutic is legitimate inasmuch as it is a response to questions that first arise in the situation in which originary religious discourse operates. At the same time, metaphysical conceptions of God must preserve the numinous sense of sacred reality that originary religious discourse presents. In fundamental theology, the work of Bernard Lonergan and David Tracy responds to these necessities. Lonergan requires that a philosophical conception of God be situated against
the horizon of an understanding of religious experience and of self-transcendence as the proper response to sacred reality. Tracy locates a metaphysical consideration of God against the background of a phenomenological analysis of the situation of religious involvement and a hermeneutic of religious discourse. The philosophical hermeneutic that Ricoeur develops provides an account of the methodological necessities basic to the work of these theologians.

Marjolaine Deschênes (École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales / Fonds Ricoeur, France)
**Narrative identity: Interpretive Strategy for Poetics of the Disfigured “I”**

How can we analyze the “narrative identity” in less narrative, or non-narrative, literary texts? Are there only stories leading to “concordance” which may have a function of *mimesis III (mimesis reconfigurante)*? Several critics have asked this question and tried to adapt Ricoeur’s poetics, enlarging the concept of “narrative identity” in order to make it useful for the analysis of contemporary, less (or not) narrative, literary texts: lyric poetry and essay, for instance. My contribution to this debate contends a triple hypothesis: 1) Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity has been specifically designed as an interpretive strategy for contemporary texts, and 2) it is immediately functional for these texts disfiguring the “I”, or foiling the traditional (Aristotelian) rules of composition, and finally 3) a hermeneutics of narrative identity can also apply to philosophical texts that we do not consider as narrative. My major argument contending these three points is that the “concordance” interesting Ricoeur throughout his works is not so much that of the contingent plot of a novel, or that of the plot intended as what Gérard Genette (1972) called “la diégèse du récit”. It is rather the requirement of an *articulation*, which underpins all the texts and speeches, as soon as they are written or formatted, that is to say, *configured*. If storytelling is still alive, it is also in the philosophical discourse. This is what Ricoeur recognizes, as it were, when he replies to Dereck Parfit’s fiction supporting the idea that the personal identity no longer counts (Ricoeur 1990), and also when he recalls that even René Descartes inaugurates his *Discours de la méthode* by relating a biographical fable (Ricoeur 2004). In my opinion, if we apply a poetics of the narrative identity to the philosophical discourse, it becomes possible to highlight what Michèle Le Dœuff (1980) calls the “philosophical imagination”.

Peter de Vries (Old Union Presbyterian Church, Mars, PA, USA)
**Time and Apocalyptic Narrative: The Configuration of Future History**

Apocalyptic texts relate to time differently from more conventional narratives. Whereas history is a description of what happened and poetry is a description of what could happen, apocalyptic narratives configure the world according to an expected conclusion of history, and they describe events according to how they lead to this culmination. Ricoeur bases his bifurcation of narrative into historical and fictional primarily upon the historical presence or absence of the referent of the text. This distinction is problematic for texts which describe future events as if they are as concrete and real as conventional histories.

Apocalyptic does not function as a poetic narrative that offers a possible but unreal world: a utopia to be held in creative tension with the lived world of the reader. To the contrary, it purports to be a description of reality. Nor, however, does it function as an emplotment of actual events: the presentation of real-world facts that invite the reader to apprehend the world in a new fashion. Instead, the events which it describes have not happened (yet). Apocalyptic narratives purport to be a telling of events in the future whose reality is as certain as events in the past. They claim to be configurations of traces of the future which have been revealed in the present.
These texts invite the reader consider time in a non-linear sense and to understand the present and past in terms of their configuration of the future. A reader who apprehends the world of an apocalyptic narrative experiences in the present a world which objectively lies in the future. The testimony of the future which apocalyptic texts present is not merely a prediction of what will happen; it is a re-description of the present situation for the reader. It is a future which does not simply reside in the future (for example: “the time will come when God transforms the cosmos”); it is a future which re-orient the present. For example, if the future is moving toward a vindication of God and his people in the face of forces which appear to prevent such vindication, as apocalyptic texts tend to claim, the present can be marked by confidence rather than despair and by actions of resistance rather than resigned submission. The present is thus shaped by the future which apocalyptic texts present. To project oneself into the world of an apocalyptic text is to ask the question: How do present events conform, or fail to conform, to the world that the text produces? Or again, how can the narrative be a frame or structure by which present events can be understood?

Colby Dickinson (Loyola University Chicago, USA)
From History to Geography: Paul Ricoeur and René Girard on Sacred Sites and Other Monuments

I focus in this paper on how Paul Ricoeur’s writings on national acts of commemoration as possible ideological shrines to violence in his Memory, History, Forgetting overlaps with his analysis of ‘monumental history’ in the third volume of Time and Narrative. By pointing toward this linkage, I hope to demonstrate how an alternative account of history, what he will call a ‘critical history’, may be the only way for something like a sacred history (as a potential ‘iconoclasm’ within history, in his formulation) to be communicated. In this sense, and now transposing his depictions of history into geographical terms, I will ask: Can a sacred site serve as a reminder of what Ricoeur has called a ‘critical history’, a suspension of history perhaps somewhat akin to what Walter Benjamin considered to be a ‘weak messianic force’ moving within history, or what Johann Baptist Metz has designated in a theological context as a ‘dangerous memory’? How might we understand such sites and how might they critique other, violence-condoning monuments?

René Girard’s contrast of a false sacrality (mythology) that is complicit with its violent origins, seeking only to conceal them, with a more genuine sense of the sacred being that which exposes its own violent foundations in order to condemn violence, might aid us in further defining the perceived sacrality of spaces. For Girard, the empty tomb of Christ is precisely a gesture meant to avoid his death becoming a ‘monumental history’. By elaborating on the various connections between Ricoeur and Girard on precisely this issue, I will look at how particular geographical and potentially ‘sacred’ sites are perceived, as either ‘monumental’ or ‘critical’ and explore whether any site could be said to be legitimately ‘sacred’ as ‘critical’ by this criteria, or whether the absence of any sacrality (a genuinely ‘secular’ site) might be the only way to authentically provide a ‘critical’ history (e.g. G. Vattimo’s reading of Girard). In this context, I examine a Girardian account of secularization as a permanent critique (iconoclasm) of the sacred within our world yet in productive tension with Ricoeur’s occasional comments on memory, suffering and the sacred.

Geoffrey Diercksen (University of Antwerp, Belgium)
Imagination and Sense: Exploring Ricœur’s Hermeneutical Approach to Meaning

This paper explores how Ricœur’s hermeneutics contributes to the contemporary problem of meaning in philosophy. Exploring a hermeneutical approach to the problem of meaning is quite uncommon today. Not only is the concept of meaning itself heterogeneous, since it can apply to
many different issues: language, sense, perception, mental activity or text (Cassin et al. 2004, Speaks 2014). Furthermore, although hermeneutics is essentially concerned with text and finds its roots in the theory of the interpretation of texts, few contemporary hermeneutical theories discuss the problem of how meaning relates to the world. In fact, this particular problem has been at center stage in analytical philosophy of language for quite some time. Following Frege's distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference) analytical philosophers have traditionally been examining the meaning of language and whether and how it refers to sense and the objects in the world (e.g., Frege 1892, Searle 1982, Grice 1989). More recently, philosophy of mind analyzes the foundational relation between meaning and the mind: how our mind interacts with the physical world that has meaning (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn 2015, Searle 2015). And although phenomenology has been contributing to the problem of mind for over a decade (e.g., Dreyfus 1992, Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), this is much less the case for hermeneutics. Certainly, many recent theories draw on hermeneutics and phenomenology in order to examine the meaning of diverging aspects of human existence: ethics (e.g., Sohn 2014), social and political life (e.g., Michel 2015, Savage 2015), ipseity (e.g., Tengelyi 2014, Zahavi 2015), and even sense (Kearney and Treanor 2015). However, the problem of the relation between the mind and the meaning of the world is a lacuna in contemporary hermeneutics. It is therefore particularly salient to examine whether and to what extent hermeneutics can contribute to the problem of meaning.

This paper intends to show that Ricœur’s hermeneutics can contribute to the problem of meaning. Although Ricœur is not a major voice in the most recent debate on meaning in philosophy of mind, his idea of meaning, so I will argue, allows responding to one of the major problems in the contemporary debate on meaning: whether meaning comes to mind by means of predisposed mental content, representations, desires, tokens, intentions and the like (i.e., representationalism), or resulting from direct empirical interaction with and adaption to the world (i.e., non-representationalism) (e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, Hutto and Myin 2013, Descombes 2014, Searle 2015). In drawing in particular on Ricœur’s idea of imagination I will aim to show how meaning relates to sensation, and how metaphors and symbols alter the relation between meaning and the world (Ricœur 1978, 1984, 1986 1990, 2004). Ricœur understands meaning as a relation between the sensible body on the one hand, and singular cultural and historical contexts (the ‘stories’ or ‘narratives’ that make-up existence) that we interpret by means of imagination on the other hand (Ricœur 1992, 2007). Ricœur draws on early analytical philosophy of language in order to contest an idealistic interpretation of meaning in questioning the idea of the ego cogito (e.g., Ricœur 1977). For Ricœur, linguistic reference allows relating concepts to the physical world. Yet at the same time Ricœur defends a phenomenological-hermeneutical idea of meaning in understanding reality by means of the interpretation of language and narratives, in particular in the form of cultural and historical texts (Ricœur 2007). For Ricœur, experiencing, acting, thinking, etc. occur within singular cultural-historical contexts mediated by interpretation that requires imagination. I argue that Ricœur’s idea of imagination thus allows understanding meaning as a creative and narrative process of affection in singular cultural and historical, yet also empirical, contexts, rather than as a process of either application of mental representational content to the world or direct empirical interaction between an organism and its environment.

David Fisher (North Central College, IL, USA)
Paul Ricoeur and the Limits of Narrative: The “Hegelian Temptation” Revisited

At the end of the concluding chapter of Time and Narrative, Paul Ricoeur discusses the limits of narrative, arguing that “limit” could refer to the way in which “the art of narration exceeds itself to the point of exhaustion, in attempting to draw near the inscrutable,” or to the way “that the
narrative genre itself overflows into other genres of discourse”. A brief mention of lyric poetry follows.

The argument of the paper is that while Ricoeur’s analysis in *Time and Narrative* can be read as an extension of *The Rule of Metaphor* (just as *Oneself as Another* can be read as an extension of his treatment of narrative identity in *Time and Narrative*), Ricoeur’s predilection for narrative can also be read as an instance of succumbing to the “Hegelian temptation”.

Beginning with a close reading of “the Hegelian temptation” in *Time and Narrative* (pp. 193 – 206) and “Life in Quest of Narrative” (in David Wood, *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*), the paper argues that “Hegelian temptation” is to surrender to desires for reconciliation of tensions implied in the beginning of a plot; a feature common to all forms of narrative. By contrast, lyric is driven by desires for attending to fragments of memory and experience through the possibilities of language - which may conclude in weak or strong closure in ways explored in Barbara Herrnstein Smith’s *Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End*.

The paper concludes with a discussion of Nikita Nanov’s “The Narrative of Ricoeur’s *Time and Narrative*.” Nanov argues that “Hegel’s narrative has an end in the strong narratological sense of the word. The “end occupies a determinative position because of the light it sheds (or might shed) on the meaning of the events leading to it. The end functions as [. . .] the magnetizing force, the organizing principle of narrative: reading (processing) a narrative is, among other things, waiting for the end”. By contrast, “Time and Narrative, narratologically speaking, has a weak end. The meaning of Ricoeur’s narrative does not absolutely depend on the end for the constitution of its overall meaning. Rather, it acquires its full meaning by pointing beyond its own narrative end”.

Where narrative suggests a supplement or sequel, lyric often ends with “not yet” or “perhaps,” as in the concluding lines of Wallace Steven’s “Man on the Dump”:

On the dump? Is it to sit among mattresses of the dead,
Bottles, pots, shoes, and grass and murmur aptest eve:
Is it to hear the blatter of grackles and say
Invisible priest; is it to eject, to pull
The day to pieces and cry stanza my stone?
Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the.

Camila Freitas (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) and Marcai Benetti (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)

*The Phenomenology of Memory and the “Capable Human Being” of Journalism*

Journalism can operate in the construction of memory, this diffuse and always open information network of documents and reminiscence. Every memory is endowed with temporality, therefore belong to a time is let to measure the existence of that time. The reminiscence falls on an active search in the elapsed timeline, which follows the original reference and returns to the moment when that impression was made remarkable. Such action suggests that the reminiscences are formed when a variation occurs after another. This reflexive activity refers to the ability to select a starting point in order to begin the journey of remembrance. Journalism is a great archive of men’s history and the journalist builds this file to organize the information that will be available in the future. Increasingly, the potential to prioritize and organize are predicates required of the journalist in the information architecture process. Thus, here, journalist will be understood as a

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subject able to prioritize, organize and provide information both for the present and the future. To understand how journalism keeps the past alive, we need to consider not only the temporal understanding, but also the narrative issue – because the narrative is a way to rescue the elapsed events. The relation between memory and journalism has a twofold responsibility – now with the notion of real, sometimes with the historical knowledge. The commitment to real aim at verisimilitude – from the mimetic understanding supported by the realist discourse – and the commitment with the historical knowledge will guide the issues of collective memory, which are linked to heritages and to the ability to reframe what happens nowadays. In a theoretical reflection, the aim of this paper is to discuss how journalism uses and negotiates memory in its narrative practices. We approach the phenomenology of memory, which allows to elucidate the evocation of the past in current days, and Paul Ricoeur’s concept of “capable human being” (Homo Capax), that discusses the subject through his actions and his ethics. We resume the capable human being’s potentialities, approximate them to the journalist desirable skills and, finally, we propose the definition of the capable human being of journalism. In our perspective, he or she may be able to: 1) recognize notable events; 2) recognize and narrate the otherness; 3) report and read the events, highlight the diversity of social discourses and insert the men in their time; 4) rank, organize and provide information to the future, and 5) create memory.

Guido Gorgoni (University of Padova, Italy)

“Vertu de la responsabilité et sagesse de l’imputation”: repenser le sujet de la responsabilité en droit

Le but de cette contribution est d’explorer les retombées des analyses que Paul Ricoeur consacre à la responsabilité juridique et au sujet de droit, notamment à partir de Le Juste (1 et 2), puis en Parcours de la Reconnaissance.

La révision sémantique de l’idée de responsabilité proposée par Ricoeur soustrait la responsabilité juridique à la logique rétributive, pour la réinsérer dans le contexte de l’anthropologie capacitaire de l’attestation dans le signe de la responsabilité éthique, en privilégiant l’étymologie de l’ouverture à l’autre (ob-audire) sur celle du devoir de réponse (ob-ligare), souvent considérée comme étant sa signification la plus authentiquement juridique (Villey).

À coté de sa traditionnelle déclinaison retrospective (en tant que tournée vers la passé du déjà-fait) se définit ainsi une dimension de la responsabilité que l’on peut appeler de prospective (en tant que orientée vers ce qui est encore à faire), qui est proactive plus que que réactive, et qui ne procède pas nécessairement d’une préalable assignation de devoirs spécifiques.

Une responsabilité qui se situe en deçà du devoir ne peut pas, par définition, être entièrement codifiée. La notion d’obligation y reste, mais elle ne peut pas être déterminée a priori et fait l’objet d’une évaluation liée aux circonstances, qui tient précisément au sujet responsable. C’est précisément la dynamique de l’auto-imputation des responsabilités qui qualifie le sujet de droit en tant que sujet du droit à plein titre, ou « véritable sujet de droit » selon l’expression de Ricoeur.

L’apport de ces réflexions pour la théorie du droit est au moins double et se joue autant au plan de la philosophie du droit, en permettant d’un côté le renouveau de l’idée de responsabilité, et en offrant de l’autre une clé de lecture du soft law et des instruments volontaires de régulation, qui caractérisent aujourd’hui les domaines où les questions de responsabilité sont les plus aigües (ex. innovation technologique), et qui répondent plus à une logique de “respondance” (responsiveness) que de réponse selon la modalité de la liability ou de l’accountability.
Face à la montée en puissance des formes soft de régulation, si d’un côté il est difficile de ne pas constater la crise des garanties juridiques traditionnelles liées à l’accès en justice, de l’autre côté il ne serait pas ni approprié ni réaliste leur nier tout droit de citoyenneté juridique, au risque d’ignorer une partie considérable de la régulation contemporaine des responsabilités.

C’est ici que peut intervenir la « sagesse de l’imputation », qui nous dit que, même pensée sous la forme d’une auto-obligation, la responsabilité juridique doit maintenir la structure triadique je-tu-chacun, relation qui n’est pas exclusive de la seule enceinte judiciaire mais qui est inscrite aussi au cœur des dynamiques de reconnaissance des droits fondamentaux, à la fois individuels et universels. La garantie de ces droits devra être cherchée dans des formes alternatives à la sanction qui privilégient la dimension horizontale de la reconnaissance réciproque sur celle verticale de l’autorité.

Brian Gregor (California State University, Dominguez Hills, USA)

_Cryptotheology or Philosophical Hermeneutics of Religion? Revisiting Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another and its Missing Lectures_

Given this year’s conference theme of “crossing boundaries,” I would like to reconsider one of the most significant—even notorious—boundaries of Ricoeur’s thought: namely, the boundary between philosophy and theology. These two disciplines have a longstanding, reciprocal relation in Ricoeur’s thought: he read widely in theology, which had a significant influence on his philosophical hermeneutics; he was also widely read by theologians, who have put his philosophy to theological work. But as is well known, Ricoeur was also very scrupulous about the boundaries between the two disciplines.

Arguably the most famous instance of Ricoeur’s commitment to disciplinary boundaries is his decision to edit the published version of his Gifford lectures—_Oneself as Another_—to exclude the two lectures on biblical faith. On his account, he sought to avoid the appearance of “cryptotheology” (OA 24) in the book’s arguments, so that its overall positions regarding the self, action, narrative, ethics, and morality would not appear dependent on convictions from biblical faith.

There has been a lot of debate regarding Ricoeur’s distinction between philosophy and theology in general. While that general approach raises important questions, in this paper I will take a fresh look at the excluded lectures themselves. In “The Self in the Mirror of Scriptures,” Ricoeur explores the symbolic grid by which self-understanding is constituted in Judaism and Christianity. In “The Summoned Subject,” he articulates a model of the self who receives this textually-constituted self-understanding. I will argue that both of these essays belong fully within the boundaries of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics, and are neither theological nor crypto-theological. While Ricoeur’s concern about these lectures is in some ways understandable, their exclusion from _Oneself as Another_ is not strictly necessary.

Moreover, I argue that Ricoeur himself actually offers a good reason for including this hermeneutics of religion within _Oneself as Another_, since it helps philosophical hermeneutics to respect its boundaries and “protect itself from the hubris that would set it up as the heir to the philosophies of the cogito and as continuing their self-foundedational claim” (OA 25). Thus Ricoeur’s lectures on biblical faith could serve this limiting, prohibitive task in _Oneself as Another_.

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Annemie Halsema (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands)
Hermeneutics of the Self: Ricoeur and Schechtman on the Unity of Narrative Identity

There are several reasons why thinking about personal identity in ethics is relevant. In the first place, because we need something constant to refer to in cases of moral deliberation or responsibility: in moral deliberation I consider what is in my best interest, in moral responsibility it is important to know whether the I that committed an action can still be held accountable for that action. In these cases, identity concerns the constancy of the self to which actions can be attributed. In the second place, personal identity is relevant for ethics in the context of moral inclinations and as an answer to the question “what makes us moral?”. In this case, self-identity does not pertain to constancy, but includes a more encompassing notion of the self. Here also constancy is at issue, but this time it is not the “whatness” of identity, but rather a person’s “whoness.” Different accounts of self-identity belong to this second category. For some of these – such as Marya Schechtman’s (1996; 2008) – the notion of the self precedes ethical action, for others, for instance Christine Korsgaard in Self-Constitution (2009), it is the action itself that is constitutive of the self’s identity.

Most theories of personal identity in ethics belong to the first category: they start with an investigation into the nature of personal identity and then show how the conclusions in the metaphysical domain apply to practical concerns. Paul Ricoeur does not seem to be an exception to this tendency to ground ethical notions of the self in ontological ones: in Oneself as Another (1992) he first develops an account of narrative identity and then relates it to ethics. His notion of self-identity is often mentioned as a notion in which the gathering of the self that is important for ethics (the self’s unity) takes place by means of a narrative. In this paper, it is my aim to show that the relevance of Ricoeur’s theory for the discussion upon personal identity in ethics is more encompassing than often noted. Most often Ricoeur is associated with thinkers such as MacIntyre, Taylor, and Schechtman who develop practical narrative accounts of the self. Galen Strawson for instance quotes a sentence in Oneself as Another in which Ricoeur relates a subject’s ethical agency with the gathering of his life in the form of a narrative (2005: 71). In this paper, my aim is to show that Ricoeur’s theory adds a third notion of self-identity relevant for ethics to the ones above, a notion in which self-identity is indispensable for ethics because it forms the instance that can produce change in the world: it is the agent that has the power to do things (1992: 112).

Timo Helenius (Brown University, USA)
Ricoeur - A Faithful Philosopher of Tension

The recent discussions between Kearney, Caputo, Kristeva, Marion, and others in a way re-enact many earlier exchanges, private and public, on the religious significance of atheism—oftentimes linked with globalization, urbanization, and secularism.¹ One such discussion took place five decades ago between Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur in form of Bampton Lectures at Columbia University in 1966. Whereas MacIntyre focused on the socio-cultural settings of and the accompanying challenges for modern theism as a platform for morality, Ricoeur presented in “Religion, Atheism, and Faith” a thesis that atheism will open a path toward a new, albeit postreligious faith. Atheism, the prevailing outlook of modernity, is for Ricoeur therefore “both a

break and a link between religion and faith.\(^2\) In brief, Ricoeur argues that atheism as value-nihilism is the destroyer of religious accusation and condemnation as well as of the illusory consolation offered by the ruthlessly commanding “moral God” that has died in modernity. Even so, atheism is at the same time also the liberator of tragic personal faith that takes risks and is, in a positive manner, uncertain of itself.

Philosophy, standing between atheism and faith, has the task of moving the moderns beyond the impasse and dead end of values toward the new “obedience” of postreligious faith. Simply put, this move is guided by the call to understand that emerges out from the atheism of such destroyers as Nietzsche and Freud. After their purification of religious accusation, condemnation, and consolation, philosophy can lead us to recognize a new, tragic faith “that wanders in the darkness”\(^3\) and yet provides a horizon of hope. Since the legalistic metaphysical gods and value systems are all expelled from the modern ethos, this as postreligious as postatheistic faith will have to assume a new kind of grounding.

Philosophy, in its obedience to the call to understand, explains that the primordial human desire and effort to exist manifests itself in language; this dynamic linguistic realm is the modern “word-becoming of Being” in place of “the word-event of Job”\(^4\) that was already an opening toward the path of tragic faith. The modern consolation, according to Ricoeur, is our belongingness to language and to *logos* that through its criticism of the given still “lets things be, or be shown”\(^5\) as also Heidegger put it. In other words, human beings belong to the whole as speaking beings whose language carries the full significance of their being. The tragedy of postreligious faith lies in having an awareness of this postcritical possibility that itself transgresses the tragic killing of gods. Symbols, Ricoeur stresses, do not decompose. I will later discuss in more detail Ricoeur’s dictum that “an idol must die, in order that a symbol of Being may speak.”\(^6\) In this paper I will explore Ricoeur’s notion of the postreligious, modern faith—or a kind of anatheistic secondary naïveté—that he elaborated in many of his texts.

Cristal Huang (Soochow University, Taiwan)

*Crossing Boundaries between Textualizing and Manifesting—Paul Ricoeur’s Emplotment on Humanistic Formation*

From the studies on Paul Ricoeur, we follow up multiple dimensions from Paul Ricoeur’s ideas from his ideas on text and discourse. In the education of Hermeneutics, it is important to re-think humanistic education in global age. Paul Ricoeur’s ideas on text and discourse may help us to re-think on the process between having a discourse, and presenting it into the form of writing in fixing. How to present one object appropriately in the humanistic education? Do we learn knowledge from certain master, mentor, or ancient authors? Or, actually we learn in order to imitate his/her structure of life as a journey? The paper will focus on introducing Ricoeur’s ideas between text and discourse, emplotment and manifesting, our ideas are by textualizing these concepts from Ricoeur in his certain writings, in order to emplot Ricoeur’s own model and the humanistic formation. He himself provided a model with ideal form for humanistic formation. In

\(^2\) Ricoeur 1969, 59.—Ricoeur’s lecture was given and published jointly with Alasdair MacIntyre’s lecture in English. It was later republished in an edited form in French in *Le conflit des interetations*. In his *Anatheism*, Richard Kearney cites the English translation of this work (*The Conflict of Interpretations*), for which the essay (that now was in French) was translated again in English.

\(^3\) Ricoeur 1969, 88.

\(^4\) Ricoeur 1969, 90.

\(^5\) Ricoeur 1969, 94.

\(^6\) Ricoeur 1969, 98.
reading Ricoeur, we always cross boundaries in order to achieve another field. Reading Ricoeur in global age, we believe that his own emplotment on humanistic formation is a journey with humanistic totality without boundaries.
Dans cet article, je présenterai les questions de l’histoire, de l’origine et de la réflexion entre le lien entre Ricoeur et la phénoménologie.


Michael Johnson (Concordia College, MN, USA)

*The Third Discourse: Convergences of Phenomenology and Neuroscience in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Pierre Changeux*

An exceptional case of Ricoeur’s “crossing the boundaries” of disciplines, driven by his understanding of hermeneutics as itself necessarily practiced through a kind of transdisciplinarity, is his engagement with the views of the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux, a conversation published in *Ce qui nous fait penser: La nature et la règle* (Editions Odile Jacob, 1998; English trans.: *What Makes Us Think?: A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain*, Princeton, 2002). Remarkably, both Changeux and Ricoeur agree on the necessity of creating a “third discourse” that would cross the “semantic dualism” of two ways of speaking, or two discourses, about human consciousness of self and world. For Ricoeur, this conversation hearkens back to the “subjective body” of Maine de Biran, Husserl’s flesh (chair), and the “third substance” discussed by Descartes in his sixth Meditation, the Passions of the Soul, and the Letters to Elizabeth, and further developed in Spinoza’s idea of substance based on the conatus, the effort to persevere in being. It also hearkens back to Ricoeur’s central argument in *Freedom and Nature* that objectifying scientific discourse can provide “indications” (or signs) of the first-person experiences of willing, decision and effort, but that such objectifying description loses the very thing it tries to describe. Changeux believes recent advances in the last few decades in neuroscience, charted out in his *Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind* (Princeton, 1997), pave the way to a new discourse that would allow a naturalizing of the phenomenology of consciousness, but in a non-reductionist manner supporting a humanistic understanding of ethics and the human spirit. Ricoeur, while, on the one hand, appreciating Changeux’s approach, resists, on the other hand, the naturalizing of the phenomenology of consciousness, and the subject body (or the third substance), even as his hermeneutical approach will endorse a mixed discourse that incorporates objectifying discourse as a moment of interpretation of human selfhood. Changeux, along with his collaborator Stanislas Dehaene, have developed a theoretical model of conscious processing called the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) which involves an “effortful consciousness” and attention, an account which has its roots in William James account of decision as a process involving an effort of attention. Here is another convergence between Ricoeur and Changeux.
underlying their agreement on the necessity of a third discourse about consciousness. However, it is here we also find the reason for Ricoeur’s final disagreement with Changeux based in his stubborn refusal to naturalize phenomenology. In his phenomenology of attention contained in the chapter, “From Hesitation to Choice,” at the end of Part I of *Freedom and Nature*, Ricoeur, in part based on James, argues that the phenomenology of the intentionality of attention reveals it to be a kind of active-receptivity, involving an effort of the “action of the self on itself” based on Husserl’s horizon analysis of the intentionality as well as the radical passive synthesis of self and time in inner-time consciousness. Despite this disagreement between Ricoeur and Changeux, I believe the GNW model is a fruitful area of future research to expand a hermeneutical discussion of the “third discourse” about the consciousness and the ontology of selfhood.

Morn Joy (University of Calgary, Canada)
Ricoeur from Fallibility to Fragility and Ethics

In the last twenty years of his life, Ricoeur expressed a growing dismay at the undiminishing amount of violence that human beings continued to inflict on one another. For Ricoeur, this was a manifestation of suffering in the form of unjustified harm perpetrated on innocent people. As a result, he moved from simply theoretical discussions of philosophical problematics to struggle with more pronounced ethical and practical issues. In an interview he observed “I must say that in my previous work there is very little about ethics and politics” (Ricoeur in Reagan 1996:114). He then continued, as if justifying this change:

It is this speculative problem of action and passion but also the problem of victimization – the whole story of this cruel century, the twentieth century – and all of the suffering imposed on the Third World by the rich, affluent countries, by colonialism. There is a history of victims that keeps accompanying or reduplicating the history of the victors. But the history I try to revive has a strong ethical debt to the victims. (114)

Ricoeur admitted that attention to the primordial suffering which seems endemic to the human situation initially led a return to his early mentors, Jaspers and Marcel. He would, however, develop his thinking beyond these earlier abstract and less-applied investigations Yet he acknowledged that this earlier work on human fallibility contained the seeds of his later work. In his early work *Fallible Man* (1986 [1960]), Ricoeur’s use of the term “fallibility” had been virtually co-extensive with “fragility,” witnessing to a weakness or intrinsic fault in humanity. In this extensive phenomenological study of human fallibility, Ricoeur appraised this term: “What is meant by calling man fallible? Essentially, this: that the possibility of moral evil is inherent in man’s constitution” (*FM*, 133).

In the same work, he invoked “fragility” as also indicative of this weakness in humanity. Fragility is not merely the “locus,” the point of insertion of evil, nor even the origin, starting from which man falls; it is the capacity for evil. To say that man is fallible is to say that the limitation to a being who does not coincide with himself is the primordial weakness from which evil arises. (*FM*, 146)

It was during his subsequent investigation of thinkers on evil and suffering that Ricoeur encountered the work of Hannah Arendt, who had a marked influence on aspects of his work. In this context, her understanding of the fragility of all things human marked subtle but significant shift in Ricoeur’s work that I believe is indicative of his move into the public domain.
This became more evident in the 80’s and 90’s when Ricoeur began to employ the word “frailty” or “fragility” together with “vulnerability” as indicative of the dimension of unmerited suffering in the world that so distressed him. He struggled to discern a way to protect human beings from such unmerited suffering. Rather than undertake a search to determine the factual fault or failing that can lead to bad behaviour. The question became: “What shall we do with this fragile being, what shall we do for her or him? We are directed towards a future of a being in need of help to survive and to grow” (Ricoeur in Kearney 1996:16). This statement encapsulates the impetus of Ricoeur’s turn to practical ethics.

In this paper, I propose to trace Ricoeur’s development, starting from Fallible Man and The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1966 [1950]), by way of The Symbolism of Evil, (1967 [1960]) OneSelf as Another, (1992 [1990]) and The Course of Recognition, (2007 [2005]) as he undertakes an important development into ways of grounding his ethical ontology.

Sebastian Kaufmann (Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile)

The Care of Time in Ricoeur

Ricoeur develops in OneSelf as Another what we can call a phenomenology of ipseity. The concept of ipseity appears in the introduction as a fundamental part of the book. The book is, in part, an effort of clarification on the meaning and the sense of ipseity, which first is introduced as reflexivity. Secondly, ipseity appears in contrast with idem-identity. While it is true that our identity is an articulation between idem and ipse, what defines humans identity is ipseity. Finally, the problem of ipseity is discussed in the context of the dialectic between oneself and otherness. This discussion shows us that ipseity is crucial to the project of OneSelf as Another where we find a phenomenology of ipseity that describes reflexivity, identity and alterity.

When we focus on the problem of ipseity and personal identity, there is another dimension of ipseity that arises: The relation between ipseity and temporality. Ipse-identity can be defined in part as a willingness of being oneself through time. The main examples of ipse-identity, that is, memory, promise, forgiveness and imputability, confirms the importance of temporality for the constitution of the self.

These analyses will lead us to the following conclusions: The relation with time is crucial for the constitution of ipseity. There are two risks that we should try to avoid. First, we should avoid a relationship with time where time erodes the self, for example, in the case when the self is incapable of keeping its promises. Secondly, we should prevent ourselves of becoming trapped by the past or by a promise that becomes meaningless. In these cases, time impede to move on and be available and capable of new promises or new projects.

These reflections will show that our relationship with time is fragile, so we need to take care of time. Time, then, primarily, is a matter of care for the self.

Giacomo Leoni (Boston University, USA)

Ricoeur and Marion: Can the Saturated Phenomenon of Inheritance Solve the Aporia of Historical Narrative?

While Ricoeur’s Temps et Récit does an excellent job at describing the reliance of narrative mimesis on the Augustinian aporia of time, it was in Histoire et Vérité that he described for the first time the inherent and problematized codependence between the historian and the object(s)
of his study. However, his concept of the historian (and the modern reader) as “immersed” in the cultural sequence of ‘philosophical reflection’ does not exhaust the problem of whether the subjectivity of the cultural inheritor is necessarily postulated by the original writer. If it is true that the reader narrates himself at the same time as he is interpreting the historical or philosophical document («l’histoire fait l’historien autant que l’historien fait l’histoire», H&V 39), would not necessarily ensue that the interpreter is necessary to the interpreted for the original ambition to “make sense” to be fulfilled? Nonetheless, our traditional binary description of cultural inheritance as a matter of either “generative” and independent interpretation (à la Barthes) or milieu-dominated reconstruction (Gadamer) fails to disclose this ruptural tension. From a strictly historical perspective, this would appear to restrict the moment of cultural inheritance into a paradoxical status of inconceivability: if the inheritor’s and the inheritee’s subjectivity are co-dependent, how can their philosophical production ever come to be, given their individual and theoretical diachronic distance? French phenomenology (especially with Levinas and Marion, the latter in dialogue with Derrida) can provide a twofold solution: on the one hand Derrida (explicitly reading Ricoeur) and Levinas invite us to conceive the inconceivable as a generative (and not a limiting) moment. On the other hand, Marion’s notion of saturated phenomenon (/-na), usually relegated to theological interpretation, provides a model for a description of a human phenomenon that can only be witnessed in the bracketing: while we cannot account for how historical legacy and interpretation are generated, we witness the two phenomena separately and we can from those intuit (but not theorize) the paradoxical moment of transmission.

In my paper, I plan to identify the problem, familiarize the audience with the discussion On the Name that was going on in French Phenomenological debate throughout the entirety of Ricoeur’s career, and propose Marion’s model as a solution for the problem described above.

Gonçalo Marcelo (CECH, Universidade de Coimbra / Universidade Católica Porto, Portugal)

*Ricoeur’s Critique of Reason*

In my presentation, I intend to analyze the specific way in which Ricoeur uses the concept of reason and, more specifically, the elements that we can find in his philosophy that allow us to discern a “critique of reason”, one of philosophy’s most important tasks from Kant onwards. In order to do so, I will come back to Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics, by showing how, in his intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate, he is close to the emancipatory project of Critical Theory and yet denies such a critical gesture (a gesture of reason itself) its full autonomy, since it is to be grounded on the meaningful traditions of the past. Secondly, I will also recall Ricoeur’s post-Hegelian Kantianism to show how the core dynamics of his thought resorts to a process of a creative conflict of interpretations that is somehow reminiscent of Hegelian dialectics but nevertheless respects the limits imposed by the Kantian antinomies, thus putting a halt to the self-development of Spirit in its strongest meaning, such as we can find it in Hegel’s metaphysics.

However, the core goal of the presentation will be to put to the test a working hypothesis, according to which we could find in Ricoeur’s writings, even though he does not explicitly spell this out in so many words, a critique of reductionism, a task that has been upheld, for instance, by Charles Taylor. More specifically, I will try to use the Ricoeurian lens to criticize two contemporary takes on reason and that reduce it to some dominant uses that do not seem justifiable to me. The first one is the identification of reason with technoscientific progress and in order to do so I will recap Ricoeur’s debate with Jean-Pierre Changeux; the second one is the definition of rational behavior as being equated with the pursuit of self-interest (or, in more sophisticated versions, with expected utility) such as we can find it in some economic theories that are prevalent today (neoclassical economics and, most of all, Rational Choice Theory).
It is in my belief that the critical project of recovering the often-neglected meanings and uses of reason has to go through the process of criticizing these prevalent, dominant contemporary uses and that in RICOEUR’S philosophy we can find the right resources to do so.

Alberto Martinengo (University of Milan, Italy)
Metaphor Gives Rise to Thought: Paul Ricoeur’s Step Beyond the Linguistic Turn

In his essay, Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor (2008), Mark Johnson argues that the impact of studies on the conceptual metaphor requires now a radical reconsideration of the nature and aims of philosophy: in light of the “metaphorical constitution of basic concepts” in many different fields, “we need now to rethink what we are about as philosophers”. As is well known, his hypothesis is that “philosophical analysis is primarily metaphor analysis”, i.e., “the logic and inferential structure of metaphors [ground] our basic philosophical understanding of experience” (Johnson 2008: 44).

The aim of my presentation is to make use of Johnson’s categories to reflect on a part of Paul Ricoeur’s legacy. I will deal with Ricoeur’s contributions to the contemporary metaphorical revival and question whether they can work as a sort of bridge between the linguistic turn and the so-called pictorial turn (W.J.T. Mitchell). I will consider the relation between the verbal and the visual according to two different figures, both dependent on the Kantian topos of the Copernican revolution.

1. Ricoeur’s philosophy as a second Copernican Revolution
Can Ricoeur’s hermeneutical turn be regarded as a sort of Copernican revolution in the 20th century philosophies of language? The answer seems positive as long as we consider Ricoeur’s issue on symbolism and metaphor as a rediscovery of their respective cognitive impacts. I will discuss this thesis, (a) retracing its origins in Ricoeur’s criticism against phenomenology, and (b) highlighting the contribution of The Rule of Metaphor to the metaphorical revival.

2. The Pictorial Turn as a third Copernican Revolution
In Ricoeur’s reading, metaphor does not work only as an instrument for renewing language, but also as a device for visualization. I will show how this focus on the visual impact of metaphor implies a step beyond the limits of panlinguism. A clear shift in the analysis becomes necessary: a displacement in which not only the extra-logical background of reflection comes to the fore, but image inside language (i.e. metaphor) gives rise to the linguistic practice. In this reactivation of the role of the image – that the pictorial turn seems able to provide, unlike the linguistic turn – the discussion concerning Ricoeur’s legacy can probably make new claims on our attention.

Greg McKinzie (Fuller Theological Seminary, USA)
Detour or Dialectic?: The Ineluctable Incarnation of Paul Ricoeur’s Textual Hermeneutics

Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic turn is part of a grand dialectic of incarnational existence and linguistic mediation that spans his work. Yet, the recent proposals called “carnal hermeneutics” proceed on the assumption that Ricoeur’s philosophy is marked by a rift between the textual and the carnal. In particular, Richard Kearney’s language calls to mind Ricoeur’s well-known tendency to structure his reflections as “detour and return”: the text was a detour from from the body. The return trip appears, however, to have left textual hermeneutics in the rear view mirror. For carnal hermeneutics, the text is a different destination than the body. The detour metaphor leaves the
body and the text at an essential distance from one another. Thus, we have difficulty asking what the body has to do with the text, for one always seems to be a “turning away” from the other. If, however, Ricoeur’s work exhibits not a detour but a dialectic, the tension between body and text may yet generate new insights, both carnal and textual. Given the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s “radical phenomenology of flesh” for carnal hermeneutics, this paper begins by briefly surveying the question of embodied expression raised by Merleau-Ponty. The inscription of embodied expression in the text is the phenomenon that poses the hermeneutical question sharply in terms of both body and text. Likewise, the presumed embodiment of both author and reader underlie Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Therefore, the paper’s primary concern is to sketch two indices that establish the existence of a body-text dialectic in Ricoeur’s philosophy. The first index is the dialectic relationship of Ricoeur’s well-known hermeneutical second naïveté with his original, incarnate second naïveté in Freedom and Nature. The second index is Ricoeur’s narrative mediation of incarnate intentionality in Oneself as Another. The progression of these two indices traces the emergence of the grand dialectic that constitutes the ineluctable incarnation of Ricoeur’s textual hermeneutics.

Robert Piercey (University of Regina, Canada)

Degenerate Traditions

Many theorists argue that inquiries such as science and philosophy are tradition-constituted: not the asking of questions that could be raised “by anyone at any place or time,” but historical movements in which thinkers inherit problematics from the past, and try, in established ways, to move them forward. An important feature of this view is a recognition that traditions sometimes break down, ceasing to progress with the questions that define them. Believers in tradition-constituted inquiry typically try to explain what it means for a tradition to break down in this way. Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, identifies three marks of degenerate traditions: widespread instrumentalism; an obsession with refuting skepticism; and repeated attempts to insulate themselves from external criticism. We might quibble with the particulars of MacIntyre’s account, but if we see inquiry as tradition-constituted, we seem obliged to give some such account. If we cannot say what it is for traditions to go badly, we cannot make sense of what it means for them to go well.

It seems clear that Ricoeur is a believer in tradition-constituted inquiry. In Time and Narrative, he argues that “we are never at the beginning of the process of truth,” because “through tradition, we always find ourselves already situated in an order of meaning.” But the idea of a degenerate tradition seems in tension with the sharp distinctions Ricoeur draws among traditionality, traditions, and tradition. Traditionality is a way of being related to the past, a form of thinking not tied to any particular heritage. Traditions are these particular heritages, and are essentially plural. Tradition denotes one of these contents once it has been accepted as legitimate. A degenerate tradition seems to combine elements that Ricoeur wishes to keep separate. It blends traditionality with traditions and tradition, since it is a particular inheritance that nevertheless defines how its adherents think. It blends traditions with tradition, because while it is not just one content among others, it is not exactly regarded as legitimate. Its members endorse it, but sense that they should

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2 Ibid., 459-461.
not. If Ricoeur cannot make sense of degenerate traditions, his view of inquiry is missing something crucial.

I argue that Ricoeur does have the resources to give an account of degenerate traditions. I find these resources in his discussion of dead metaphors. Traditions, I claim, are inseparable from narratives of a certain sort. To belong to a tradition is to tell a certain kind of story about its development. And for Ricoeur, narratives and metaphors are two versions of the same process: a giving-rise to thought that results when the productive imagination sees one thing as another. If metaphors can wear out, so can narratives, and the ways in which they do illuminate what it is for a tradition to be in crisis.

Elyse Purcell (SUNY Oneonta, USA)

Testimony, Memory and Solidarity Across National Borders: Paul Ricoeur and Transnational Feminism

The challenges facing Syrian women refugees is only a recent example of the challenges women face in the transnational public sphere. Amnesty International interviewed forty refugee women and girls in northern Europe who travelled from Turkey to Greece and then across the Balkans, and reported that these women were often subjected to violence, assault, exploitation and sexual harassment. Some have even gone days without food. Sixteen-year-old Maryam described her experiences in the following story:

(In Greece) People started screaming and shouting, so the police attacked us and was hitting everyone with sticks. They hit me on my arm with a stick. They even hit younger kids. They hit everyone even on the head. I got dizzy and I fell, people were stepping on me. I was crying and was separated from my mother. They called my name and I was with my mother. I showed them my arm and a police officer saw my arm and laughed, I asked for a doctor, they asked me and my mother to leave.1

The case of the Syrian women refugees points to a larger problem within the transnational public sphere. This problem is one of presenting a cohesive identity for representation in the transnational public sphere for women. Should this lack of a represented identity be considered a problem for “women’s rights” or should it be considered a challenge a group of women with shared experiences faces from specific region in the world? Both of these approaches face particular difficulties. On the one hand, if one considers the problem of cohesive identity to be a problem for “women’s rights,” this stance does not address intersectional concerns. On the other hand, if one seeks to ground this cohesive identity on a set of shared common experiences, then one excludes those who are allies in the fight for representation in the transnational public sphere.

This paper proposes a solution to this problem of a cohesive identity for women’s representation in the transnational public sphere by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. What these women seem to have in common are shared political aims, but they have no basis for those aims. This paper will provide a basis for these aims by turning to Ricoeur’s work on collective memory from Memory, History, Forgetting. A group of people have access to past events and deeds through a collective memory. This memory is strengthened by the testimony of its group members who can

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say: “I was a witness to what happened, and if you do not believe me, ask someone else who was there.” Thus, this shared testimony and memory of past events can provide a foundation for a social bond for those with common political aims. Moreover, this common knowledge provides a justification or basis for the representation of women and their allies in the transnational public sphere.

Ken Reynhout (Bethel University, USA)
Ricoeur’s Ambivalent Take on Tillich’s Method of Correlation

Paul Ricoeur makes a number of references to Paul Tillich’s theological method of correlation. It is not surprising that Ricoeur was familiar with Tillich’s work, given Ricoeur’s occasional interest in theology, Tillich’s penchant for philosophy, similar interests (symbols, ontology, the self, etc.), a shared inclination toward interdisciplinarity, some mutual friends, and the fact that Ricoeur succeeded Tillich at the University of Chicago. However, Ricoeur displays some apparent ambivalence toward Tillich’s correlational method. At different points he is both an enthusiastic supporter and a suspicious critic (for example, in his well-known essays on “revelation” and “evil”), so it is not surprising that his theological interpreters are similarly divided on the question of whether or not Ricoeur’s philosophy endorses a Tillichian-style method of correlation (for example, Schweiker vs. Klemm, or more generally the ways in which some theologians continue to take sides in the “Yale-Chicago” debates, each arguing for a version of Ricoeur that sounds more Barthian or Tillichian, respectively). In this paper I assess this apparent ambivalence through a careful analysis of each reference to Tillich’s method within their rhetorical context. I argue that there is a reasonable explanation for this apparent ambivalence, which rests on the complicated relationship between philosophy and theology in Ricoeur’s thought and how this is worked out in his philosophical method. This is, of course, a controversial aspect of Ricoeur’s project, particularly as it relates to the question of Ricoeur’s personal religious convictions and their impact on his philosophy. Essential here is a distinction Ricoeur draws elsewhere between the sources of philosophy (where one’s personal faith convictions necessarily shape one’s hermeneutical naiveté) and the organization of philosophical discourse (where convictions are held in suspension while concepts are phenomenologically analyzed, weighed, and organized). In so doing, I hope to show that Ricoeur cannot easily be claimed as a champion for any particular theological method, Tillichian, Barthian, or otherwise.

Jeffrey Sacks (The Mount Sinai School of Medicine, USA)
“Freud and Philosophy: An Essay On Interpretation” by Paul Ricoeur: Fifty Years of Vulnerability, One Hundred Years of Hope

Paul Ricoeur in his 1965 work on Freud’s opus offers a collaborative commentary to Freud’s heirs. His offer or gift of collaboration through his “philosophical linguistic” study of the Freudian psychoanalytic theory introduced fallibility, multiple meaning and conflict of interpretation to a community wedded to a knowing hermeneutics of suspicion. He examined the therapeutic theory and wondered, “How were Freud’s discoveries interrelated with philosophy?” But looking backwards reveals the misrecognition of this collaborative invitation by the Freudian Analytic community struggling with its own conflicted identity without its founder. This misrecognition or misunderstanding deprived Ricoeur of a collaborative clinical voice and the clinical arena of an examination of its core assumptions by a major figure from another discipline.

Over the last fifty years, Ricoeur evolved his linguistic philosophy into his philosophical anthropology and offered gifts of commentary on the analytic clinical process. This paper explores
Ricoeur’s commentary on the clinical process and suggests areas of potential mutual recognition evolving over the next fifty years. In his last major works, “The self as Another” and “The Course of Recognition” he moves his exploration from an “I Know” to an “I am” model and moves his text/reader interaction into a person to person making sense model. This model of enduring human fallibility and clinical vulnerability initiated the transformation from capable man to a vulnerable one. Gratitude, Ricoeur suggested, is the embrace of multiplicity of meaning, vulnerability and hope. One way to understand the challenge Ricoeur posed to the analytic community was a shift in conceptualization from one-person biological gratification to two-party intersubjective gratitude. Gratification reflects a knowing moment or resolution from frustration to relief. Gratitude reflects an embrace of multiplicity of meaning and conflict, the intersubjective interaction with its myriads of permutation.

His phenomenological dialectical hermeneutics process or model moved towards the interpersonal interrelational world of contemporary psychoanalysis. The contemporary psychoanalytic community moved independently towards fallibility and vulnerability. Perhaps the next fifty years will contain a fuller collaborative exploration of Ricoeur’s gifts to the psychoanalytic venture, 1) the healing process of mutual recognition, 2) the shared poetics of will and 3) the search for liberation.

Roger Savage (University of California, Los Angeles, USA)

_Singularity and Exemplarity in Aesthetic Experience and Political Judgment_

In his remarks on aesthetic experience, Paul Ricoeur draws our attention to the paradox of the work of art’s communicability. This paradox, he explains, stems from the fact that the experience occasioned by a work in each case involves an individual listener, reader or spectator. Despite its singular character, this experience is at the same time in principal available to everyone. Hence this experience is the spring of the work’s claim to universality. The claim to universality brings to the forefront the prospective dimension of the work’s capacity to refashion the real in accordance with the world projected by the work. Ricoeur’s assertion that _mimesis_ demands more of the way that we think about truth thus places the work’s exemplarity at the heart of its productively subversive power.

In this paper, I intend to draw on the model of the work’s exemplarity in order to explore the role of imagination in political judgment. The conjunction of the work of art’s singularity and communicability authorizes transposing aesthetic experience laterally onto the domains of ethics and politics. Moreover, our apprehension of the fittingness of a moral or political act in response to the demands of the situation calling for it is the equivalent of the work of art’s communicability. Just as we grasp the “rule” summoned by a work through apprehending the fit of its various elements, the testimony offered by exemplary acts and lives is the source of the injunction to follow after them. What is more, exemplary works and acts are indicative of the imagination’s subversive power in breaking open ideologically congealed systems and habits of thought. By focusing on the connection between singularity and exemplarity, I propose to show how the testimony given by works and acts vests aesthetic experience and political judgment with their prospective dimensions. In conclusion, I will outline the place of political judgment in the structure of action as Ricoeur describes it.
Some of Ricoeur’s earliest articulations of hope appear as a response to evil (*The Symbolism of Evil* 1967). The symbol “gives rise to thought” and also to hope, “‘even Life is a symbol, an image, before being experienced and lived. And the symbol of life is saved as a symbol only through communication with the ensemble of the eschatological symbols of justification’” (Ricoeur 278). Communication then is crucial for the power of a symbol to invoke hope. In 1965, Ricoeur’s contemporary Jacques Ellul publishes his seminal work *Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes*. I am interested in describing the (unavoidable?) overlap between Ricoeur’s articulations of hope and Ellul’s discernment of propaganda. Ellul distances his study from a definition of propaganda as “evil” (x) but notes that under the influence of propaganda “everyone stops speaking the language of the others” (215). Propaganda hijacks the language of hope. Ellul maintains that “propaganda scientifically (not spontaneously. . .) develops dividing lines, establishes psychological separations between groups, and does all this under a common collective cloak of unreality and verbal fiction” (216). Propaganda then frustrates any healthy sense of a “conflict of interpretations” and establishes a “world of closed minds” with individuals accusing others while justifying the self (Ellul 214). Ricoeur issues a similar warning at his conclusion of *The Symbolism of Evil* as he contrasts his hermeneutical wager with “an apologetics that pretends to lead reflection, without a break, from knowledge toward belief” (357). Propaganda itself is rife with symbols that, for Ricoeur, give rise to thought and hope. However, “propaganda suppresses conversation; the man opposite is no longer an interlocutor but an enemy” (Ellul 213). How then are symbols warped to not give rise to thought? Propaganda’s symbols are not “dead” but perhaps closest to the symbols of defilement or stain (Ricoeur 24-46). Finally, one possible literary source to serve as a case study in which to convene this discussion between Ricoeur and Ellul on hope and propaganda may be touched upon in James Joyce’s fictional assessment of early 20th century Dublin, Ireland in his collection of short stories *Dubliners* (1914). Joyce’s collection begins with the ominous decree, “There was no hope. . .” (3). Joyce’s hopeless inhabitants of Dublin are faced with a domineering moral and spiritual authority in the form of the Roman Catholic Church and the political and economical oppression of the British Empire. In this literary scenario, religious and political propagandas usurp the vital messages of hope. Through the combined lens of Ricoeur and Ellul against the backdrop of Joyce’s hopeless Ireland, this study discerns the symbols of hope against the trappings of propaganda.

**Works Cited**


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Michael Sohn (Cleveland State University, USA)

**Translation as an Ethico-political Task**

Translation is an apt metaphor for describing the contemporary situation of pluralism and difference. It is not simply an act or movement between languages, but, more primordially, between people who start from a situation of distance. The reality of linguistic diversity and difference has led to reflection on whether and to what extent translation is possible. Some argue for the impossibility of translation given the radical heterogeneity of other languages. Others argue for an original language beneath the diversity of languages that is the common fund and
possibility of translation. Rejecting the extremes of both linguistic heterogeneity and linguistic universality, I draw on the work of Paul Ricoeur to argue for an understanding of translation as an ethico-political task of crossing between linguistic and religious boundaries.

Translation requires an ethics of hospitality that welcomes the foreign. Put differently, it reads the myth of Babel through the murder of Abel. The myth of Babel leaves individuals scattered and confounded; the murder of Abel suggests that fraternity is an ethical project and not a fact of nature. Translation, then, is a challenge that one must labor or work through, to borrow Freud’s notion of *Durcharbeitung*, where there is some salvaging, but also some loss. In other words, the work of translation is necessarily tied to the work of mourning in the acknowledgment that the will for perfect translation or the nostalgia for pure language must be relinquished.

Translation also demands a politics of recognition that is distinct from both an Enlightenment model of the politics of tolerance as well as a messianic model of the politics of anticipation. Both models, according to Ricoeur, are expressions of the desire for pure language. His account of translation, to the contrary, rejects the extremes of radical heterogeneity and linguistic universality, and, instead, affirms difference, attends to finitude, and presents an ethico-political model of hospitality and recognition.

**Sources**


John Starkey (Oklahoma City University, USA)

*From ‘Mystery and Paradox’ to ‘Conviction and Critique’: Ricoeur with Respect to Philosophic Knowing and Unknowing of God*

It is hard to believe it has been a full 25 years since Dominique Janicaud’s famous protest against what he called (somewhat misleading) the “theological turn” in continental phenomenology—his complaint about the use of phenomenology as a tool for the investigation of epistemological and ontological issues as they may arise from and within the philosophy of religion. But of course, in spite of any such complaint, the output of material on and by Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Greisch, and such related ‘American continental’ figures as Kearney and Caputo, has only increased, decade by decade and indeed year by year. But while it is true that Ricoeur is not missing from this mix, Ricoeur can sometimes be more side-swiped than read head-on in English language articles the field, receiving his full due in but only in books or articles focused on his work alone, or
alone with one other figure (e.g. the relatively recent or recent works by Blundell, Bourgeois [2013], Carter, the volume edited by Dalfert and Block, the volume edited by Hettema and vandeCastelee, Ille, Laughery, Moyaert, Scott-Baumann, Sohn, Stiver). The present proposal, then, is to partially rectify this situation not simply attending to the later thought of Ricoeur, most well known through Critique and Conviction but also by even more by returning to his seminal work on Jaspers and Marcel.

In his work on Jaspers Ricoeur was already taking over and making his own Jaspers’ re-worked Kierkegaardian notion of a paradoxical “leap of faith” in which an un-grounded “leap” combined with a conviction about the “Encompassing,” and in the parallel work on Marcel Ricoeur was taking over and making his own Marcel’s notion of offering “testimony”

Beartiz Contreras Tasso (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile)  
Las repercusiones éticas de una antropología de la fragilidad. Confluencia de Martha Nussbaum y Paul Ricoëur

La interpretación de Aristóteles que Martha Nussbaum desarrolla en su obra La fragilidad del bien tiene un alcance ético indiscutible, que pone de relieve la encrucijada entre la autonomía racional y el componente emocional de toda decisión. Ella intenta mostrar los elementos constitutivos de una tensión del obrar humano que revelan la fragilidad inherente a la acción. Su lectura reivindica, sin embargo, el rol inductivo del deseo como elemento no intelectual de la deliberación que posee un tipo particular de “saber” decisivo en la acción moral. El desafío ético es justamente alcanzar un equilibrio entre estos componentes disímiles e irrenunciables del obrar: la deliberación y el factor desiderativo que lo desencadena. Considerando que se trata de una intersección frágil e incierta y cuya vulnerabilidad es irreductible en la vida buena, como mostrará Nussbaum, dicha paradoja le permite revalorizar la phrónesis aristotélica en su función articuladora tanto de las fuentes incontrolables de la dimensión trágica de lo humano, como de los elementos arraigados en la condición corporal ligada a las pasiones y de los factores ligados a las exterioridades de la fortuna. En este punto, Nussbaum y Ricoëur alcanzan una convergencia notable al revelar la fragilidad como clave antropológica central que, paradojalmente, permite fortalecer la dimensión ética de la acción a través de los recursos de la racionalidad práctica que orientan la vida buena.

Ricoëur, por su parte, indagará acerca del anclaje voluntario e involuntario (Filosofía de la voluntad) de las capacidades del hombre capaz, identificando en dicho seguimiento fenomenológico el rasgo central de la desproporción constitutiva de la existencia humana, que resulta determinante para la comprensión de la fragilidad de la acción (Lo voluntario y lo involuntario). Esta pesquisa encuentra en la afectividad un lugar eminente para dar cuenta de dicha fragilidad (Finitud y culpabilidad): “Si una filosofía del sentimiento fuese posible, el sentimiento es el que tendría que expresar la fragilidad de este ser intermedio que somos”. Según nuestra hipótesis de lectura, explorar los elementos incoativos de una ética de la acción cimentados en dicha afectividad es un aporte antropológico decisivo para la comprensión del alcance ontológico de la dialéctica de actividad y pasividad, la cual constituye un horizonte tácito de la ética desplegada en la hermenéutica del sí mismo (Sí mismo como otro). Además, Ricoëur como Nussbaum valora la reserva de sabiduría trágica que Aristóteles explora en la Poética, asumiendo la irreductibilidad del conflicto constitutivo de la acción (Sí mismo como otro).

En suma, esta intersección de enfoques de Nussbaum y Ricœur en relación a la cuestión de la fragilidad contribuye a: 1) la reposición crítica del objetivo de la vida buena, como criterio teleológico de la acción; 2) la revalorización contemporánea de la dimensión afectiva como factor insoslayable de la racionalidad práctica; 3) mostrar el rol instructivo del componente trágico de la acción, como desafío ético de la condición humana intermedia, desde su base ontoantropológica. Finalmente, este balance crítico postula la relación de continuidad del nivel ontológico del deseo –en cuanto deseo de ser–, en el despliegue de la dimensión propiamente ética, permitiendo hacer del factor desiderativo un contrapeso -phronético- a la valoración exagerada del nivel normativo, cuya relevancia indiscutible en nuestro tiempo, que Ricœur reconoce en la huella kantiana, deja, sin embargo, un vacío del sentido ontológico fundante de la acción humana.

Azadeh Thiriez-Arjangi (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales / Fonds Ricoeur, France)

Du mal à la psychanalyse jusqu’à la reconnaissance

La question du mal, comme un leitmotiv au cœur de la philosophie ricœurienne a eu un impact majeur sur toute la pensée du philosophe. La place occupée par la pensée d’Eliade et notamment par son Traité d’histoire des religions dans l’article capital de Ricœur à savoir : Le symbole donne à penser est connue de tous. C’est la réflexion sur le problème du mal, en passant entre autre par la pensée de Mircea Eliade sur la question des symboles qui a conduit Ricœur jusqu’à la psychanalyse et lui a permis de réfléchir sur les concepts liés à cette dernière dont le complexe d’Œdipe et les concepts tels que l’identification et la sublimation. Ces concepts ont laissé un résidu indéniable sur les lectures ricœuriennes futures, les résidus qui ont poursuivi le philosophe jusqu’à son Parcours de la reconnaissance.

Cristina Vendra (Università degli studi di Chieti, Italy / École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, France)

Reconfiguring the Social Bond: Paul Ricoeur’s Phenomenology of Imagination across Tradition and Innovation

Even if in Paul Ricoeur’s published works there is no comprehensive development on the philosophical problem of imagination, this topic is apparently central to his inquiries. Through reference to his thought, my essay seeks to extend the implications of his phenomenology of imagination for rethinking the social bond. The main references are Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, which were delivered at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1975. The analysis focuses on the development of productive imagination and its positive function within the social lifeworld.

First, my research examines human’s creativity in connection with its ambivalent nature disproportioned between the pole of the finite and infinite. Creativity is a fundamental anthropological concept: through the creation of symbols, humans create a theoretical framework of sense which is fundamental to founding the models of thinking and acting of the practical life. On the one hand, the finitude of existence arises in our finite biological necessities. Moreover, the person is a historically situated being who assumes a sense of reality on the basis of the tradition in which he or she is born and has a knowledge that is necessarily potential. On the other hand, each person’s identity is an open task, a never ending enterprise of innovation, a matter of transformation, creating a path of infinitude. Imagination deals then with the dynamic constitution of human being.
The person’s existence is rooted in the social world. On the collective level, imagination is constitutive of social reality and is shaped into two imaginative directions: ideology and utopia. Both refer to the common ground of collective identity. Like human nature, the development of social reality is paradoxical. It is a dialectical process between the experience of belonging and the power of distanciation, between the symbolic mediation of ideology and the projective function of utopia. The two positive roles of ideology, i.e., the legitimation of authority and the integration of a human group, cannot be separated from the utopia’s aim to give alternatives to the existing social model. Social imaginary is interconnected with history.

In today’s era of globalization, the complex question of the reconsideration of the social bond arises with a strong sense of urgency. It is in this context that the phenomenology of productive imagination, both in its ideological and utopian functions, can play a decisive role in reshaping the practical field from within. As never before, today’s social reality shows up as a fragile space in which the challenge is to find the right balance between maintaining and transgressing, between the loyalty to one’s own tradition and utopia’s fictions which provide new dimensions of reality. The claim is that finally we should not restrict ourselves to the settled tradition, as Ricoeur’s work moves us across boundaries and opens a post-critical social theory. Undertaking the attainment of this theory is an arduous project with a limited range of possibility that can never be completely accomplished and needs our constant effort to protect the essential value of our cohabiting together.

Robert Vosloo (Stellenbosch University, South Africa)
Mutual Recognition, Threshold Crossing, and Embodied Performativity: An Engagement with the work of Paul Ricoeur and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela

This paper brings the thought of Paul Ricoeur on mutual recognition into conversation with the work of the South African psychologist and public intellectual Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela. The paper proceeds in three parts.

The first part briefly highlights the way in which Ricoeur’s understanding of mutual recognition can be placed between what he calls the prose of justice and the poetics of agape. In The Course of Recognition Ricoeur discusses, in conversation with the work of Axel Honneth, capacities associated with the struggle for recognition such as self-confidence, respect and self-esteem. Yet Ricoeur also registers some uneasiness with some of the claims associated with the idea of a “struggle” for recognition. Hence his important question: “When … does a subject deem him- or herself to be truly recognized? (The Course of Recognition, p. 217). One can ask whether this question of Ricoeur displays the necessary sensitivity towards those people in our global world that experiences daily the “underside of Modernity” (cf. Enrique Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation). Yet the force of the question posed by Ricoeur remains, as well as his attempt to propose an alternative that is to be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, “based on symbolic mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchange” (The Course of Recognition, p. 219).

The second part of the paper introduces the work of Gobodo-Madikizela (who was officially involved with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and has written extensively on themes such as memory, trauma, and forgiveness). The paper indicates important resonances between her work and the gist and direction of Ricoeur’s argument on mutual recognition and the importance of gestures. For instance, in her book A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Woman Confronts the Legacy of Apartheid, Gobodo-Madikizela describes her interviews with
Eugene de Kock (also nick-named “Prime Evil”), the notorious commanding officer of the apartheid regime’s death squads. During one of the interviews Gobodo-Madikizela reached out, in a compassionate gesture, to touch De Kock’s hand. She describes her own mixed emotions as she realized that she was touching the physical body that had made evil happen. In her perceptive reflection on this unsettling incident, Gobodo-Madikizela remarks: “My action may well have been the first time a black person touched him out of compassion. ... Perhaps de Kock recognized my touch as a kind of threshold crossing, a new experience for him” (A Human Being Died That Night, p.42).

The third part of the paper draws on the work of Ricoeur and Gobodo-Madikizela to argue that a responsible and hopeful engagement with traumatic memories and historical injustices points towards the importance of gestures as part of an embodied performance of threshold crossings. The argument is extended by bringing the notion of embodied performativity (cf. Judith Butler’s Notes towards a performative theory of assembly) into conversation with the need for a carnal hermeneutics (cf. Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor (eds.), Carnal Hermeneutics).

Andrew Walters (University of Hull, UK)

Paul Ricoeur’s Social Philosophy and the Symbolism of Atonement in the Architecture of Weightlessness

A product of an ongoing doctoral research project, this paper will endeavour demonstrate that the symbolic hierarchy that appears in the early philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, can be evidenced by its speculative application to surface cultural phenomena, when it is viewed as a social philosophy. Applying this speculative hierarchy to architecture, we will hope to show that relationships between surface cultural phenomena and primary symbols such as atonement, salvation and sin can be productively interpreted via a hermeneutic interpretation of cultural myths.

In the first section of the paper - based on the critique and reconstruction of Ricoeur envisaged by Marcelo - we will demonstrate that Ricoeur’s early philosophy whilst ontologically unsound and academically overly fluid, still holds value when considered in isolation as a social philosophy, a claim that we shall attempt to demonstrate by drawing from the discipline of architecture.

The second section of the paper, will initially demonstrate Ricoeur’s relationship with architecture by reference to his text Architecture et Narrativité, before exploring the accessibility of the symbolism of architecture as analogous to the symbol of Sin as it appears in The Symbolism of Evil. To exemplify this analogous relationship, we will propose the framework for a short study into the symbolism of ‘Weightlessness’ - defined as architecture which visibly demonstrates an attempt to circumvent Euclidean geometry and the strictures of gravity – to demonstrate the viability of this Ricoeurian social philosophy.

The final stage of the paper will show the product of this framework when applied to a specific example of weightless architecture. This stage will examine in detail the way in which one specific weightless surface symbol, can be deciphered through the reading of a cultural narrative (a myth) to reveal an intrinsic relationship with the primary symbol of atonement – thereby demonstrating the application the framework and laying open the symbolic hierarchy to speculation over its relationship with cultural self-understanding, where the paper will conclude.
Tomoaki Yamada (Faculté Libre de Théologie Protestante de Paris, France)

Demeurer vivant jusqu’à la mort, la pensée de Paul Ricœur aux dernières années

Ricœur a tracé une ligne de démarcation nette entre son œuvre philosophique et sa conviction confessionnelle.1 En même temps, il sait combien pour lui les limites entre ces deux registres sont difficiles et complexes. La question de l’articulation du philosophique et du théologique est ainsi poursuivie jusqu’à la fin de sa vie. Un des enjeux de cette question est celui de la compatibilité entre ces deux démarches. Il en émerge notamment une attitude agnostique qui travaille l’œuvre posthume de Vivant jusqu’à la mort.2

Dans le Fragment 0(1),3 elle fructifie sous l’égide de l’expression d’un «philosophe sans absolu», emprunté de Pierre Thévenaz.4 Ricœur se l’applique à lui-même comme une sorte d’autodésignation. Cette expression n’indique pas seulement l’affirmation de l’attitude agnostique, mais elle est aussi située à un autre pôle d’une identité conflictuelle que celui existant en tant que le «chrétien d’expression philosophique». Cette tension conflictuelle intime est le processus d’ouvrir sans cesse une voie vers l’autarcie et l’autosuffisance de l’investigation philosophique, confirmée indirectement par la motivation de rendre raison de la foi biblique. En considérant la réception thévenazienne chez Ricœur, l’attitude agnostique est incarnée dans la résistance existentielle de celui qui cherche à être pleinement vivant jusqu’au dernier moment.

Ce thème de la volonté d’exister s’affirme dans le dernier Fragment consacré à Jacques Derrida,5 en disant «demeurer vivant jusqu’à la mort». Il propose un parcours difficile de réconciliation entre le refus et le consentement à la mort.6 Deux lignes de pensées sur l’imaginaire de la survie sont particulièrement synthétisées avec ce parcours. L’un est le «détachement parfait» en menant à son terme le « travail de deuil » sans céder à l’imaginaire des morts qu’exprime habituellement la survie.7 Ricœur en arrive au transfert aux autres de l’amour de la vie.8 La transmission de la vie passe par la « trace écrite », laissée comme témoignage d’un ayant été, aux autres, aux survivants.9 L’autre est la « confiance dans le souci de Dieu » exprimée par le schématisme de la « mémoire de Dieu ». Elle justifie l’existence humaine par la grâce.10 Cette existence est confiée

3 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
5 VM, p. 130.
6 Voir F. Worms, «Vivant jusqu’à la mort...et non pas pour la mort», Esprit, mars-avril, 2006, pp. 300-311.
7 Ibid., p. 75.
8 VM, p. 76.
9 Ibid., p. 76.
10 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
aux mémoires des survivants après la mort.11 Dans le dernier Fragment, Ricœur l’exprime en d’autre mots : « make a difference in God (fait une différence en Dieu) ».12

Afin d’éclairer l’agnosticisme philosophique chez Ricœur, il faut nous confronter à l’affirmation de « demeurer vivant jusqu’à la mort ». La présente contribution se donne pour but de la considérer à travers l’œuvre posthume qu’est Vivant jusqu’à la mort.

—END OF ABSTRACTS—

11 « Je remets mon esprit à Dieu pour les autres. Ce lien, cette transmission a son sens au-delà de moi et un sens y est caché auquel Dieu peut-être m’associera d’une façon que je ne peux imaginer; reste : demeurer vivant jusqu’à la mort. », VM, p.130.